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As I reach the point, which for so many years seemed unreachable, I cannot but reflect 
on the four years that have brought me here. They were not easy. When the initial excitement 
about starting a new job in a foreign country faded away, the task ahead of me appeared to be 
insurmountable. Not having followed the CentER Master’s program, I spent the first two 
years of my Ph.D. earning the required 40 credit points of course work. At the same time, 
from the pile of papers that flooded me desk I strived to form a coherent picture of the state-
of-the-art literature and identify a gap I could try to fill. The third year was hardly a relief, as I 
entered the laborious process of fieldwork and data gathering. The final year was not much 
better either. Looking for a job and aiming to finish my dissertation in time, I found the 24 
hours that a day offered insufficient. It is thus no surprise that throughout the four years, times 
of discouragement were not rare. Along the way, I was faced with a number of decisions, 
many of which I took without a clear idea of their consequences. When I look back, therefore 
it seems almost a miracle that finally all ends came together to a successful completion. 
Needless to say, the support I received from numerous people was invaluable.  
Undoubtedly, the person I have learned most from is Niels Noorderhaven. When in the 
fall of 2001 I approached him with a question whether he would be willing to consider taking 
on a role of my PhD supervisor, I was almost surprised when I received a positive answer. 
Looking back, I cannot but think that in agreeing to do it, Niels took a great leap of faith. 
Three years later, in my dissertation I argue that “trust in organizational settings requires a 
‘probabilistic leap of faith, which may lead the trustor astray’ (McEvilly et al., 2003: 98), as 
the attributes of trustworthiness are not easily observable (Barney & Hansen, 1994). It is 
possible that the amount of trust endowed on a trustee exceeds the actual level of his 
trustworthiness (Barney & Hansen, 1994).” I can only hope that this was not Niels’s 
experience. On my part, I have benefited tremendously from his knowledge, insight and 
experience. I have greatly appreciated his keen involvement in supervising my work as well 
as the candor of his feedback and expeditiousness with which he provided it. Finally, his 
sober perception of reality and a balanced set of priorities have been a source of 
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constructive criticism with me through the courses they taught and otherwise. Who I am as a 
researcher today, is largely a product of the mentoring I received from these individuals. Their 
support and helpful advise in the decisions concerning my career in academia and future job 
choices have been very important to me. 
 My time in Tilburg would not have been what it was without my friends and 
colleagues, many of whom qualify as both. Dorota and Anna, my compatriots in the 
Department of Organization and Strategy, my office mates at various time periods, shared 
with me in the experience of being molded into a researcher by the hard press of CentER’s 
new Ph.D. in Business. Through better or worse, their friendship and companionship made 
my stay far away from home so much easier and more enjoyable. Greg, Greg and Pawel, three 
other members of the Polish ‘clique’, shared their intellectual and physical stamina with me 
when I needed it most. As initiators of countless activities of sportive, cultural or culinary 
character, they made sure that my weekends in Tilburg were never boring. Rekha, my 
housemate and fellow student of trust, is a living proof that friendship is not constrained by 
cultural boundaries. I offer to her my highest appreciation for faithfully bearing with me 
through the good and bad times of the last two years of my life and patiently putting up with 
the challenges of living with me. I thank Carla my fellow jazz dancer and a great friend, with 
whom a conversation is never finished, for her great care, encouragement and endless fun. 
Finally, I want to thank all those colleagues and friends who have been a very important part 
of the last four years of my life; Rian, Renata, Jana, Jana, Fleur, Vera, Sjoerd, Arjen, Eric, 
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1.1. Knowledge transfer in alliances: opportunities and threats 
 
 Competitive advantage of an organization has its source in the idiosyncratic resources 
it holds (Barney, 1991). To sustain such advantage, new resources need to be acquired and the 
existing ones further developed (Kogut & Zander, 1992). For businesses that are not capable 
of creating all the necessary resources on their own, collaboration is often the only way of 
survival and growth (Dussauge, Garrette & Mitchel, 2000). Learning in an interorganizational 
context involves management of three knowledge processes: transfer, transformation and 
harvesting (Tiemessen, Lane, Crossan, & Inkpen, 1996). While transfer refers to “the 
movement of knowledge between parent firms” be it directly or via an alliance (Tiemessen et 
al., 1996: 387), transformation involves creation of new knowledge through the alliance’s 
independent activities and harvesting the flow of the newly created knowledge from the 
alliance back to the parent organizations (Berdrow & Lane, 2003: 17). Although all three 
processes are undeniably important, this dissertation focuses on knowledge transfer only and 
accordingly terms like interorganizational “learning”, “knowledge transfer” and “knowledge 
flows” are used interchangeably.  
 Strategic alliances are considered to be a particularly suitable context for partners to 
access and share each other’s knowledge-based, organizationally embedded, i.e., tacit 
resources that lie at the core of competitive advantage (Hall, 1992; Inkpen, 1997; Powell, 
Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Yet tacit knowledge, being unarticulated and highly intuitive, 
does not yield itself easily to transfer (Martin & Salomon, 2003; Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 
2000; Polanyi, 1962). Therefore, understanding the process of inter-organizational tacit 
knowledge flows and factors that affect that process is key from the point of view of 
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sustaining and developing organization’s competitive advantage. This issue constitutes the 
focus of this dissertation. 
 Yet, transfer of knowledge between alliance partners creates not only opportunities for 
the cooperating firms (Hamel 1991; Kogut 1988)—knowledge sharing in strategic alliances 
involves considerable risk as well. There is risk of expropriation, if one of the partners should 
use the rightfully obtained knowledge opportunistically, in ways contrary to the letter or spirit 
of the alliance contract. There is also risk of knowledge leakage, where the partners, 
intentionally or unintentionally, acquire knowledge that was not intended to be shared. Even if 
the alliance partner is not a potential competitor (i.e., the linkage is of vertical rather than 
horizontal nature), the risk of spillover may still be high, if such competitors are part of the 
partner’s network. In such case core competence can leak to a competitor indirectly via the 
alliance partner (Nooteboom, 1999). Finally, since the value of tacit knowledge cannot be 
reliably evaluated prior to its transfer (Hennart, 1988), partners may engage in (costly) 
transfer of knowledge that does not meet their expectations.1 Given these risks, trust between 
partners emerges as an important factor affecting their mutual knowledge transfers. Trust 
mitigates partners’ fear of the other’s opportunistic behavior (Kale et al., 2000; Dyer & Chu, 
2003) and thus increases their willingness to grant each other access to knowledge (Dirks & 
Ferrin, 2001; Kale et al., 2000). Partner trustworthiness can also be used by the knowledge 
acquirer as a proxy for quality of the knowledge whereby the need to check its authenticity 
and veracity is decreased (Bhatt, 2000). 
 Besides granting an opportunity for partners to access each other’s knowledge, 
strategic alliances are also argued to constitute a context, which is highly conducive to skill 
building and knowledge sharing (Powell et al., 1996). From the point of view of social 
learning theory, learning is situated in the context of social activity and practice, (Plaskoff, 
2003; Elkjaer, 1999, 2003) and is accomplished through “observation and emulation of skilled 
practitioners and socialization” (Easterby-Smith & Arujo, 1999: 5). Learning is thus a process 
of social construction (Brown & Duguid, 1991) that depends crucially on the conditions under 
which it takes place (Powell et al., 1996). The social activity of learning is fraught with risks. 
Undertaking learning may require admitting an error or asking for help, which can signal 
incompetence and negatively affect one’s image (Edmondson, 1999). Brown & Starkey 
(2000) argue that individuals may resist learning also because it might challenge their existing 
                                                
1 Involvement of go-betweens can be a solution to the valuation problems. Having established relationships with both 
partners, go-betweens can help them assess the value of each others’ knowledge before they commit significant 
resources to the transfer (Nooteboom, 1999). 
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concepts of self. Finally, individuals who view knowledge as a source of power may resist 
sharing it (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Szulanski, 1996) or even erect barriers to prevent its 
incidental leakage. Trust between individuals can help them be more open to the influence 
exerted by others, feel more comfortable admitting need for learning and more secure in 
sharing their knowledge.  
 
1.2. Trust: an important yet illusive factor 
 
 Admittedly, the positive impact of trust on knowledge sharing (McEvilly, Perrone, & 
Zaheer, 2003) in both intra-organizational (e.g., Kostova, 1999; Makino & Inkpen, 2003; Tsai 
& Ghoshal, 1998) and inter-organizational context (Geringer, 1988; Dyer & Chu, 2003; 
Inkpen, 1997; Hedlund, 1994) has been suggested in prior research. Yet, conceptualizing and 
empirically tapping interorganizational trust is far from straightforward. Interorganizational 
relations constitute a very specific context where those who frame the strategic intentions of 
collaborating organizations are often distinct from those who actually implement them—a 
consideration that is rarely reflected in research on strategic alliances (Salk & Simonin, 2003). 
A variety of theoretical and empirical approaches to interorganizational trust are to be found 
in the literature; Chapter 2 of this dissertation presents a critical review of research in the area. 
It also proposes an alternative conceptualization of interorganizational trust, and a 
measurement method that relies thereupon. In accordance with extant literature (for example 
Currall & Inkpen, 2002), chapter 2 assumes knowledge sharing to be one of the dimensions of 
inter-partner trust.  
 However, although knowledge sharing is without a doubt a manifestation and, thus, a 
good proxy for trust in a relationship2, the two are conceptually distinct and the strong 
positive relationship between them, though intuitive, should not be taken for granted. In 
particular, in an interorganizational context where the inherently individual level concepts of 
trust and knowledge sharing can not be applied indiscriminately, there is need to understand 
exactly why high level of trust between partners leads to greater knowledge transfer between 
them. To that end, this dissertation moves beyond the familiar, yet relatively ambiguous, 
concept of interorganizational trust and identifies two distinct levels of that trust. It formulates 
                                                
2 Most studies that consider open communication as a dimension of trust, focus on exchange of partner-specific 
information between partners (e.g., opinions, decisions, plans, programs, expectations, goals, motives or evaluation 
criteria (e.g., Currall & Judge, 1995; Barcley & Smith, 1997)). The relevance of substantive knowledge flows in this 




a model illuminating mechanisms through which trust at each of those levels affects 
knowledge transfer in a unique way. In specific Chapter 3 develops the model theoretically, 
while Chapters 4 and 5 undertake to test its predictions. All the three chapters consider 
interorganizational knowledge transfer to be an outcome of inter-partner trust (rather than a 
dimension or a proxy, as is the case in chapter 2).   
 
 
1.3. Unit of analysis: joint venture 
 
 Strategic alliances are not a homogenous category; they encompass a broad range of 
contractual forms, from arm’s-length contracts to equity joint ventures (Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999). Some contractual forms are argued to be better suited for the transfer of tacit 
knowledge between partners than others. According to transaction cost theory, the market for 
tacit knowledge is likely to fail since its value cannot be reliably evaluated before its transfer 
(Hennart, 1988). Therefore, equity joint ventures (JVs), by combining features of markets and 
hierarchies, are considered to be superior conduits of tacit knowledge compared to contract-
based agreements (Gulati, 1995; Kogut, 1988; Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996). In 
particular the necessity to replicate difficult to grasp, company specific, experiential 
knowledge is posited to be the reason for markets being displaced by joint ventures.  
 Similarly, representatives of the resource-based view argue that equity JVs are “more 
effective conduits for the transfer of complex capabilities than are contract-based agreements” 
(Mowery et al., 1996). This is because success of tacit knowledge exchanges depends strongly 
on the quality of communication between the partners and their “intimacy” level (Szulanski, 
1996). JVs, by offering a high level of intimacy and intensity of interactions between partners, 
are, therefore, especially suitable for transferring organizationally embedded, highly 
ambiguous, tacit knowledge (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998).  
 For all the above reasons, equity JVs were chosen to be the empirical context in which 
this dissertation’s predictions regarding the effect of inter-partner trust on tacit knowledge 
transfers, are tested. The term “joint venture” is used to refer to all equity alliances, whether 
they involve creation of a separate entity or a minority stake held by one company in another 
(cf. Hennart, 1988). Attempts to empirically investigate the effect of trust on 
interorganizational learning have been few so far. Moreover, they do not always corroborate 
the theoretical predictions. Lane, Salk and Lyles (2001), for example, in their study of 
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Hungarian international joint ventures (IJVs) found inter-partner trust to be positively 
associated with IJV performance rather than directly with learning. Predictions of the model 
proposed in chapter 3 are tested on a sample of 149 international joint ventures operating in 
Poland. Chapters 4 and 5 present the results of these analyses.  
 
 
1.4. Empirical context: a transitional economy 
 
Most research on the inter-partner learning in strategic alliances has been carried out 
in the context of developed market economies. Generalizability of the findings to the 
transitional economy context has not been ascertained. Yet, the economic policies of the past 
have left a profound imprint on those economies, causing some significant contextual 
differences between established market economies and those in transition (Steensma & Lyles, 
2000). Lack of research on interorganizational learning in the context of transitional 
economies is particularly taunting, since inter-partner learning in this context appears to be 
especially important.  
First, the political and economic transformation that affected Central and Eastern 
European countries in the early 1990’s has left many of the local enterprises impotent of 
competing under free market circumstances. They “developed in economies with 
monopolistic, state-dominated industries and are not likely to have the management, 
manufacturing, and marketing capabilities needed to survive in a market-based economy” 
(Lane at al., 2001: 1140). The lack of skills necessary to compete in a free-market economy is 
particularly serious considering that a number of these countries, Poland included, have just 
joined the European Union. In order to be competitive in the common market, the local 
companies need to catch up with their European rivals in terms of new technologies and 
market-oriented management practices. In that context collaboration with a foreign partner is 
considered to be an effective learning strategy (Child & Markoczy, 1993; Markoczy, 1993). 
Transition-economy organizations view foreign partners as rich reservoirs of new 
competencies and tend thus tend to be more appreciative of the knowledge supplied by the 
foreign partner compared to local firms in Western economies who “have historical 
confidence in their administrative and managerial heritages” (Lyles & Salk, 1996: 898). In 
fact, the survival of the transition economy IJV has been found to depend critically on the 
continued learning from the foreign parents (Lane et al., 2001: 1140).  
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Learning in transitional economy JVs seems to be of high relevance also from the 
foreign partner perspective. Growing competition in the maturing markets forces Western 
multinationals to expand into the transitional economies of Eastern Europe. Problems in 
navigating those uncertain markets incite the multinationals to seek local partners, to supply 
them with valuable local knowledge about government relations, laws and customs (Steensma 
& Lyles, 2000). Finally, international joint ventures between local and foreign partners and 
the inter-partner learning that they enable are also important from the point of view of 
transitional economies as a whole. Such IJVs are posited to be beneficial to the transitioning 
economies not only because of their positive effect on economic stability and global 
competitiveness but also because of the role models and insight into management imperatives 
they provide (Steensma & Lyles, 2000). For all these reasons, a transitional economy context, 
such as Polish, appears to be a very suitable empirical setting for the investigation of 
interorganizational knowledge transfers between alliance partners. 
Tacit knowledge transfers between IJV partners in this context are also likely to be of 
special relevance. The Marxist ideology, under the influence of which the former communist 
economies operated, stressed the importance of technical skills and production output. 
Technology and technical education were thus given priority over marketing and management 
skills (Steensma & Lyles, 2000). Consequently, while the post-communist economies can 
boast the highest concentration of well-trained engineers in the world (Steensma & Lyles, 
2000), their marketing and management skills are greatly underdeveloped (Child & 
Markoczy, 1993). The skill gap between the foreign and the local partner in terms of 
managerial knowledge is thus likely to be great (Steensma & Lyles, 2000). Yet, compared to 
technical knowledge, acquiring new managerial skills is much more difficult because of the 
cognitive and behavioral change that it requires (Lane, Salk & Lyles, 2001). In line with that 
Shenkar & Li (1999) argue that compared to manufacturing and production process 
knowledge, management skills are highly tacit and socially embedded, while technological, 
product development, and marketing knowledge falls somewhere in between (Lane, Salk & 
Lyles, 2001).  Therefore, learning between a transitional economy partner and a foreign 
partner would likely involve more transfer of tacit rather than explicit knowledge. 
Considering all of the above, Poland appears to be an appropriate context for investigating not 






1.5. Research method: survey 
 
The data for the purpose of this research project were collected by means of a survey 
conducted in the fall of 2002 and spring of 2003.  Survey is a research strategy that allows for 
relatively systematic and standardized collection of information (Rossi, Wright, & Anderson, 
1983) by way of direct contact with the research objects (Warwick & Liniger, 1975). This is 
usually accomplished by means of questionnaires and/or interview schedules (Warwick & 
Liniger, 1975), which can be implemented in face-to-face contact, by phone, telephone, mail 
or internet (McGivern, 2003). The survey used to collect data for the purpose of this work was 
designed according to the Tailored Design Approach (Dillman, 2000). This approach can be 
shortly summarized as “the development of survey procedures that create respondent trust and 
perception of increased rewards and reduced costs for being a respondent, which take into 
account features of the survey situation and have as their goal the overall reduction of survey 
error” (Dillman, 2000: 27). 
 The survey method was suitable in the context of this doctoral research for a number 
of reasons. First and most importantly, the concepts subject to investigation were for the most 
part intangible in nature. Similar to most variables in social sciences, many of the constructs 
that constitute the theoretical core of this dissertation, are not directly observable. Measuring 
such illusive, intangible concepts poses a challenge, as established measures are often 
unavailable (DeVellis, 1991) or unsatisfactory. In such cases the only way to assess a 
construct is to develop customized scales—special measurement instruments made up of 
items designed to reveal the level of the latent, theoretical variables (DeVellis, 1991). A 
survey method allows for obtaining data on thus developed scales from a large sample of 
respondents. 
 Second, a survey allows for gathering data on a relatively large sample of research 
objects (McGivern, 2003), i.e., quantitative data (Warwick & Liniger, 1975). Such data are 
considered to be useful for measuring, quantifying, validating and testing hypotheses and 
theories (McGivern, 2003), which was the aim of the empirical investigation at hand. In fact, 
hypothesis testing and, more generally, causal explanation is considered to be one of the 
primary objectives that a survey can help accomplish (Warwick & Liniger, 1975). Although 
surveys provide information on the current state or reality only, thus making inference with 
respect to causal connections more difficult, the data they provide are accurate and reliable 
and allow for generation of generalizable results (Warwick & Liniger, 1975).  
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 Finally, surveys, and self-completion surveys in particular, are appropriate when a 
widely dispersed sample is targeted (McGivern, 2003). This in combination with the 
substantially lower costs, compared to methods that require participation of an interviewer 
(McGivern, 2003), made the survey method particularly attractive in the context of this 
research project. The international joint ventures investigated were dispersed throughout the 
country; reaching them in person would involve a considerable additional investment of time 





 Summarizing, this dissertation investigates the effect of interorganizational trust on 
tacit knowledge transfers between alliance partners. To that end, a theoretical model is 
developed and testable hypotheses are formulated. These are subsequently tested on a sample 
of 149 Poland-based joint ventures surveyed in the fall of 2002 and spring of 2003. The value 
added of this work lies in the following. First, the role of interorganizational trust in 
stimulating interorganizational knowledge flows is theoretically elucidated through a two-
level approach. The propositions thus put forward are subsequently tested empirically. 
Second, for each level of analysis distinctly types of trust are identified and argued to be 
particularly relevant. This constitutes a basis for a new approach to empirical measurement of 
interorganizational trust as demonstrated in the dissertation. Third, this work contributes to 
our understanding of inter-partner learning in alliances, an issue of high strategic relevance 
for many organizations. It further provides insights into such processes in the context of a 
transitional economy. Finally besides theoretical contribution, this work also has practical 
implications. Although it has been argued that the level trust can be influenced by managers’ 
actions (cf. Parkhe, 1998a,b), our understanding of mechanisms that companies can use to 
build and maintain trusting relationships is up till now is very limited, especially in the 
context of international JVs (cf. Inkpen and Currall, 1997). Therefore, insight into the 
mechanisms through which interpartner trust is formed at both levels, can become a basis for 
formulating strategies for fostering trust with the aim to achieve a superior learning.  
 Chapters 2 through 4 of this dissertation are a result of joint work with Niels 
Noorderhaven. Some overlaps between the chapters will be encountered and are due to the 
fact that each of them constitutes a separate and independent paper, which has been or will be 
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submitted for publication in the near future. In specific Chapter 2 will be published in the 
forthcoming (in 2005) “Handbook of Trust Research” edited by Aks Zaheer and Reinhard 
Bachmann. The pilot study preceding the collection of data for this dissertation has been 











































Levels of interorganizational trust: 
conceptual and empirical considerations 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
 The notion of trust has received increasing attention in recent years. It is pointed to as 
an important factor for understanding human nature and exchange relationships of market 
participants. In particular, trust between partners is considered to be an important variable 
affecting interorganizational cooperation (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Madhok, 1995). Yet, 
interorganizational relations constitute a very specific context where those who frame the 
strategic intentions of collaborating organizations are often distinct from those who actually 
implement them—a consideration that is rarely reflected in research on interorganizational 
alliances (Salk & Simonin, 2003). This consideration should be taken into account in studying 
interorganizational relationships, especially that the differences in the nature and character of 
trust across different levels are to be expected (e.g., Anderson and Narus, 1990; Zaheer, 
Lofstrom, & George, 2002).  
 Yet research on trust in inter-organizational relationships is quite short of studies that 
would go beyond one level of analysis (c.f. Doney and Cannon, 1997). Moreover, the link 
between the different levels of trust analysis is often ignored (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 
1998). Additionally, the few studies that do adopt a multilevel approach to studying 
interorganizational trust differ, often substantially, in how they define levels of trust. This is 
reflected in various empirical treatments of trust at those levels, and consequently in 
inconsistent findings. It is in this context that the issue of alignment between the levels of 
theory and measurement in multilevel empirical studies is raised. In their recent work Currall 
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& Inkpen (2002) point out that a number of studies that attribute individual attitude (i.e., of a 
key informant) to the firm are in fact marked by misspecification (Currall & Inkpen, 2002). 
In light of the above, this chapter has two aims. First, we explore the different ways in 
which levels of trust in interorganizational relationships have been conceptualized in the 
literature. To that end, we systematize and critically evaluate research on the levels of trust so 
far. Additionally, we propose a new approach to conceptualizing the levels of 
interorganizational trust, which takes into consideration the differential role of various types 
of organizational actors in the enactment of interorganizational relationships. Zaheer et al. 
(2002: 4) posit that “there is need to understand if, and how, interpersonal trust across 
organizational boundaries of individuals at different hierarchical levels differs in nature, 
causes and consequences.” As we will further argue, trust at top management level is 
qualitatively different in its sources and outcomes from trust at the level of lower-level 
managers and employees. While, top-management level trust influences the goals and 
parameters of the interorganizational cooperation, trust between lower-level managers and 
employees working within the bounds of these parameters affects the extent to which the 
goals are met. 
Second, we critically review Currall and Inkpen’s (2002) claim of misaligned studies. 
We take issue with the conclusion that the solution to the problem lies in better data, as 
obtaining such data, particularly for a large scale study, is often simply not possible. We argue 
that the problem of misalignment does not only result from the shortcomings of the empirical 
tools used but also from the existing conceptualizations of levels of interorganizational trust. 
We demonstrate that the two-level conceptualization of interorganizational trust, as proposed 
in this chapter, helps to overcome the limitation imposed by the availability of a single 
organizational informant.  The approach hinges on the assumption that trust at different levels 
is likely to come about in a different way. We posit that sources of trust can be used as 
indicators of the presence of trust. Moreover, since the sources of trust at the different levels 
can be argued to be quite distinct, even a single informant can (relatively) objectively assess 
their presence in an interorganizational context. We provide an illustration of our approach, 
which focuses on the information sharing dimension on trust (cf. Currall & Inkpen, 2002). 
In short the contribution we hope to make with this study is threefold. First, we 
systematize and evaluate the extant approaches to conceptualizing levels of 
interorganizational trust. Second, we propose a new conceptualization of the levels of trust. 
Third, we address the empirical issues related to measuring trust at the different levels both in 
the extant and the proposed conceptualization. Accordingly, we first critically consider the 
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different approaches to conceptualizing levels of trust. We continue by presenting an 
alternative approach to identifying levels of trust. Next, the empirical issues involved in 
tapping trust at two levels are dealt with and an alternative method is proposed. Finally, we 
provide an empirical illustration, which captures the impact of sources of trust on the extent of 
inter-partner trust at two levels, as reflected in the extent of their mutual knowledge sharing.  
 
 
2.2. Interorganizational trust  
 
 A consensus concerning the definition of interorganizational trust has not been 
reached. Some define it as an attitude, i.e., an expectation of the partner’s reliability with 
regard to his obligations, predictability of behavior, and fairness in actions and negotiations 
while faced with the possibility of behaving opportunistically (cf. Zaheer et al., 1998). Others 
point to the behavioral aspect of trust (e.g., McAllister, 1995), which finds reflection in the 
“decision to rely on another” (Currall and Inkpen, 2002: 484). The definition of trust adopted 
by a given author is closely related to the assumptions s(he) holds with respect to the nature of 
organizational trust. 
Currall and Inkpen (2002), for example, propose a definition of trust, which reflects 
the actual reliance of an organization on a trustee—“the willingness to increase one’s 
vulnerability to another whose behavior is not under one’s control” (Zand, 1972: 230). The 
assumption here appears to be that organizational trust is held by an organization as such, i.e., 
trust is attributed to organization as an entity. Since an attitude (i.e., trusting) is an inherently 
individual-level phenomenon, a definition of trust in terms of observable behavior is 
appropriate because it allows to extend the concept of trust to the level of a group or an 
organization (Currall and Inpen, 2002).  
 Other authors, however, argue that while it is conceptually consistent to view an 
individual both as an origin and an object of trust, the same is not true of an organization 
(Zaheer et al., 1998). Organizations are made up of and managed by individuals (Aulakh, 
Kotabe & Sahay, 1996) through whom inter-firm relations come into effect (Inkpen & 
Currall, 1997; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997). Therefore, it is not an 
organization itself that trusts, but rather the individuals who constitute it.  Such assumption 
concerning organizational trust is in line with an attitudinal definition of organizational trust. 
Although organizations do not have the ability to experience an attitude (Dyer & Chu, 2000, 
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Aulakh et al, 1996; Madhok, 1995), the individual agents that define their behavior do. 
Therefore a definition that views trust as “the subjective probability that one assigns to 
benevolent action by another agent or group of agents” (Nooteboom et al., 1997) is 
appropriate. 
 It is worth emphasizing that the choice of a definition of trust as an attitude or a 
behavior is not simply a theoretical question. Trusting behavior of a party to a relationship 
does not automatically imply the presence of attitudinal trust as the observed trusting behavior 
may be driven by factors other than trust, e.g., a lock-in or dependence on the trustee (cf. 
Nooteboom et al., 1997). Therefore, behavioral trust is a much broader and more ‘messy’ 
concept than attitudinal trust. At the same time attitudinal trust is much more difficult to 
assess, particularly when considered at the organizational level. Since the conceptualization of 
the levels of trust that we propose subsequently hinges strongly on the role of an individual in 
shaping organization’s behavior, for the purpose of this paper we choose to subscribe to the 
attitudinal view of trust. We therefore understand trust to be expressed in the attitudes of 
agents, who may play various roles in their organizations and thus affect organizational 
behavior in different ways.  
 
 
2.3. Levels of interorganizational trust 
 
The primary dimension along which levels of interorganizational trust can be 
distinguished and conceptualized is whether the parties to a trusting relationship are 
individuals or organizations. The question needs to be addressed for both sides of a 
relationship—the trustor and the trustee. Accordingly a 2x2 matrix can be sketched with the 
resulting four theoretical constructs. The majority of the conceptualizations to be found in the 





Levels of interorganizational trust 
 15
Table 2.1. Conceptualizations of interorganizational trust 









INDIVIDUAL Æ INDIVIDUAL 
 
        Zaheer et al. (1998),  
        Zaheer et al. (2002), 
        Jeffries & Reed (2000),  
        Inkpen & Currall (1997) 
 
INDIVIDUAL Æ ORGANIZATION  
 























ORGANIZATION Æ INDIVIDUAL 
 
       Doney & Cannon (1997) 
 
ORGANIZATION Æ ORGANIZATION 
 
        Zaheer et al. (1998),  
        Zaheer et al. (2002), 
        Jeffries & Reed (2000), 
        Doney & Cannon (1997) 
  
In the upper left quadrant—where the trustor and the trustee are individuals—we find 
conceptualizations of what is commonly referred to as interpersonal trust (Zaheer et al., 1998; 
Jeffries and Reed, 2000; Inpen and Currall, 1997). This is the least controversial category as it 
captures trust present between individuals who happen to be members of two different 
organizations. In the lower right quadrant—where both the trustor and the trustee are 
organizations—we find conceptualizations of what is referred to as interorganizational trust 
(Zaheer et al., 1998; Dyer & Chu, 2000; Doney & Cannon, 1997) or organizational trust 
(Jeffries & Reed, 2000). Although most common and conceptually neat it is certainly not the 
only possible conceptualization of inter-organizational trust. In the upper right quadrant—
where the trustor is an individual and the trustee is an organization—we encounter what is 
defined by Inkpen and Currall (1997: 312) as firm-level trust, i.e., a manager’s perception of 
the partner firm trustworthiness. Finally, in the lower left quadrant—where the trustor is an 
organization and the trustee is an individual—a conceptualization of trust where a (buying) 
firm trusts a (supplier) firm’s sales person is to be found (Doney & Cannon, 1997). The latter 
two conceptualizations are by far less frequent than the former two treatments. Especially the 
organization-trusts-individual approach is quite rare.  
 
2.3.1. Critical evaluation 
Conceptualizations that involve an individual as a trustor (i.e., the upper two 
quadrants) are relatively unproblematic. First, there seems to be a widely accepted consensus 
concerning the conceptualization of interpersonal trust. Since both the trustor and the trustee 
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are individuals, the theories of trust at the individual level are fully applicable here. Besides 
the relationship being based in an interorganizational context—the two individuals being 
members of different organizations—there is not much that would make it unique or different. 
Similarly the conceptualization that holds an individual as a trustor and an organization as an 
object of that trust is largely uncontroversial. Doney & Cannon (1997: 36) comment, 
“although some researchers disagree about whether organizations can be targets of trust, a 
large stream of literature emphasizes that people can develop trust in public institutions 
(Lewis & Weigert, 1985) or organizations (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), as well as individuals”. 
Trustworthiness can thus be a quality attributed to an organization (Inkpen & Currall; 1997), 
and consequently one can talk of an individual’s trust in an organization (Doney & Cannon, 
1997). 
In contrast, conceptualizations of trust that involve an organization as a trustor (the 
lower two quadrants) are much more problematic. There are few attempts to conceptually 
tackle the question what it means for an organization to trust. Many authors who adopt the 
organization as the unit of analysis simply apply individual level terminology and logic to the 
organizational level (Zaheer et al., 1998). Zaheer et al. (1998: 142) maintain that theories of 
inter-firm exchange that simply take trust to be a property of organizations, without 
specifying the link between the micro and macro level are inaccurate, as they 
“anthropomorphize the organization”. In the strict sense of the word an organization cannot 
trust, only an individual can (Inkpen & Currall, 1997; Zaheer et al., 1998; Doney & Cannon, 
1997; Dyer & Chu, 2000). Because of that organization-level trust has been frequently 
defined as a shared attitude held collectively by members of a given organization (Zaheer et 
al., 1998; Jeffries & Reed, 2000; Dyer & Chu, 2000). This is quite different from saying that 
an organization trusts (Zaheer et al., 1998).   
The usefulness of such a conceptualization of organizational trust is questionable, 
however. Organizational trust as the shared attitude of individual organization members is 
likely to be heterogeneous, as individuals’ trust may be formed in different ways, be of 
different strength, and have different consequences. Hence, shared attitude of organizational 
members can hardly be considered to be a predictor of organization’s behavior. 
Organizational members collectively do not undertake any action. First, it is usually only the 
boundary spanners of the organizations that interact with each other, rather than all members 
of the organizations. Consequently, including trust of the non-boundary-spanning individuals 
in the concept of firm-level trust (in the interorganizational context) seems irrelevant. Second, 
organizational members occupy different positions in organizational hierarchy, which 
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determines their power to influence organization’s actions. Aggregating trust of individuals 
who play different organizational roles in an effort to assess its impact on the overall 
organizational behavior, poses the risk of overlooking the actual causal relationship.  
For example, the structure of interorganizational collaboration is determined largely 
by the organizational decision makers. Therefore it is trust held by those decision makers that 
should be taken as a predictor of the structure rather than the attitude shared by all 
organizational members. It is conceivable for overall organizational trust towards a partner 
organization (or some of its members) to be quite high, while trust held by the decision 
makers would in fact be very low (or vice versa). Similarly, day-to-day implementation of the 
collaboration is a function of trust between operational level employees of the partner 
organizations. Including the top-level trust under the explanatory variable would likely cloud 
the actual relationship. In sum, if shared attitude of organizational members is taken as a 
predictor of organization’s actions the actual trust of a given organizational group gets “lost” 
(averaged out) in the overall measure of organizational trust. This would likely distort the 
empirical results and lead to wrong conclusions. The significance and direction of a causal 
relationship in such case would very much depend on what outcome is chosen as a proxy for 
an organization’s behavior; one decided upon by top managers or one determined by the 
collaborativeness of the operational-level employees.  
Adequacy of the conceptualization of trust as held collectively by members of one 
organization towards the partner organization (Zaheer et al., 1998) can also be questioned 
based on empirical grounds.  The shared attitude of all organizational members towards the 
partner organization (or its members) is practically impossible to tap empirically, particularly 
in a large-scale study. Its literal measurement would in effect require interviewing every 
single member of the organization in question. Additionally, if we define organizational trust 
as the attitude shared by organizational members towards the partner organization next to 
interpersonal trust, the former by definition encompasses the latter—the individual trustor is 
part of the trusting organization and the individual trustee is part of the trusted organization. 
The two constructs are not independent. Thus their effect should not be assessed 
simultaneously. In contrast, defining levels of interorganizational trust in terms of trust held 
by individuals at different levels in organizational hierarchy, as we propose below, is much 
more pragmatic from empirical point of view. The resulting measures of trust at different 
levels are not only relatively independent but also much easier to obtain in a field research. 
Therefore, the conceptualization of organizational trust as a shared attitude of organizational 
members does not seem to be very fruitful for furthering research in the area. 
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2.3.2. Re-defining the two levels of interorganizational trust 
Considering the above, we propose a conceptualization of levels of trust which takes 
into account the importance of the individual trustor in the constitution of interorganizational 
trust and recognizes the different roles that individuals play in shaping organization’s 
behavior. Numerous authors have stressed the importance of individuals and individual 
relations in trust between organizations (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Lewis & Weigert, 1992; 
Macaulay, 1963; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Inkpen and Currall, 1997).  Inkpen & Currall 
(1997: 311) follow Yoshino & Rangan (1995) in arguing that “the relationships between the 
managers involved in the collaborative relationship are critical to the establishment of 
interorganizational trust”.  
It is because of the crucial role individuals play in organizations that the idea of trust 
can be extended to an organization. We subscribe to the view of Zaheer et al. (1998) that an 
attitude of trust can only be attributed to an individual and not to an organization. Trust may 
be attributed to organizations only because they are made up of and managed by individuals 
(Aulakh, et al. 1996) through whom the inter-firm relations come into effect (Inkpen & 
Currall, 1997; Nooteboom, et al. 1997, Aulakh et al., 1996). We further build on this 
assumption, by considering the diversity of roles played by different organizational actors in 
shaping the course of organizational activities and accordingly distinguishing levels of trust in 
interorganizational context. 
Every position in organizational hierarchy is associated with a certain role, which 
reflects the expectation with respect to the position holder’s contribution to the operational 
and strategic tasks (Floyd and Lane, 2000). Organizational roles thus restrict and guide 
individuals’ conduct in an organizational (Nooteboom et a., 1997). This implies that 
individuals involved in an alliance on both sides are likely to play different roles depending 
on the position they occupy in the organizational hierarchy. While the roles of the top 
management are dominated by decision-making tasks (e.g., ratifying or directing), those of 
the non-executive managers encompass primarily communication of and reaction to 
information (e.g., implementing, facilitating, conforming or responding) (Floyd and Lane, 
2000). Therefore, while top (executive) mangers can influence the cooperation policy of the 
organization, this is clearly not the case for operational level employees, who will likely be 
responsible for its implementation. 
Organizational roles held by individuals affect also their perceptions and mode of 
functioning. Zaheer et al. (2002: 348) state that “…individuals at different organizational 
levels view their respective worlds from different perspectives (…) Individuals at higher and 
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lower hierarchical levels (…) each see the world in qualitatively different ways”. These 
differences pertain particularly to the level of uncertainty, time horizons and risk. All these 
three dimensions are closely related to trust (Zaheer et al., 2002; Parkhe, 1993). Thus, they 
argue, “interpersonal trust between top managers may need to be understood differently than 
that between individuals at other levels of the organization.” (Zaheer et al., 2002: 4). 
Similarly, Salk and Simonin (2003) argue that, in terms of attitudes, those who frame strategic 
intentions of an organization are clearly distinct from those who actually implement them at 
the operational level. Thus, individuals at these two levels would not only differ in the scope 
of their power but also in the way in which they would form trust. 
The idea that the position that individuals hold in an organization will affect how they 
form trust finds support in the literature. Zaheer et al. (2002) argue that roles played by 
individuals in organizational settings have a strong influence on how trust is formed between 
them. They posit “we may be getting only a partial understanding of the nature of trust in 
interorganizational relationships by focusing only on boundary-spanner trust while ignoring 
top management trust, or by implicitly assuming that trust at these two hierarchical levels is 
similar in its causes (…)” (Zaheer et al., 2002: 349). Accordingly in line with Zaheer et al. 
(2002) we subsequently argue that trust between top decision makers and trust between 
boundary spanners at lower hierarchical levels is formed in different ways. 
Before we proceed with the discussion of the differences between trust held by the 
executive level managers and lower level managers, however, we shortly consider the 
possible objects of their trust (i.e., the trustee). Although, as we argued, only individuals can 
be trustors in inter-firm trust, both an individual and an organization can be an object of trust 
(Inkpen & Currall, 1997; Perrone, Zaheer & McEvily, 2003) at either of the levels. Inkpen & 
Currall (1997: 311) posit “alliance managers can foster trust by building one-to-one 
relationships with partner managers” but also “by developing a familiarity with the partner’s 
strategy, organization, and culture.” The idea of an organization as an object of individual’s 
trust is supported by Nooteboom et al. (1997), who treat trust in terms of relational risk with 
respect to a partner organization as perceived by an individual who enacts the relation with 
the partner organization. Next to trust in the partner organization, trust held by the managers 
towards their counterparts in the collaborating organizations is of relevance. Beneath the 
formalities of contractual agreements, personal relationships among key individuals play a 
pivotal role in producing trust between collaborating firms (Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Gargulio 
1999; Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998; Bradach and Eccles 
1989). Thus in our further discussion we assume that trust held by organizational actors at 
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different levels of organizational hierarchy can have as its object both the partner organization 
and its individual members. 
 Our conceptualization of interorganizational trust, therefore, assumes that an 
individual is the only subject of trust (i.e., a trustor) in an organization. The two levels of 
interorganizational trust are delineated according to who is the trustor and independent of who 
is the object of trust (an individual or an organization). Although research has shown that 
individuals do distinguish between trust towards counterpart boundary spanners and the 
partner organization (for example Zaheer, Lofstrom, & George, 2002), we believe that in 
carrying out their responsibilities with respect to the interorganizational collaboration, 
decisions of organizational boundary spanners (of either level) would be determined by the 
overall attitude towards the partner organization and their individual counterparts, rather than 
each of those objects of trust separately.  
 Additionally, the effect of trust towards the partner organization and its individual 
members are unlikely to be independent; we expect that they would moderate each other. 
Thus although we do acknowledge that organizational actors can distinguish between trusting 
the partner organization or its specific members, we do not believe that this distinction has a 
bearing on the decisions they take. Rather, such decisions would be based on the overall 
evaluation of the trustworthiness of the partner organization and its individual members. 
There exists empirical evidence in support of our approach; trust in an individual manager of 
the partner firm has been shown to be a strong predictor of trust in the partner firm as a whole 
(Inkpen & Curral, 1997; Zaheer et al., 1998). 
 
2.3.3. Strategic-level trust  
 We are now ready to define the two levels of interorganizational trust; a strategic-level 
and operational-level. We conceptualize strategic-level trust as the attitude held by the 
company’s executives towards the partner firm (cf. Inkpen & Currall, 1997) and its members 
(cf. Gulati & Gargulio, 1999). It has been stressed above that top managers play roles that are 
systematically different from those of the lower-level managers. Zaheer et al. (2002) 
following Andrews (1971) argue that top managers need to face higher levels of uncertainty, 
and adopt a longer-term view. The role of a top manager is also different in that the corporate 
level is predominantly responsible for the shaping and manipulation of the structural context 
of the collaboration (cf. Burgelman, 1983). Therefore, trust at the strategic-level is bound to 
be manifested in the policies of the firm and in a strategic alliance context in the collaborative 
arrangements. 
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2.3.4. Operational-level trust  
Operational-level trust between organizations, in contrast, captures the trust held by 
the non-executive boundary spanners of the collaborating organizations towards the partner 
organization and its individual members. The boundary spanners in carrying out the 
operational tasks of the collaboration “provide the linking mechanism across organizational 
boundaries” (Inkpen & Currall, 1997). The interacting boundary spanners at the lower levels 
of organizational hierarchy are responsible for the actual implementation of the collaboration. 
In contrast to the top managers, they do not shape the structure and collaboration policies, but 
operate within their bounds. Currall & Inkpen (2002) define ‘trust network’ as the sum of 
interpersonal trust in a joint venture, i.e., trust present in all dyadic relationships of boundary 
spanners from the partnering organizations. Our definition of operational-level trust, includes 
the trust network but, is broader than that; it additionally comprises the boundary spanners’ 
trust towards the partner organization. Thus similarly to the strategic level, both the partner 
organization and/or its individual members can be the objects of operational-level trust. 
Operational-level trust will therefore be manifested in the way the collaboration agenda set 
forth by the top management is implemented in the day-to-day operations of the alliance.  
Thus, we regard strategic-level trust to be primarily operative at the strategy and 
policy making levels (thus affecting the structural conditions of the alliance), while 
operational-level trust to play a major role in the effectuation of the interorganizational 
collaboration (i.e., the process of cooperation itself). Both of these types of trust, however, 
have an interorganizational character and jointly constitute interorganizational trust. 
Schematically then, in delineating the two level so interorganizational trust, we merge the two 
upper quadrants of Table 1.1 and subsequently introduce a horizontal division of the upper 
field (rather than a vertical one)—See Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2. Levels of interorganizational trust reconceptualized 
Who is trusted? (i.e., trustee)  
Individual  Organization 
 

















































It is worth pointing out that although this operationalization bears some resemblance 
to the one offered by Zaheer et al. (2002), it is not the same. The authors do differentiate 
between levels in hierarchy but only in terms of interpersonal trust i.e., between two 
individuals. Therefore, the two levels they identify would simply fit in the upper left quadrant 
of Figure 1. Our conceptualization, in contrast, cannot be simply placed in any single quadrant 
of Figure 1 (it cuts across two quadrants of the figure), as neither trust at the strategic nor 
operational level is simply of interpersonal type—it can have as its object another individual 
and/or the partner organization.  
 A criticism can be raised that our framework does not allow for the possibility that 
executive boundary spanners, next to their responsibility for setting the structure of the 
collaboration, may also be involved in the day-to-day implementation of the collaboration. 
Theoretically speaking, the trust they hold as top executives should affect their decisions 
concerning structure while the trust they hold as ‘implementators’ should affect the 
implementation of the collaborative tasks. However, it seems likely that in most cases the role 
of executives will be restricted to setting the structural conditions and they will not have 
(much) opportunity to engage in the everyday implementation of the tasks of the 
collaboration. Thus, since the role of the top executives as organizational decision maker is 
likely to overshadow that of an operational organizational member, we do not consider it in 
our further analysis. This is obviously a simplification, as at least some knowledge can be 
expected to flow at the executive manager level. Yet, although undeniably there is an overlap 
in terms of roles played by boundary spanners at the executive and non-executive levels with 
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respect to knowledge transfer, for the sake of conceptual clarity we stress the difference 
between the two.  
 We wish to stress that by delineating the strategic and operational levels, we do not 
wish to suggest that they are completely separate. Admittedly individuals at both levels are 
subject to similar psychological processes and limitations; it is not our intention to argue that 
top managers are in any way qualitatively different than their lower level counterparts. Also, 
the two levels are linked by the common organizational culture, in which they are embedded. 
Organizational culture has been argued to affect the propensity of its members to trust and be 
trustworthy (Nooteboom, 2002). Additionally, conscious efforts to limit problems associated 
with implementing the collaboration agreement can further bring the two levels closer. A 
situation may arise where a poorly negotiated collaborative agreement is handed over to the 
lower-level management for implementation. To avoid such problems either the lower level 
can be involved in the initial negotiations of the collaborative arrangements or the top level 
can be made responsible for successful implementation of the agreement they negotiate. In 
our view, however, the above facts do not undermine our argument that the ways in which 
top-level managers and lower-level managers are involved in the process of 
interorganizational collaboration are distinct. The different nature of responsibility born by 
individuals at both levels and the distinct character of decisions they are required to take are 
what constitutes the basis for the delineation of strategic and operational level trust. 
 
 
2.4. Empirical considerations 
 
In their recent article Currall and Inkpen (2002) raise the issue of misspecification 
between the level of theory and the level of measurement in interorganizational trust research. 
According to Currall and Inkpen (2002: 481) “the validity of hypothesis tests is diminished, 
when person-level measures of trust are the basis of statements made about trust at the firm 
level (i.e., “trust by a firm” or “inter-firm trust”).”  The misspecification, thus, has to do with 
the attribution of an individual attitude (i.e., of a key informant) to the firm. As a solution to 
the problem of misspecification, Currall & Inkpen propose alternative, more accurate 
empirical approaches to measuring trust at levels higher than individual.  For example, for the 
organization-level trust, they suggest the investigation of agreements, corporate statements, 
and all the other actual actions of the organization that can be characterized as trusting 
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(Currall & Inkpen, 2002), rather then relying on responses of a single informant, as is the case 
in the majority of studies. 
We only partly recognize the validity of the problem as defined by Currall and Inkpen 
(2002). There are two assumptions they implicitly make—one conceptual and one 
empirical—which when lifted undermine the validity of their conclusions. First, in assessing 
the presence of misspecification Currall and Inkpen appear to use the yardstick of their own 
conceptualization of organizational-level trust. In other words, they evaluate the empirical 
tools used in other studies by comparing them with the conceptualization of organizational 
trust they themselves propose rather than with the one proposed by the authors of the studies. 
We believe that in at least a few of the cases the misspecification is only apparent, and 
disappears when the definition adopted by the original authors is considered.  
For example, with respect to their own earlier study of organizational trust (Inkpen 
and Currall, 1997), the authors contend misalignment based on the fact that data was sourced 
from a single informant. Such a conclusion may be correct if trust is attributed to the 
organization as a whole, i.e., as in “firm’s decision to engage in trusting actions toward the 
other firm” (Currall & Inkpen, 2002). However, the definition of organizational trust that the 
authors adopted in 1997 was as follows: “trust in the partner firm in terms of an [international 
joint venture] manager’s perception of the perceived trustworthiness of the partner firm” 
(Inkpen & Currall, 1997: 312).  From that perspective, the use of a single respondent appears 
very much justified; the empirical treatment of trust is fully in line with the way it was 
conceptualized. Another similar example is the study by Nooteboom et al. (1997: 312) who 
treated trust between organizations as “relational risk with respect to a partner organization 
perceived by an individual who enacts the relation with the partner organization”.  Again, the 
use of a single respondent appears to be fully justified when such a conceptualization is 
adopted. In sum, by benchmarking different studies against their own definition of 
organizational trust, Currall and Inkpen (2002) find a number of them to be misaligned. Yet 
this misspecification may be a result not so much of empirical shortcomings of the extant 
research (i.e., poor data) as of the conceptualization of organizational trust Currall and Inkpen 
adopt.  In sum, we believe that the problem of misalignment that Currall and Inkpen (2002) 
posit is a conceptual rather then an empirical issue. 
Second, even if the conceptualization of trust as held by an organization (or as an 
attitude shared by all members of an organization) is adopted, we do not believe that all 
studies that rely on individual informants for data on inter-firm trust are by definition 
misaligned.  The conclusions of Currall and Inkpen (2002) concerning the misalignment are 
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based on the (empirical) assumption that an individual cannot be a source of data on group or 
organization level phenomena. This seems to be contrary to existing empirical findings. 
Geringer & Hebert, (1991), for example, demonstrate that JV managers are a reliable source 
of information concerning joint venture performance and conclude that using individual 
respondents as sources of data on JV’s is justified. Also, Zaheer et al. (2002) find that 
individuals distinguish without problem between trust towards an individual and trust towards 
an organization. These studies suggest that top managers, who usually respond to 
questionnaires, are quite capable of reliably evaluating firm-level phenomena.  
We believe that the level of measurement does not necessarily have to be identical to 
the level at which data is sourced. An individual respondent can be a source of information 
that concerns the organization as a whole. Just as one can obtain a measurement of individual 
level phenomenon through direct observation or an interview, in the same way one can obtain 
organization level measurement by observation or interview. Obviously, it is not possible to 
interview an organization as such, yet it is possible to interview its well-informed members. 
Such data do not necessarily need to cause misalignment  (assuming the organization is the 
level of theory) if the respondent is asked about matters that concern the organization as a 
whole.  
That raises the issue of such data being reliable and representative for the 
organization. Yet, if the questions asked to the respondent deal with objective facts 
concerning organization’s behavior (e.g., number of licenses provided by the organization to 
the partner, the presence of conflict resolution provisions in the contract, etc) then the use of 
an individual respondent seems more than justified. Data sourced from an individual would 
naturally be less reliable if it concerned the attitudes of the organizational members. However, 
Currall and Inkpen (2002), very unequivocally call for behavioral treatment of trust, thus their 
criticism of using an individual as a source of organization-level data seems to be 
ungrounded.   
Additionally, it is worth pointing out that it is usually also an individual researcher 
who, through observation, collects organization-level data. Such researcher may be just as 
subjective in gathering information as an organizational member providing it. We do not deny 
that there are challenges involved in such a cross-level approach, i.e., obtaining organization-
level data from an individual. We sympathize with Currall & Inkpen’s (2002: 481) concerns 
that “reliance on key informants can give rise to problems of selection and perceptual 
agreement” and that “informants’ personalities, roles and experiences often result in 
perceptual disagreement”. However, the above concerns do not change the fact that the level 
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of measurement and the source from which data is obtained are not one and the same. In sum, 
Currall and Inkpen’s conclusion concerning the presence of misspecification is, in some 
sense, itself marked by a misalignment; a misalignment between the level of measurement 
and the level of sourcing data.  
Since we only partly recognize the problem as defined by Currall and Inkpen we 
consequently also do not fully recognize the adequacy of the solution they propose. Calling 
for better quality data is a solution that not only is unlikely to solve the problem of 
misalignment (as we argued above) but also is very difficult to implement. In particular, 
gathering group and organization-level data through direct observation by the researcher is 
hardly feasible in a large-scale study. Ruling out individual respondents as a source of data on 
organization-level phenomena does not appear to be a very pragmatic solution. It would seem 
much more fruitful to make suggestions as to how to minimize the individual bias such tools 
may potentially introduce. 
 
2.4.1. An alternative approach to measuring interorganizational trust at two levels 
 In the spirit of suggesting ways to improve the objectivity of multi-level measurement 
of trust in a situation where one respondent per organization is available, we subsequently 
present an alternative approach to gauging trust at the two levels in interorganizational 
context. In particular, we focus on a method of empirically measuring the level of strategic- 
and operational-level trust as was defined above. We have argued earlier that trust between 
boundary spanners at the top management level affects interorganizational collaboration 
differently than trust between operational level boundary spanners. We further argued that the 
two kinds of trust are different in character. In particular, according to Doney & Cannon 
(1997) different antecedents and sources of trust are likely to be relevant for different levels of 
interorganizational trust. Thus, if unique sources of trust at both strategic- and operational-
level can be identified and validated, they could be used in empirical research as indicators of 
the level of interorganizational trust at the two levels. Such approach appears promising from 
the point of view of overcoming the limitation that the availability of a single respondent 
imposes on the measurement of trust at two levels. This is because such a single informant 
can assess the presence of sources of trust much more objectively than attitudes held by 
different organizational members. In the latter case, the risk of confounding the trust variable 
with other variables of interest (e.g., learning, performance etc.) is high. 
  Extant literature on trust posits that the overall attitude of a trustor towards a trustee is 
a product of a number of conditions. Although some previous studies on the effect of trust and 
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learning between organizations considered the different sources interpartner trust can stem 
from, the fact that some sources may be more relevant for the development of trust at one 
level or the other has been largely ignored. Zucker (1986) identified four modes of trust 
production3; experience-based (i.e., process-based obtained first-hand), reputation-based (i.e., 
process-based obtained second-hand), characteristic-based and institution-based. Other 
authors (e.g., Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Doney & Cannon, 1997) have 
subsequently elaborated on a fifth mechanism, i.e., calculation. We believe that new insights 
can be derived from applying the trust production modes approach to analyzing the effect of 
multilevel trust on interorganizational learning, as different mechanisms of trust formation are 
likely to be relevant at different levels (cf. Doney & Cannon, 1997). In specific, we argue that 
different modes of trust production are of unequal importance for the operational- and 
strategic-level trust in an alliance. We do not wish to suggest that the types of trust we 
identify as relevant for each level are exclusive of other types. Rather the argument is 
intended to reflect our belief in the dominating role of the identified mechanisms of trust 
formation for either the operational or strategic-level of analysis.  
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman (1995) identified ability, benevolence and integrity as the 
three qualities of the partner which if discovered are likely to produce trust. Similarly, 
Nooteboom et al. (1997) distinguished between trust in trustee’s competence and trust in 
trustee’s intentions. The focus of our discussion, however, is not on the qualities of a trustee 
on which trust is built but rather on mechanisms through which a trustor comes to trust the 
trustee, i.e., modes of trust production (cf. Zucker, 1986).  These in essence are two different 
dimensions of trust formation process as the trustor can come to trust the trustee’s 
competence, for example, through various mechanisms, e.g., first-hand experience, reputation 
or institutions. Of course, some modes of trust production are likely to be more conducive to 
the built-up of trust based on a given quality of a trustee, be it competence, benevolence or 
integrity. However, consideration of the qualities of the trustee on which such trust is built is 
outside the scope of our analysis. Accordingly, in subsequent discussion the term ‘sources of 
trust’ will be used to refer to indices employed by individuals and organizations in the process 
of forming trust (Zucker, 1986), and not qualities of the trustee. Thus, for example, brand 
name established by an organization would be a source related to reputation-based mechanism 
of trust formation while educational background would be a source related to characteristic-
based mode of trust formation (Zucker, 1986). 
                                                
3 Zucker (1986) distinguished in fact three mechanisms, with experience-based and reputation-based trust jointly 
constituting process-based trust. We choose to focus on each of the sub-types separately. 
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2.4.2. Modes of trust production at the operational level 
  Individuals working closely together towards accomplishment of certain tasks 
constitute communities of practice (Fox, 2000). Since, operational-level boundary spanners of 
alliance partners are involved in the joint effectuation of the day-to-day alliance tasks, 
crosscutting communities of practice are likely to emerge. An alliance, therefore, can be 
viewed as a community of communities of practice (cf. Fox, 2000; Brown & Deguid, 1999). 
Communities of practice are characterized by high intensity of personal interactions among 
the members who engage in joint execution of tasks. Zucker (1986: 62) argues that extensive 
interaction of a small number of “individuals involved in a limited set of exchanges” over 
long periods of time results in the development of trust between them. In the process of 
working closely together members of communities of practice can therefore be expected to 
develop trust—experience-based trust.  
  Experience-based trust between parties is based on repeated, past interactions 
(Rousseau et al., 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), assuming they were accompanied by 
successful fulfillment of mutual expectations (Rousseau et al., 1998), thus on the positive 
development of a relationship (Nooteboom et al., 1997). This corresponds to the concept of 
‘habitualization’, which describes bonds that develop between parties in the process of their 
mutual interactions and result in familiarity, mutual understanding and shared habits 
(Nooteboom et al., 1997). Formation of experience-based trust is a slow, time-consuming 
(Aulakh et al., 1996; Madhok, 1995) and cumulative process (Lewicki & Bunker, 1994). In its 
deepest form, trust based on experience takes the form of identification (Rousseau et al., 
1998), where parties learn to recognize and understand each other’s desires, preferences and 
intentions (Lewicki & Bunker; 1996). We conclude therefore that through processes of 
repeated, close interactions within crosscutting communities of practice boundary spanners 
develop trusting relationships. The level of experience at the operational level can be proxied 
with measures of the duration, frequency, informality and density of boundary-spanner 
contacts, or off-the-job informal contacts. 
  Besides a community of practice, trust between individuals can come about in the 
context of yet another kind of network. People who engage in similar practice form a network 
of practice even though they may never come to know each other personally or work on 
common tasks (Brown & Deguid, 1999). The similarity of tasks that the members of a 
network of practice have in common can be a source of shared identity of its members 
(Brown & Deguid, 1999). One can think for instance of networks of professionals, like 
engineers or accountants. According to social identity theory, shared identity fosters the 
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development of trust between individuals. The perceived similarity of the members of a 
network of practice can thus become the basis for the formation of characteristic-based trust 
(cf. Zucker, 1986). Additionally, Plaskoff (2003) stresses that development of in-group 
identification is fostered by the alignment of cultural elements, as well as common reference 
points (e.g., experiences, frameworks). This would suggest that similarity would not only 
directly result in more trust but also stimulate the boundary spanners’ propensity to interact 
and thus indirectly foster experience-based trust.  
  Zucker (1986) defines characteristic-based trust as trust based on certain qualities of a 
person (e.g., family background or ethnicity). Similarity (for example in profession) is the 
basis for categorizing oneself and others into social groups (Williams, 2000). According to 
social identity theory individuals use groups to which they belong (i.e., social aggregates) to 
construct their own identity and accordingly categorize others as in-group or out-group 
members (Kane, Argote & Levine, 2002). At the same time, individuals’ identities (i.e., social 
groups with which they identify) determine the extent to which they perceive each other to be 
similar. When people identify with a given social group, it allows them to “surface certain 
cognitive assumptions about themselves in relation to others” (Child & Rodriques, 2003: 537) 
as well as “expectations about the behaviors and intentions of the members of a collectivity” 
(McEvilly, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003: 98).  In particular, social similarity, in terms of values 
and beliefs, as well as personalities, demographics, educational and professional backgrounds, 
leads to the assumption that common background expectations exist and opportunistic 
behavior is unlikely (Zucker, 1986). As a result of social categorization and in-group bias 
processes, in-group members therefore tend to be evaluated more positively than out-group 
members, in terms of their cooperativeness, commitment (McEvilly et al., 2003) as well as 
honesty, loyalty, benevolence, and trustworthiness (Kane et al., 2002; Doney & Cannon, 
1997). These positive attributions stemming from social similarity are likely to produce trust 
between individuals (Brewer, 1981; Burt, 1992; Porter, 1997; McGuire, 1968).  
In the organizational context, similarity of occupational identities of the gatekeepers 
(based on shared practice, i.e., networks of practice) is likely to be of primary importance as it 
can “serve as a bridge” between the partner organizations in an alliance (Child & Rodriguez, 
2003: 544). Thus linking of partnering organizations along the lines of networks of practice 
can be considered a condition conducive to operational-level trust between their boundary 
spanners, due to the social identity they share as members of the same profession. In terms of 
operationalization, professional and education background characteristics of the boundary 
spanners can easily be measured and may be a preferable proxy compared to personality traits 
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or demographic features, because of their higher relevance in formation of occupational 
identities. In summary, we expect experience and similarity to be the most relevant sources of 
operational-level trust.  
 
2.4.3. Modes of trust production at the strategic level 
  The role of strategic-level managers regarding an alliance is likely to be very different 
from that of operational-level employees (Andrews, 1971). In their role of strategy makers, 
top executives are responsible for initiating and directing the strategic actions of their 
organizations. Therefore it is in the alliance formation stage that their involvement can be 
expected to be greatest, while the subsequent, every-day functioning of the alliance (with the 
exception of some extraordinary circumstances) would largely be left to the responsibility of 
lower level managers. Having set up an alliance, top mangers are likely to move on to other 
pressing issues of strategic nature, some of which may involve formation of new alliances. 
What the above implies is that compared to non-executive boundary spanners strategic-level 
managers are likely to have a much higher exposure to a variety of alliances while being 
much less involved in the actual effectuation of any of them. They thus can be expected to 
treat each alliance much more instrumentally than would be the case for operational-level 
boundary spanners. Additionally, since the decisions surrounding the formation of an alliance 
(e.g., partner choice, resource contributions or collaborative arrangements) are of crucial, 
importance for the organizations they represent, top-managers can be expected to arrive at 
them by way of relatively conscious rational deliberations and strategic considerations (cf. 
Burgelman, 1983).  
  In identifying sources of trust relevant at the strategic level, therefore, we turn to the 
theoretical paradigm of strategic choice, which focuses on motives like profit and growth as 
drivers of the strategic choices of top executives (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). Clearly, social 
factors such as managerial hubris, personal ambition and reputation (rather than 
organizational), rivalry etc. are likely to be at work here as well.4 However, considering the 
importance of the decisions with respect to the alliance formation, it can be expected that 
rational and strategic considerations would prevail. We deem the social factors mentioned 
above to be a distorting factor rather than the dominant and desirable mode of deciding on the 
shape of collaborative arrangements in an alliance. Therefore, although undeniably some 
social factors are likely to be of importance at the strategic level, for the sake of conceptual 
                                                
4 We thank Bart Nooteboom for drawing our attention to this fact. 
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clarity, we focus on the differences between the levels with respect to the nature of decisions 
taken at each of them. In light of the above discussion, we expect strategic considerations to 
dominate at the strategic level and trust founded on calculation, institutional safeguards, 
reputation and the track record of expectations fulfillment to be most relevant. 
The essence of calculation-based trust lies in the conviction that the partner will meet 
his obligations for fear of the consequences of not doing so (Lewicki & Bunker, 1994). 
Calculation considers the impending punishments, but also the loss of potential rewards from 
breaching trust. Organizations that engage in a continuous collaboration have economic 
incentives to behave in a trustworthy manner as seeking short-term benefits may endanger the 
possibility of future, repeated transactions (Granovetter, 1985; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). 
Calculated trust therefore is based on the hostages held mutually by the partners (cf. Madhok, 
1995). Thus high level and/or severity of potential consequences from terminating 
collaboration or placing the quality of the relationship at risk, is likely to result in trustworthy 
behavior of alliance partners. Such alignment of partners’ incentives, in turn, is likely to find 
expression in the structural arrangements that assure their continued successful collaboration.  
Calculation is a more relevant source of trust at the strategic than at the operational 
level, because, as we argued earlier, decision behavior at the strategic level is of less social 
and more instrumental nature. It seems plausible to expect that the level of trust held by 
organizational decision makers towards a partner would be correlated with the extent to which 
they perceive the structure of the incentives in the alliance to be conducive to parties’ 
trustworthy behavior (i.e., abstention from opportunism). In the context of empirical research, 
incentive alignment may be proxied with the stakes that the partners have in preserving the 
collaboration. Where such stakes are perceived to be high, it can be expected that partners will 
abstain from opportunistic behavior that could endanger the quality of their relationship 
(Sarkar, Cavusgil, & Evirgen, 1997).   
Institution-based trust is grounded in values and standards of conduct that guide 
behavior as well as formal structures that enable and constrain it (Nooteboom, 2002). 
Institutions support risk taking and trusting behavior (Hagen & Choe, 1998) of both 
individuals and organizations (Rousseau et al., 1998). Institutionalization at the country-level 
encompasses shared values and norms of conduct, which constitute part of national culture  
(Nooteboom, 2002) as well as the framework of national laws and regulations (Kostova, 
1999). Both norms and values as well as legislative systems are likely to vary significantly 
across cultures or countries and thus have different effect on the behavior of the entities and 
individuals whose actions they guide and regulate (cf. Fukuyama, 1995). Additionally, 
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institutions that issue public statements concerning the qualifications and reliability of entities 
(for example professional certifications) as well as other bureaucratic structures are likely to 
serve as formal, social, trust-evoking structures (Parkhe, 1998b; Zucker 1986).  
The stronger the institutions, the easier it will be for business partners to rely on trust, 
since those institutions safeguard against (some of) the potential for opportunistic behavior on 
the part of the partners (Mudambi & Navarra, 2002). Therefore, the strength of 
institutionalization of the environment in which the alliance is embedded should positively 
influence the level of strategic-level trust between partners for two reasons. First, it would 
increase the probability of the partner’s behavior in conformance to a cultural norm of value. 
Second, it would mitigate the fear of partner opportunism. International differences in trust-
inducing institutionalization may be operationalized with published indices of the judicial 
system effectiveness, the bureaucratic process reliability, etc. (Gwartney, Lawson & Block, 
1996).  
The formal institutional structures are related to legally or socially established 
guidelines, which result in negative consequences for parties violating trust (Hagen & Choe, 
1998). Trust based on calculation, on the other hand, is grounded in the partners’ belief that 
the other party will not defect (behave opportunistically) considering the impending sanctions 
(Gulati, 1995). From that perspective, institution-based trust (its structural part) and 
calculation-based trust are both grounded in deterrence, since both are a source of potential 
sanctions for a defecting partner. The difference between the two is that in case of the former 
the sanctions are relationship-specific, while in the latter they are general and hold across all 
relationships, independent of the partner. Institutional trust thus “generalizes beyond a given 
transaction and beyond specific sets of exchange partners” (Zucker, 1986:64).  
  The third source of trust that we expect to be of relevance at the strategic level is 
reputation, which allows for confident expectations about the other’s behavior based on third-
party experiences. Reputation may be equated with the “record of cumulative past behaviors” 
(Parkhe, 1998a: 233) or “a symbolic representation of past exchange history” (Zucker, 1986: 
62) and thus be positively related to trust (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidynath, 2002). The network of 
relationships in which firms are embedded is a rich source of information concerning the 
competencies and reliability of potential partners (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). These networks 
are what the decision makers rely on in deciding who to potentially collaborate with (cf. 
Dollinger, Golden & Saxton, 1997; Gulati, 1995) and how to structure the collaboration.   
Finally, similarly to the operational level, we expect experience, grounded in the 
partners’ past exchanges to be a source of trust at the strategic-level. Trust based on knowing 
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the partner emerges from their past interactions by allowing them to get to know each other 
(Gulati, 1995). The better the past expectations have been met the greater the confidence 
firm’s decision makers will have that a partner will follow through on its current and future 
promises (Parkhe, 1993). The better the collaborating organizations know each other, 
therefore, and the more dependable and reliable the partners have proven themselves to be 
(Rousseau et al., 1998; Ireland et al., 2002), the higher the mutual trust held by their executive 
managers will be. In an empirical investigation, experience-based trust towards a particular 
partner can be gauged by the duration of the current collaboration. 
 
 
2.5. Empirical illustration 
 
In the final section of this chapter, we present an empirical illustration of the approach 
to conceptualizing trust at two levels in interorganizational collaboration as well as the way of 
tapping it in empirical research. We undertake to demonstrate the relevance of the different 
sources of trust (independent variables) that we identified for the operational and strategic 
level of analysis. As the measure of trust between the partners (the dependent variable) we 
adopt knowledge sharing—a dimension of trust commonly referred to in the literature. We 
considered this to be a preliminary step towards validating the relevance of the different 
sources of trust for the two levels that may allow for their future use as indicators of the 
presence of trust at these two levels. 
 
2.5.1. Sample and model 
A number of different dimensions of trust have been identified in the literature (see 
Currall & Judge, 1995; Currall & Inkpen, 2002, Smith & Barclay, 1997). Open 
communication and information exchange are among those considered “central to ongoing 
exchange relationships” (Smith & Barclay, 1997: 6). Currall & Judge (1995) argue that 
boundary role persons (BRPs) manifest trust towards each other “by disclosing important yet 
potentially self-damaging information, being accurate when communicating, and not filtering 
or distorting information” (Currall & Judge, 1995).  Open communication finds reflection in 
“the formal and informal sharing of timely information between partners and is concerned 
with the mutual disclosure of plans, programs, expectations, goals, motives, and evaluation 
criteria” (Smith and Barclay, 1997: 6) Since the different dimensions of trust are a 
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manifestation of the trustor’s decision to allow the trustee to determine its fate (Currall & 
Inkpen, 2002), open communication between alliance partners, finding reflection in the extent 
to which the partners share knowledge with each other (Currall and Inkpen, 2002), can be 
considered to be a good proxy for the level of their mutual trust. 
  We illustrate this approach to conceptualizing and measuring trust at two levels in 
interorganizational relationships on a sample of 149 joint ventures formed in Poland between 
a local and a foreign partner. Joint ventures constitute a particularly appropriate context for 
studying inter-partner knowledge transfers. The high level of intimacy and intensity of 
interactions they allow makes them especially suitable for transferring organizationally 
embedded knowledge, highly ambiguous and tacit in nature (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). 
Additionally, since the market for tacit knowledge is likely to fail, as its value cannot be 
reliably evaluated before its transfer (Hennart, 1988), compared to contract-based agreements 
equity joint ventures, should be superior conduits for the transfer of difficult to grasp, 
company-specific, experiential knowledge (Gulati, 1995; Kogut, 1988; Mowery, Oxley & 
Silverman, 1996).  
  The data was gathered by way of a survey, which covered Poland-based JV 
organizations and was carried out in the fall of 2002 and spring of 2003. The total response 
rate reached the level of 18,6% and is deemed to be of an acceptable level considering the 
standards for a transition economy5. The questionnaire was developed based on extensive 
literature review in the area of interorganizational learning and inter-partner trust as well as on 
an exploratory study which involved interviews with top managers of Polish-foreign JVs. 
Questions were formulated with the aim to gauge the knowledge transfer between partners—
both the actual sharing between operational boundary spanners and the overall extent of inter-
partner learning—as well as the different sources of trust which we argued to be relevant for 
strategic and operational level respectively. 
 We argued that trust at the two levels has different sources. To validate this claim, we 
need measures to tap the level of trust at each of the two levels separately.  So far we have 
only posited that knowledge transfer between partners can be a proxy for their mutual trust. 
Below we identify dimensions of interorganizational knowledge transfer that, we believe, can 
be treated as manifestations of trust at each of the two levels.  To do that we rest on the 
assumption that boundary spanners at the top management level and those at the operational 
level play different roles in interorganizational learning.  
                                                
5 Low response rates stem partly from lack of tradition to collaborate with academia and partly from a large number of 
questionnaires received by most companies resulting in their reluctance to participate. 
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 As was argued above, top management, by means of administrative tools (Bower, 
1986) orchestrates the formal structure, systems and the management process of an 
organization (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). This involves in particular, shaping of structures, 
systems and interactions, geared towards managing organization’s knowledge and skills (i.e. 
knowledge management) (Tiemessen, Lane, Crossan, & Inkpen, 1996). Therefore, in the 
interorganizational context, organizational decision makers can be assumed to determine the 
structure, systems and the management process for navigating the knowledge processes. 
Lower level boundary spanners in contrast do not have such power. They are, however, 
involved in the communities of practice that cut across the organizational boundaries of the 
JV partners. The execution of common tasks provides those individuals with the intensity, 
intimacy and continuity of face-to-face contacts necessary for the successful transfer of tacit 
knowledge between alliance partners (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Kale, 
Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000). Both the conditions mentioned above are necessary for achieving 
knowledge transfer between alliance partners. Therefore, the collaborative knowledge 
arrangements set by the executive managers and the sharing between the lower-level 
boundary spanners can be considered to be proxies of trust at the strategic and operational 
levels, respectively.   
 In light of the above, we operationalize trust at operational level as the extent of 
knowledge sharing between organizational members. Tackling strategic level trust is less 
straightforward; because of multidimensionality of the collaborative arrangements construct 
(structure, systems and process), it is impossible to design a homogenous dependent variable. 
Therefore, resting on the assumption that the overall interorganizational knowledge flow 
(learning) between organizations is a sum of the collaborative arrangements and the sharing of 
knowledge between their boundary spanners, we take the interorganizational learning as a 
proxy for strategic level trust and control for the extent of knowledge sharing. Thus, after 
factoring out the extent of sharing from the overall learning variable, we believe we are able 
to capture the effect of collaborative arrangements.  
 It is important to stress that our measure of learning outcome (see below for exact 
definition of items), besides transfer of existing knowledge may also be partly capturing the 
acquisition of knowledge newly created in the alliance. If this is indeed the case, the measure 
could be argued to misrepresent the intended construct and undermine the validity of our 
findings. There are two reasons why we believe the context in which the study was carried out 
(i.e., a transition economy) mitigates these concerns. First, the gap between the local partner 
and the foreign partner in terms of their knowledge bases is likely to be vast; while on one 
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hand the Polish partner’s knowledge with respect to operating in free market circumstances is 
likely to be very limited, on the other hand the foreign partner’s knowledge of the Polish 
market can also be expected to be very limited. Considering that creation of knowledge in an 
alliance requires certain proximity of the partners’ knowledge bases, the increases in 
efficiency and the scope of changes reported by the local partner can plausibly be attributed to 
knowledge acquisition from the foreign partner rather than to joint knowledge creation. 
Related to the above, partners to a Polish-foreign joint venture would likely contribute very 
different skills to the collaboration. While the foreign partner can be expected to contribute 
superior technological or managerial knowledge, the Polish partner would be a rich source of 
local market knowledge. This would further limit the potential scope for knowledge creation.  
 The hypothesized model takes the form depicted in Figure 2.1. Operational level trust, 
proxied by the extent of knowledge sharing between boundary spanners, has its source in 
similarity and experience of the boundary spanning individuals. Strategic-level trust 
operationalized with collaborative arrangements (i.e., amount of inter-partner learning while 
controlling for the boundary spanner sharing) is expected to be based on calculation, 
reputation and experience. Institutionalization of the environment, which we argued to be the 
fourth source of strategic-level trust, is not included in the model. Our data do not allow for 
testing such a hypothesis, since all the JVs in our sample are based in one institutional 
environment (i.e., Poland). 
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2.5.2. Variables, data diagnostics and the method 
Operationalization of the constructs posed a serious challenge due to their intangible 
nature. This was especially the case for learning outcome from collaboration, as it is debatable 
whether this is an observable phenomenon, that is, whether acquiring new knowledge always 
finds reflection in organizational change. For the sake of the empirical investigation, we 
assume that every time learning takes place it does find reflection in improved actions and 
modified routines of the organization (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Levitt & March, 1996). This is a 
conservative measure of the amount of learning taking place in the JV. Where possible, an 
attempt was made to include both objective proxies and perceptual measures.  
We measured learning outcome with six items, addressing the areas in which 
knowledge was acquired, the average scope of that acquisition, improvements that took place 
in the company as a result of the collaboration, their scope, as well as the increases in 
efficiency due to the learning and application of the knowledge acquired in the firm’s 
operations. Knowledge sharing was captured by a couple of subjective measures related to the 
sharing of knowledge between the foreign partner’s employees and those of the JV (see 
Appendix 1 for exact wording of the items).  
As for independent variables, three items were used to gauge calculation. The items 
tapped such aspects of the cooperation as the potential severity of consequences of the foreign 
partner withdrawal from the collaboration, the dependence of the Polish JV’s success on the 
continued collaboration with the foreign partner, as well as the reputation consequences in 
case of conflictual termination of the cooperation. The reputation was gauged by a couple of 
items related to the extent of partner research prior to engaging in the collaboration and the 
impact the partner’s reputation on the decision to engage in the collaboration. Boundary 
spanner similarity was captured with two items tapping the likeness of their educational 
backgrounds and professional experience. Finally, the grounds of experience-based trust have 
been operationalized in the same manner at both levels of analysis as the experience between 
organizations and the organizational members constituting them are likely to be the same at 
best and impossible to disentangle empirically at worst. The variable is captured by the 
duration of the alliance. 
 Table 2.3 (see below) presents the descriptive statistics of the items. With the 
exception of 3, all the 16 items were measured on 7-point Likert type scales. The three 
exceptions are items capturing the number of areas in which knowledge was acquired and 
change was introduced—count measures with ranges from 0 to 9 and from 0 to 7, 
respectively—as well as item capturing JV duration, which ranged from 0 (set up in 2002) to 
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19 years. Although no strict levels of skewness and kurtosis pointing to departure from 
normality exist, skewness in the range 2.00 to 3.00 and kurtosis in the range from 7.00 to 
21.00, are considered to be an indication of moderate nonnormality. Skewness and kurtosis of 
above 3.00 and 21.00 respectively are an indication of extreme nonnormality (Byrne, 1998). 
Considering these criteria and the fact that the average skewness and kurtosis in our sample 
are –0.17 and -0.86 respectively, we can likely consider the scores below as approximating 
normality. 
 
Table 2.3. Item descriptive statistics. 
 Mean St. Dev. Skewness p-value Kurtosis p-value 
Areas where knowledge was acquired  3.71 2.30  0.41 0.04 -0.66 0.03 
Average knowledge acquisition in the areas  4.07 1.68 -0.12 0.56 -0.70 0.02 
Areas in which improvements were made  2.73 2.10  0.52 0.01 -0.70 0.02 
Average scope of improvements made  3.76 1.53 -0.20 0.33 -0.74 0.01 
Knowledge application  4.30 2.04 -0.21 0.30 -1.27 0.00 
Efficiency improvement 4.18 1.91 -0.15 0.46 -1.17 0.00 
Foreign partner sharing  3.56 2.04  0.31 0.12 -1.19 0.00 
JV sharing  3.65 1.99  0.28 0.16 -1.10 0.00 
Partner research  3.47 1.97  0.21 0.31 -1.21 0.00 
Impact of reputation 4.64 2.23 -0.54 0.01 -1.20 0.00 
Withdrawal consequences  5.30 1.73 -0.80 0.00 -0.09 0.98 
Success dependence  4.60 2.00 -0.45 0.02 -1.07 0.00 
Negative reputation effect  4.31 2.28 -0.19 0.33 -1.52 0.00 
Similarity of educational backgrounds 5.36 1.64 -1.03 0.00  0.30 0.34 
Similarity of professional experience 4.90 1.72 -0.60 0.00 -0.58 0.08 
JV duration  9.26 2.86 -0.35 0.08  0.91 0.45 
 
 We tested for the possible non-response bias by evaluating the differences in the 
means of the 16 items (15 factor items and JV age) between the early and the late respondents 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977). The early respondents included the first 60% batch of returned 
questionnaires, while the late respondents the remaining 40% of responses. Such 
categorization approximately reflected the actual inflow of the questionnaires (cf. Lages & 
Lages, 2003). With the exception of one item, no significant differences between the early and 
late respondents were found. The two groups did significantly differ on one of the items 
constituting part of the calculation construct (i.e., perceived negative effect of conflictual 
termination of the collaboration for the JV’s reputation). The average for early respondents 
equaled 3.91 while for the late respondents 4.90, with the item being measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale. We do not see this as a strong evidence of non-response bias nor do we perceive 
this to pose any serious threat to the reliability of our results. 
 The instrument (i.e., questionnaire) used in this study could have created a common 
method variance. This would be particularly likely have the respondents known the theoretical 
framework used in designing the tool (Lages & Lages, 2003). This was, however, not the 
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case. Additionally the items were not presented to the respondents in any way that would 
suggest the purpose of the study. To further check for a possible common method bias, we 
have performed a principal component analysis on the 15 items that make up our constructs. 
Four factors with an eigenvalue of more than 1 were identified, with the first factor 
accounting for 41% of the total variance. Based on the above, we conclude that common 
method bias is unlikely present in our data.  
 To increase the reliability of the measures and limit the measurement error, multi-item 
scales were used to assess the constructs (Churchil, 1979). To evaluate the reliability of the 
measures we used Confirmatory Factor Analysis, coefficient alpha, and     indicators. The 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was carried out with the maximum likelihood estimation 
in LISREL 8.3 (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993). Each item was restricted to load on its specified 
construct, with the 5 constructs being allowed to correlate freely. The chi-squared for this 
model was not significant – chi-squared=94.00, df=79, p-value=0.12. The fit indices – the 
Absolute Fit Indices GFI (0.92) and AGFI (0.88) as well as the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI=0.98) and the Incremental Fit Index (IFI=0.98) are all of high level. Additionally, the 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) was assessed as it incorporates a 
penalty for lack of parsimony. It took on a value of 0.036. All of the above point to a very 
good fit of the model with the sample observations. Coefficient alpha for Learning (six items) 
equaled 0.87, for Sharing 0.86, for Calculation 0.82, for Reputation 0.72 and for boundary 
spanner Similarity 0.77. A final measure of reliability we used were the     indicators. 
Value of more than 0.50 indicates that the variance captured by each construct is larger than 
the variance due to measurement error, which supports the validity of the constructs as well as 
the individual indicators that constitute them (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). For all five 
constructs this requirement was met (see Table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4. Reliability of the constructs  
Construct    	  Standardized 
item loading 
t-value 
Learning  0.87 / 0.54   
Areas in which knowledge was acquired   0.74 10.08 
Average knowledge acquisition in the areas   0.73 9.84 
Areas in which improvements were made  0.76 10.44 
Average scope of improvements made   0.81 11.51 
Knowledge application   0.56 6.96 
Efficiency improvement   0.77 10.75 
Sharing 0.86 / 0.77   
Foreign partner sharing   0.96 14.01 
JV sharing   0.79 10.80 
Organization level reputation 0.72 / 0.58   
Partner research   0.68 5.84 
Impact of reputation  0.84 6.42 
Organization level calculation 0.82 / 0.63   
Withdrawal consequences   0.75 10.12 
Success dependence   0.94 13.68 
Negative reputation effect  0.66 8.65 
BRP similarity 0.77 / 0.63   
Similarity of educational backgrounds   0.82 7.96 
Similarity of professional experience   0.77 7.63 
   
 Convergent validity of the constructs is established when the confirmatory factor 
analysis model fits the data and the factor loadings are significant (Abe, Bagozzi & 
Sadarangani, 1996). The first condition was discussed above and fully supports the claim of 
convergent validity. As for the second condition, all constructs reveal large and significant 
standardized loadings and the average loading size equals 0.77. All of this points to a 
desirable level of convergent reliability (see Table 2.4). 
 A test for the presence of discriminant validity between constructs involves a 
comparison of a model in which the constructs are allowed to correlate freely with a model in 
which the correlations between them are fixed to be 1; the larger the difference in the chi-
square of the two models as well as in the GFI and CFI values they yield, the stronger the 
evidence of discriminant validity (Byrne, 1998). The difference in chi-squared between the 
two models equaled 259.18 (df=10) and was highly significant. The difference in GFI 
between the two models equaled 0.16 and 0.24 in CFI. Therefore, both statistical and non-
statistical criteria provided evidence of discriminant validity being present between the 
constructs. Discriminant validity can also be inferred from the correlation estimates between 
any two constructs (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993). As far our constructs are concerned, no 
correlation included a value of 1 (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). The highest correlation was 
0.73, between learning and sharing. This high value was to be expected however as it captures 
the relationship between closely related, yet distinct concepts.  
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Table 2.5. Inter-construct correlations and squared correlations (in brackets) 
 Learning Sharing Reputation Calculation BRP similarity 
Learning 1.00     
Sharing 0.73 (0.53) 1.00    
Reputation 0.36 (0.13) 0.25 (0.06) 1.00   
Calculation 0.63 (0.40) 0.57 (0.33) 0.12 (0.01) 1.00  
BRP similarity 0.40 (0.16) 0.41 (0.17) 0.25 (0.06) 0.30 (0.09) 1.00 
JV duration  -0.38 (0.14)  -0.52 (0.27)  -0.05 (0.00)   -0.13 (0.02) -0.16 (0.03) 
 
The discriminant validity of pairs of constructs with highest correlations (i.e., above 0.5) was 
additionally assessed using the strict Fornell and Larcker (1981). This was accomplished for 
each set of constructs by comparing two nested confirmatory factor analytical models; one 
where the constructs were allowed to correlate freely with another where they were perfectly 
correlated6. As was the case for the general discriminant validity, the larger the difference in 
Chi-squared and practical fit measures (i.e., CFI/GFI) between the models, the stronger the 
support for evidence of discriminant validity of the traits (Byrne, 1998). Table 2.6 presents the 
results of this investigation. 
 
Table 2.6. Discriminant  validity assessment for pairs of constructs 
  Chi-
squared 
df CFI GFI 
Learning vs. Sharing Free   31.04 18 0.98 0.95 
 Constrained   89.81 19 0.88 0.87 
    58.77 1 0.10 0.08 
Learning vs. Calculation Free   38.09 25 0.98 0.95 
 Constrained 137.33 26 0.84 0.83 
    99.24 1 0.14 0.12 
Sharing vs. Calculation Free    3.86 4 1.00 0.99 
 Constrained   78.89 5 0.75 0.82 
    75.03 1 0.25 0.17 
 
The difference in chi-squared between the two models turned out to be strongly 
significant (p<0.001) in all three cases. Also, in all three cases the difference in the practical 
model fit was quite substantial. Thus, on the strength of both statistical and nonstatistical 
criteria, there was sufficient evidence for discriminant validity of the constructs. Finally, the 
GLVFULPLQDQWYDOLGLW\EHWZHHQWZRFRQVWUXFWV DQG  LVDVVXUHGZKHQLQGLFDWRU    ! 2 
DQG    ! 2ZKHUH 2 is equal to squared correlation between the two constructs (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). This was the case for all pairs of constructs, which satisfied the requirement 
of discriminant validity (see Tables 2.4 and 2.5). 
                                                
6 LISREL 8.3 statistical package was used. 
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All relationships hypothesized in the paper (with the exception of the effect of 
institutions) and presented in Figure 1 were tested simultaneously by means of a structural 
equations model (SEM). SEM approach is particularly well suited for analyzing data that 
involve both observed and latent variables as well as the causal relationships between them. 
Its major benefit lies in the fact that the causal relationships, represented by a set of structural 
equations, can be analyzed simultaneously, allowing for the testing of the validity of 
particular relationships as well as the structural theory underlying the model (Byrne, 1998). 
Additionally, the SEM approach in contrast to most other multivariate methods (for example 
multiple regression), by estimating the measurement model, allows the assessment of the 
measurement error (Byrne, 1998). The SEM techniques are quite demanding in terms of the 
sample size required to obtain reliable and stable estimates. However, as our hypothesized 
model is limited in size (see Figure 1) the sample of 149 observations yields itself to analysis 
by SEM technique.  
 
2.5.3. Results 
Table 2.7 presents the item loadings from the estimated model. All standardized 
ladings have the expected sign and are significant.  
 
Table 2.7. Model item loadings 
Construct Standardized item loading t-value 
Learning    
Areas in which knowledge was acquired   0.74  8.62 
Average knowledge acquisition in the areas  0.73  8.46 
Areas in which improvements were made   0.76  8.83 
Average scope of improvements made  0.81  9.40 
Knowledge application  0.56  6.40 
Efficiency improvement  0.77  8.98 
Sharing   
Foreign partner sharing  0.96  3.70 
JV sharing  0.79  3.79 
Organization level reputation   
Partner research  0.69  5.87 
Impact of reputation 0.83  6.40 
Organization level calculation   
Withdrawal consequences 0.75 10.07 
Success dependence  0.94 13.79 
Negative reputation effect  0.66  8.61 
BRP similarity   
Similarity of educational backgrounds  0.41  4.36 
Similarity of professional experience  0.38  4.06 
Experience   
JV duration  1.00 -- 
 
Table 2.8 presents information concerning the quality of the model and the estimated 
causal paths. The model offers a very good fit with the data; the chi-squared for the model is 
Levels of interorganizational trust 
 43
insignificant, standardized RMR is lower than 0.05, the absolute fit index, GFI is of 
acceptable level (0.92), comparative fit indices all demonstrate very good fit. 
 








Calculation Æ Learning  0.33  3.69    0.33  3.69 
Reputation Æ Learning  0.19  2.45    0.19  2.45 
JV duration Æ Learning -0.03 -0.41 -0.07 -0.95 -0.10 -1.02 
JV duration Æ Sharing -0.14 -0.95   -0.14 -0.95 
BRP similar. Æ Sharing  0.81  2.59    0.81  2.59 
BRP similar. Æ Learning    0.40  3.87  0.40  3.87 
Sharing Æ Learning  0.49  3.15    0.49  3.15 
Chi-squared = 106.39, df=91, p-value=0.13 
stand. RMR = 0.047 
RMSEA = 0.034 
GFI = 0.92,  
NFI = 0.90, CFI = 0.98, IFI = 0.98 
  
 As for the path estimates, starting with the trust at the two levels, sharing between 
boundary spanners has a strong positive effect on learning.  The effect of boundary spanner 
similarity on sharing also has the predicted sign and significance. Collaborative arrangements 
(learning after controlling for sharing) are significantly and positively affected by calculation 
and reputation of the partners. Experience, as proxied with JV duration, does not appear to 
have a direct effect on sharing or collaborative arrangements, nor an indirect effect on 
learning.  
 Our results reveal that operational level trust is strongly based on boundary spanner 
similarity, while strategic level trust is grounded in calculation and reputation of the partners. 
Experience does not seem to affect trust at either of the two levels. This demonstrates that 
trust at the different levels is indeed based on different sources, which in turn, in lack of more 
objective measures, can become useful indicators of interorganizational trust at the two levels. 
The above analysis also reveals how trust at two the levels can be operationalized, by means 






 There are various ways to define interorganizational trust, depending on whether the 
trustor and the trustee are conceptualized to be individuals or organizations. However, 
concepts developed in the context of interpersonal trust (i.e., between two individuals) should 
not be uncritically used in discussions of interorganizational trust, as this may weaken the 
strength of the arguments and the reliability of the findings.  In order avoid such pitfalls one 
should be specific with regard to the definition of the concept of interorganizational trust 
employed in a particular study. We propose a conceptualization of interorganizational trust in 
which the trustor is always an individual, while the trustee can be either the partner 
organization as a whole or its individual members. Furthermore our definition of 
interorganizational trust emphasizes the importance of trustor’s position in his or her own 
organization. Specifically, we propose to distinguish between operational-level organizational 
actors and strategic level organizational actors, and suggest that the outcomes and sources of 
interorganizational trust are likely to be different at these two levels. 
 This definition of the concept of interorganizational trust also throws a different light 
on the problem of misspecification of interorganizational trust operationalizations as 
discussed by Currall and Inkpen (2002). If the trustor is conceptualized to be an individual, 
data collection at the level of the individual is adequate. Also, well-positioned individual 
actors can be reliable sources of information concerning interorganizational trust, both at the 
operational and at the strategic level (as we define them). This is an important issue, for if 
Currall and Inkpen’s (2002) criticism were correct, large-scale survey-based studies of 
interorganizational trust would pose practically insurmountable data requirements. 
 Based on our conceptualization of the two levels of interorganizational trust, we 
further propose an approach to empirically gauging interorganizational trust. It is based on the 
expectation that partly different sources of trust are at play at these two levels. At the 
operational level we expect interorganizational trust to be based on experience acquired in 
interactions with representatives of the partner in question and similarity of occupational 
identities of the gatekeepers. At the strategic level stakes involved in preserving collaboration, 
institutions providing safeguards, organizational reputation and experience in collaboration 
with the partner are argued to be the most important sources of trust. We illustrate the use of 
this approach with an empirical study of interorganizational learning in joint ventures between 
Polish and foreign firms. We adopt the extent of knowledge transfer between organizations as 
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a measure of their mutual trust. Transfer of knowledge depends on open and honest 
communication, which makes the sending party vulnerable to the partner. We hypothesize 
positive relationships between the various sources and the identified proxies of trust at the two 
levels. 
 A model based on our proposed framework shows excellent fit with the data. 
Calculation and reputation were found to be significant sources of strategic-level trust, while 
identification a significant source of operational-level trust. We did not find support for 
experience being a source of trust at either of the two levels. Since the study was set within 
one particular institutional environment, we could not test for effects of institutions as a 
source of trust. Nevertheless, the overall results of our empirical study are encouraging for the 



































 The growth in the number of strategic alliances since the beginning of the ‘90s has 
exceeded 25 percent annually (Inkpen, 1998). Strategic alliances encompass a broad range of 
contractual forms, from arm’s-length contracts to equity joint ventures (Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999). Learning between partners is an important aspect of inter-firm collaboration, because 
of the opportunities and threats it poses to the cooperating firms (Hamel 1991; Kogut 1988). 
Concurrently, the notion of trust emerges as an important factor for understanding human 
nature and exchange relationships of market participants, while the emphasis on opportunism 
in, for example transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985), is subjected to much criticism 
(Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). In specific, trust, as an expectation of the partner’s reliability with 
regard to his obligations, predictability of behavior, and fairness in actions and negotiations 
while faced with the possibility of behaving opportunistically (cf. Zaheer, McEvily & 
Perrone, 1998), is argued to be an important variable in interorganizational cooperation (e.g., 
Gulati, 1995; Madhok, 1995).  
 A high level of trust is suggested to have a positive effect on knowledge sharing 
(McEvilly, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003) in both intra-organizational (e.g., Kostova, 1999; 
Makino & Inkpen, 2003; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) and inter-organizational context (Geringer, 
1988; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Inkpen, 1997; Hedlund, 1994). This is a very specific context where 
those who frame the strategic intentions of collaborating organizations are often distinct from 
those who actually implement them at the operational level; a consideration that is quite rarely 
reflected in research on learning in interorganizational alliances (Salk & Simonin, 2003). A 
theory of trust and interorganizational learning should therefore address the potential role of 
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trust at (at least) two levels, as trust between top management boundary spanners would likely 
affect interorganizational learning differently than trust between operational level boundary 
spanners. Moreover, trust at these two levels would not only likely differ in its effects, but 
also in how it is formed. Although some existing literature on trust and learning between 
organizations considers the different sources interpartner trust can stem from, the fact that 
some sources may be more relevant for the development of trust at one level or the other has 
been largely ignored. We use social learning theory to analyze how trust at the two above 
mentioned levels, with its distinct antecedents and consequences, affects learning between 
partners. 
 In light of the above the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we formulate an 
explicit theoretical argument for why trust between alliance partners would result in superior 
learning between them. To that end, we move beyond the familiar, yet relatively ambiguous, 
concept of interorganizational trust and identify two distinct levels of that trust. We illuminate 
mechanisms through which trust at each of those levels affects knowledge transfer in a unique 
way. We argue that while operational level trust held by non-executive boundary spanners is 
conducive to tacit knowledge sharing between them, strategic-level (i.e., held by top 
managers) trust affects collaborative arrangements that facilitate (or not) the sharing. Second, 
we argue that distinct antecedents are of importance for the formation of trust at the two levels 
i.e., trust at the strategic and operational levels is based on different sources. Besides 
theoretical contribution, this also has practical implications as the level of trust is not 
necessarily a given, but can be influenced by managers’ actions (cf. Parkhe, 1998a,b). 
Understanding mechanisms through which interpartner trust (at both levels) is formed, 
therefore, can become a basis for formulating strategies for fostering trust with the aim to 
achieve a superior learning outcome.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. First, we explore the issue of inter-partner learning in 
alliances. Second, we delineate the two levels of trust relevant to interorganizational 
knowledge transfer. Third, we formulate propositions linking different types of trust to 
subprocesses of interorganizational learning and present our model. Conclusions follow. 
 
 
3.2. Learning between alliance partners 
 
 Definitions of organizational learning abound. Huber (1996) defines learning very 
broadly as a process in which an entity, through processing of information, changes the range 
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of its potential behaviors. He further states, “an organization learns if any of its units acquires 
knowledge that it recognized as potentially useful to the organization” (Huber, 1996: 126). 
Organizational learning is based on routine, history-dependent, and oriented towards targets 
(Levitt & March, 1996) and although it is accomplished through individual organizational 
members it is much more than the sum of their learning (Fiol & Lyles, 1985). While 
individual learning deals with personalities, personal beliefs and habits, organizational 
learning focuses on routines, shared mental maps, norms and values as well as the ecologies 
of learning (Levitt & March, 1996) 
 Four phenomena related to organizational learning can be distinguished: knowledge 
acquisition, information distribution, information interpretation, and organizational memory 
(Huber, 1996). In this paper we focus on knowledge acquisition. Organizations can gain 
knowledge from their own experiences (Huber, 1996; Levitt & March, 1996) but also acquire 
it vicariously, i.e., externally (Von Krogh, Nonaka, and Aben, 2001). We turn our attention to 
the latter case, to a situation where an organization acquires knowledge from an external 
source, its alliance partner in specific (Huber, 1996, Levitt & March, 1996), and define that as 
the process of interorganizational learning.7 
 Interorganizational learning is frequently pointed to as the primary reason for the 
existence of alliances (Salk & Simonin, 2003; Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Lyles, 1988). Others, however, argue that many alliance partners do not have a well-
defined learning objective (e.g., Hagedoorn & Sadowski, 1999; Inkpen, 2000). We distance 
ourselves from that dispute, and assume that whether some alliances are formed for the sole 
purpose of acquiring knowledge from the partner or not, they do offer opportunities for 
learning between the partners (cf. Inkpen, 1997). For learning in an interorganizational 
context to take place three knowledge processes need to be managed: transfer, transformation 
and harvesting (Tiemessen, Lane, Crossan, & Inkpen, 1996). “Transfer” can be described as 
“the movement of knowledge between parent firms” be it directly or via an alliance 
(Tiemessen et al., 1996: 387). “Transformation” involves extending the existing knowledge 
and creating new knowledge through the alliance’s independent activities. “Harvesting”, 
finally, encompasses the “flow of the transformed and newly created knowledge” from the 
alliance back to the parent organizations (Berdrow & Lane, 2003: 17). Although all three 
                                                
7 We make an implicit assumption here that the knowledge acquired by the alliance partners from each other is subsequently 
distributed, interpreted and stored in their respective organizations. 
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processes are crucial, in the current paper we focus on knowledge transfer only, and thus the 
issue of knowledge newly created within an alliance is outside the scope of this work.8 
 Knowledge may be explicit or tacit (Polanyi, 1962). The former is systematic, 
formalized and transferable without loss of integrity (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Polanyi, 1962). 
Its transfer across organizational boundaries is thus likely to be for the most part 
unproblematic. Tacit knowledge in contrast is intuitive and unarticulated, cannot be 
verbalized, and thus cannot be easily transferred (Martin & Salomon, 2003; Kale, Singh, & 
Perlmutter, 2000; Polanyi, 1962). Tacit knowledge is the personal judgment that comes in 
between explicit formulations of knowledge (e.g., rules, formulae) and the actual experience 
of an individual’s senses (Tsoukas, 2003). It finds expression in the skills of an individual, the 
rules of behavior which s(he) is usually not consciously aware of (Polanyi, 1962). We, 
therefore, understand tacit knowledge to be distinct from explicit knowledge and non-
convertible into the latter (Polanyi, 1962; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998, Cook & Brown, 1999). 
Examples of tacit knowledge in an interorganizational context include the successful 
operation of a complex manufacturing system, like in the cooperation between General 
Motors and Toyota in NUMMI (Doz & Hamel, 1998: 53), or the development of profitable 
customer relations in a service industry, like in the alliance between the Royal Bank of 
Scotland and Banco Santander (Child & Faulkner, 1998: 290). 
 Compared to explicit knowledge, the flows of tacit knowledge necessitate more 
informal control mechanisms (Makhija & Ganesh, 1997) as well as a higher level of 
understanding and commitment of the learning parties (Brown & Deguid, 1991). Tacit 
knowledge transfers are thus best achieved by means of strong ties that assure the necessary 
intensity of interaction (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000), quality of communication and “intimacy” 
between the partners (Szulanski, 1996). Trust between the partners would, therefore, be much 
more relevant for the transfer of tacit knowledge than for the transfer of explicit knowledge. 
Additionally, extant literature views alliances as a particularly suitable environment for 
allowing partners’ to mutually access and share each other’s knowledge-based, 
organizationally embedded, i.e., tacit resources (Hall, 1992; Inkpen, 1997; Powell, Koput, & 
Smith-Doerr, 1996). For the above two reasons in our further analysis our focus will be on 
tacit knowledge.  
                                                
8 We consider knowledge transfer between the parents to be a prerequisite for knowledge transformation and/or harvesting to take 
place i.e., an enabling condition for the two subsequent processes. Additionally, since transformation happens within an alliance and 
harvesting is the responsibility of the parent organizations (Tiemessen et al., 1996), neither depends directly on the level of 
interorganizational trust between the alliance partners.  
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  Successful transfer of tacit knowledge between alliance partners requires wide-
ranging, continuous, face-to-face interactions between individual members of the learning 
alliance partners (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Kale et al., 2000), which 
can be achieved by means of organized personnel contacts, meetings and transfers of 
managers (Makhija & Ganesh, 1997). In fact, the greater the tacitness of knowledge the more 
individuals must be the transfer agents (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Hedlund, 1994). Yet, although 
the cognitive process of learning is individual in nature, the social context in which it takes 
place is of crucial importance (Brown & Deguid, 1991; Powell et al., 1996).  
  The basic precept of the social learning theory is that learning is situated in the context 
of social activity and practice, (Plaskoff, 2003; Elkjaer, 1999, 2003; Fox, 2000) and is 
accomplished through “observation and emulation of skilled practitioners and socialization” 
(Easterby-Smith & Arujo, 1999: 5).  Learning emerges thus as a product of social interactions 
of individuals within the context of communities of practice (Fineman, 2003), one of the 
primary notions of this approach (Fox, 2000). Communities of practice encompass individuals 
working closely together towards accomplishment of certain tasks (Fox, 2000). An 
organization therefore can be viewed as a community of communities of practice (Fox, 2000; 
Brown & Deguid, 1999). Members of communities of practice build shared identity, which 
allows for the development of social networks along which tacit knowledge can travel 
efficiently (Brown & Deguid, 1991). The shared practice that members of a community of 
practice engage in can thus be said to constitute the rail along which tacit knowledge can 
travel within a community of practice. What the above implies is that transfer of tacit 
knowledge between the alliance partners necessitates the existence of communities of practice 
spanning the boundaries of both organizations. 
  The above discussion also suggests that the extent of possible knowledge flows 
between organizations is determined by the collaborative arrangements of an alliance, i.e., the 
enabling conditions for the built-up of crosscutting communities of practice. In other words, 
collaborative arrangements determine to what extent the intimate, face-to-face, interactions 
between organizational boundary spanners from the partner organizations, enabling the 
sharing of tacit knowledge, are possible (Kale et al, 2000; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Dyer & 
Singh, 1998). We conceptualize collaborative knowledge arrangements as any combination of 
interorganizational structure, systems and management process elements that are put in place 
and modified in the course of collaboration by the decision makers (cf. Prahalad & Bettis, 
1986) with the aim to stimulate or prevent knowledge flows between the organizations they 
represent. These knowledge management mechanisms, by fostering, blocking or delaying 
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knowledge flows between partners, are a strong determinant of learning between the partners 
(Doz, 1996; Tiemessen et al., 1996).  
  An optimal configuration of the collaborative arrangements assures the necessary flow 
of information for the successful functioning of the alliance, while simultaneously preventing 
uncontrolled flow of proprietary knowledge (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002). The above 
also implies that although “most learning takes place at the lower levels of alliance”, where 
the operating employees “play a vital role in acquiring knowledge”, the learning process must 
begin at the top (Hamel, Doz, Prahalad, 1989: 138), with top management’s commitment to 
knowledge acquisition from the partner. Consequently in our further analysis we differentiate 
between the flow of knowledge along the lines of practice within cross-organizational 




3.3. Inter-partner trust at the operational and strategic level  
 
 An issue that is central to our further argument is the distinction between trust at the 
strategic and operational level in interorganizational relations. Organizations are made up of 
and managed by individuals (Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay, 1996) through whom inter-firm 
relations come into effect (Inkpen & Currall, 1997; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 
1997). These actors, however, play different roles in organizations and thus have unequal 
power to impact organization’s behavior in the collaborative context. Every position in 
organizational hierarchy is associated with a certain role, which reflects the expectation with 
respect to the position holder’s contribution to the operational and strategic tasks (Floyd and 
Lane, 2000). Organizational roles thus restrict and guide individuals’ conduct in an 
organizational (Nooteboom et a., 1997). This implies that individuals involved in an alliance 
on both sides are likely to play different roles depending on the position they occupy in the 
organizational hierarchy. While the roles of the top management are dominated by decision-
making tasks (e.g., ratifying or directing), those of the non-executive managers encompass 
primarily communication of and reaction to information (e.g., implementing, facilitating, 
conforming or responding) (Floyd and Lane, 2000). Therefore, while top (executive) mangers 
can influence the overall cooperation policy of the organization, this is clearly not the case for 
operational level employees, who will likely be responsible for its implementation.  
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 Therefore, strategic-level trust defined as the attitude held by the company’s 
executives towards the partner firm (cf. Inkpen & Currall, 1997) and its members (cf. Gulati 
& Gargulio, 1999) is bound to be manifested in the collaboration policy of the firm in general 
and collaborative knowledge arrangements in specific. Operational-level trust between 
organizations, in contrast, captures trust held by the non-executive boundary spanners of the 
collaborating organizations, who “provide the linking mechanism across organizational 
boundaries” (Inkpen & Currall, 1997) as they carry out the operational tasks of the 
collaboration. Currall & Inkpen (2002) define ‘trust network’ as the sum of interpersonal trust 
in the JV, i.e., trust present in all dyadic relationships of boundary spanners from the 
partnering organizations. Our definition of operational-level trust includes a trust network 
thus defined but is still broader; it additionally comprises the boundary spanners’ trust 
towards the partner organization as a collectivity. Similarly as at the strategic level, therefore, 
the object of the operational-level trust can be the partner organization as an entity and/or its 
individual members. 
 The above conceptualization of interorganizational trust is unique in that it 
distinguishes two levels of interorganizational trust according to who holds it, independent of 
who is the object of it. Previous research has shown that individuals with ease distinguish 
between trust towards the partner organization and an individual counterpart boundary 
spanner (for example Zaheer, Lofstrom, & George, 2002). Nevertheless, we do not expect the 
extent of knowledge flows and/or the shape of collaborative knowledge arrangements to be 
systematically affected by whether the object of trust at either level is an individual or an 
organization. In fact, it seems plausible to assume that a certain level of trust in both is needed 
for learning to occur. Of course, the effects of trust in a counterpart boundary spanner and in 
the partner organization are unlikely to be independent. We expect that the two are positively 
associated.  
 Executive managers could be argued to affect interorganizational knowledge transfer 
not only as those who shape collaborative arrangements but also as the agents of knowledge 
sharing within the context of crosscutting communities of practice. However, it seems 
plausible that in most cases the role of executives will be restricted to setting the parameters 
for collaboration and their opportunity to engage in intensive, hands-on interactions that 
would enable knowledge sharing would be quite limited. Thus since the role of the top 
executives as organizational decision maker is likely to overshadow that of a knowledge 
transfer agent, we do not consider it in our further analysis. This is obviously a simplification, 
as at least some knowledge can be expected to flow at the executive manager level. Yet, 
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although undeniably there is an overlap in terms of roles played by boundary spanners at the 
executive and non-executive levels with respect to knowledge transfer, for the sake of 
conceptual clarity we stress the difference between the two.  
 We wish to stress that by delineating the strategic and operational levels, we do not 
wish to suggest that they are completely separate. Admittedly individuals at both levels are 
subject to similar psychological processes and limitations; it is not our intention to argue that 
top managers are in any way qualitatively different than their lower level counterparts. Also, 
the two levels are linked by the common organizational culture, in which they are embedded. 
Organizational culture has been argued to affect the propensity of its members to trust and be 
trustworthy (Nooteboom, 2002). Additionally, conscious efforts to limit problems associated 
with implementing the collaboration agreement can further bring the two levels closer. A 
situation may arise where a poorly negotiated collaborative agreement is handed over to the 
lower-level management for implementation. To avoid such problems either the lower level 
can be involved in the initial negotiations of the collaborative arrangements or the top level 
can be made responsible for successful implementation of the agreement they negotiate.9 In 
our view, however, the above facts do not undermine our argument that the ways in which 
top-level managers and lower-level managers are involved in the process of 
interorganizational collaboration are distinct. The different nature of responsibility born by 
individuals at both levels and the distinct character of decisions they are required to take are 
what constitutes the basis for the delineation of strategic and operational level trust. 
 
3.4. Trust as a determinant of interorganizational learning 
 
Before we proceed with our argument, we wish to point out two assumptions that 
underlie our further discussion. First, we assume symmetry in the level of trust held by 
alliance partners with respect to each other, i.e., we assume that trust held by A towards B is 
of the same level as trust of B towards A. That implies that we take the level of trust to be a 
characteristic of a relationship, rather than of the partners. Second, in our further argument we 
assume that trust held by partner A towards partner B, will affect the level of knowledge 
flows from A to B and from B to A. This is only an apparent inconsistency as we argue that 
higher trust held by A towards B, should result in A’s greater transparency in dealings with B 
                                                
9 We thank Bart Nooteboom for drawing our attention to this point. 
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(thus more generous knowledge flow from A to B) and A’s higher intent to learn from B (thus 
greater knowledge flow from B to A)  
 
3.4.1. Effect of operational level trust on knowledge flows between organizations 
  In the context of the social learning theory, we expect operational-level trust to play a 
positive role in stimulating knowledge sharing between boundary spanners  (cf. McEvilly et 
al., 2003). First, undertaking learning involves risk as admitting an error or asking for help 
can signal incompetence and negatively affect one’s image (Edmondson, 1999). Potential for 
embarrassment and interpersonal threat can thus impede learning (Argyris, 1982). In line with 
that, social construction of knowledge is argued to be a process fraught with conflict inherent 
in any social process (Easterby-Smith & Arujo, 1999). Learning is thus an emotional process 
(Elkjaer, 1999), and knowledge “an emotionalized commodity.” (Fineman, 2003: 65). 
"Excessive concern about others’ reactions to actions that have the potential for 
embarrassment or threat, which learning behaviors often have” (Edmondson, 1999: 355) can 
be alleviated by team psychological safety thus positively effecting group learning. Trust is 
one of the foundations for creating the climate of psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999) 
and thus can be expected to positively affect learning behavior of team members.  
Second, as Brown & Starkey (2000) argue, individuals may resist learning because it 
might challenge their existing concepts of self. Resistance to internalize knowledge from a 
given source (Szulanski, 1996) can be at least partially overcome if the source is perceived to 
be trustworthy.  A trusting disposition towards another person makes one more open and 
susceptible to the influence exerted by this person (Chiles & McMackin, 1996) in terms of 
selection of goals, choice of methods, and evaluation of progress (Porter, 1997). 
Trustworthiness of the source can thus be conceived of as “a proxy for quality and veracity of 
the knowledge conveyed” (McEvilly et al., 2003). Perceived value of the knowledge, in turn, 
is likely to influence student’s openness to assimilate it. Polanyi (1962: 53) stresses:  
 
“to learn by example is to submit to authority. You follow your master because you trust 
his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyze and account in detail for its 
effectiveness. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence of his 
example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including those, which 
are not explicitly known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated only 
by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the imitation of another”.  
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 Third, individuals who view knowledge as a source of power may resist sharing it 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Szulanski, 1996) or even erect barriers to prevent its incidental 
leakage. Trust between actors fosters free exchange of information, as they do not feel the 
need to guard themselves against opportunistic behavior of the other party (Jarillo, 1988). 
Therefore, if the sender of knowledge trusts the receiver, the former is likely to be more open 
in sharing the knowledge (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). In fact Edmondson & Moingeon, 
(1999) argue that in the context of organizational learning “trust can be seen as a decision to 
place resources (i.e. knowledge) at others’ disposal”.  
For all the above reasons we argue that higher operational-level trust, by increasing 
the parties’ willingness to make themselves vulnerable to each other (cf. Sarkar, Cavusgil, & 
Evirgen, 1997), mitigates the risks involved in the learning process and thus leads to higher 
knowledge sharing between the interacting boundary spanners of the two partner 
organizations.   
 
3.4.2. Effect of strategic-level trust on collaborative arrangements 
 In shaping the collaborative arrangements, executive managers need to consider the 
risks that their organizations face by engaging in knowledge sharing. First, there is the risk of 
expropriation, if the partner uses the rightfully obtained knowledge opportunistically in ways 
contrary to the letter or spirit of the alliance contract. Second, an organization runs the risk of 
knowledge leakage, where the partner, intentionally or unintentionally, acquires knowledge 
that was not meant to be shared. Even if the alliance partner is not a potential competitor (i.e., 
the linkage is of vertical rather than horizontal nature), the risk of spillover may still be high, 
if such competitors are part of the partner’s network. In such case core competence can leak to 
a competitor indirectly via the alliance partner (Nooteboom, 1999). Given these risks, trust 
between partners emerges as an important factor affecting their mutual knowledge transfers. 
Interorganizational governance based on trust mitigates the decision-makers’ fear of partner 
opportunistic behavior (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1992; Kale et al., 2000; Dyer & Chu, 2003) thus 
increasing their willingness to grant each other access to knowledge (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; 
Kale et al., 2000). Trust between partner organizations positively influences their 
transparency, reflecting the level of mutual openness and accessibility, and is negatively 
correlated with the degree of knowledge protectiveness vis-à-vis each other (Hamel, 1991). 
Transparency translates into the absence of structural barriers that can prevent the flow of 
knowledge between partner organizations. Consequently we expect high level of strategic-
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level trust between organizations to result in the collaborative arrangements more conducive 
to knowledge flows. 
Trusting the partner is also likely to increase organization’s motivation to acquire 
knowledge from the partner. Learning between partners in an alliance does not happen by 
default; strategic intent is a crucial ingredient of the organization’s commitment to learn and 
finds reflection in the amount of resources committed to learning (Hamel, 1991) and the 
strategic importance assigned to acquiring knowledge from the partner. However, since tacit 
knowledge is unarticulable its value cannot be reliably evaluated prior to its transfer (Hennart, 
1988). Therefore, similarly as at the operational level, perceived trustworthiness of the source 
of knowledge, rather than the knowledge itself, can be used by the knowledge acquirer to be a 
proxy for quality of the knowledge. If the source of knowledge is deemed trustworthy, 
therefore, the receivers of knowledge feel less need to check its authenticity and veracity 
(Bhatt, 2000), and thus can be expected to be more intent on acquiring it.  
 Organizational transparency and intent to learn reflected in the extent to which 
collaborative arrangements are conducive to knowledge flows between alliance partners, are a 
function of the strategic-level trust held by the executive managers towards the partner 
organization and its members. Thus, higher trust at both operational and strategic level is 
conducive to knowledge transfer between organizations, while the former results in greater 
knowledge sharing between boundary spanners, the latter in collaborative arrangements more 
conducive to knowledge flows.    
 
 
3.5. Types of trust and learning between alliance partners 
 
  Extant literature on trust posits that the overall attitude of a trustor towards a trustee is 
a product of a number of conditions. Zucker (1986) identified four modes of trust 
production10; experience-based, reputation-based, characteristic-based and institution-based. 
Other authors (e.g., Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Doney & Cannon, 1997) have 
subsequently elaborated on a fifth mechanism, i.e., calculation. We believe that new insights 
can be derived from applying the trust production modes approach to analyzing the effect of 
multilevel trust on interorganizational learning, as different mechanisms of trust formation are 
likely to be relevant at different levels (cf. Doney & Cannon, 1997). In specific, we 
                                                
10 Zucker (1986) distinguished in fact three mechanisms, with experience-based and reputation-based trust jointly 
constituting process-based trust. We choose to focus on each of the sub-types separately. 
Chapter 3 
 58
subsequently argue that different modes of trust production are of unequal importance at the 
operational- and strategic-level trust in an alliance and thus affect the knowledge transfer 
process differently. We do not wish to suggest that the types of trust we identify as relevant 
for each level are exclusive of other types. Rather the argument is intended to reflect our 
belief in the dominating role of the identified types of trust for either the operational or 
strategic-level of analysis. 
 
3.5.1. Modes of trust production at the operational level 
  We have argued using social learning theory, that shared practice leads to the 
development of shared identity among people, and thus constitutes a rail along which tacit 
knowledge can travel between the interacting boundary spanners of the alliance partners. 
Brown & Deguid (1999) posit that such shared identity can come about in the context of two 
kinds of networks. The first, and already mentioned, is the community of practice, 
characterized by high intensity of personal interactions among the members who engage in 
joint execution of tasks. Zucker (1986: 62) argues that extensive interaction of a small number 
of “individuals involved in a limited set of exchanges” over long periods of time results in the 
development of trust between them. In the process of working closely together members of 
communities of practice can therefore be expected to develop trust—experience-based trust—
which in turn facilitates knowledge sharing between them. The second is a network of 
practice, which encompasses people who engage in similar practice but who do not work on 
common tasks and may never come to know each other personally (Brown & Deguid, 1999). 
Participation in the same network of practice, by providing the basis for the formation of 
characteristic-based trust (cf. Zucker, 1986) can be considered a condition that supports the 
development of trust between members of a community or practice. Thus, we expect 




  Experience-based trust between parties is based on repeated, past interactions 
(Rousseau et al., 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), assuming they were accompanied by 
successful fulfillment of mutual expectations (Rousseau et al., 1998), thus on the positive 
development of a relationship (Nooteboom et al., 1997). This corresponds to the concept of 
‘habitualization’, which describes bonds that develop between parties in the process of their 
mutual interactions and result in familiarity, mutual understanding and shared habits 
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(Nooteboom et al., 1997). Formation of experience-based trust is a slow, time-consuming 
(Aulakh et al., 1996; Madhok, 1995) and cumulative process (Lewicki & Bunker, 1994). In its 
deepest form, trust based on experience takes the form of identification (Rousseau et al., 
1998), where parties learn to recognize and understand each other’s desires, preferences and 
intentions (Lewicki & Bunker; 1996). We conclude therefore that through processes of 
repeated, close interactions within crosscutting communities of practice boundary spanners 
develop trusting relationships, which result in higher knowledge sharing between them. We 
thus propose the following: 
 
Proposition 1: The level of experience-based trust at the operational level in an 
alliance will positively affect tacit knowledge flows between the 
partners. 
 
The level of experience-based trust at the operational level can be proxied with measures of 
the duration, frequency, informality and density of boundary-spanner contacts. Although, 
transfer of tacit knowledge itself takes place through such interactions also, our argument is 
that at any point in time, trust build up in previous contacts between boundary spanners may 
be assumed to be predictive of tacit knowledge flows in subsequent periods. 
It must be pointed out, however, that excessive group identification may have adverse 
consequences for the interorganizational learning process. While identification within a group 
can have a strong positive impact on its performance, it simultaneously limits the group’s 
openness to new knowledge (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Over-identification can produce 
groupthink, not-invented-here syndrome, or even inertia and rigidity (McEvilly et al., 2003), 
thus limiting the knowledge creation potential of a community. Additionally, although cross-
cutting communities of practice can foster the sharing of tacit knowledge within the groups, 
they can by the same token lead to increasing isolation from other groups within their 




Zucker (1986) defines characteristic-based trust as trust based on certain qualities of a 
person (e.g., family background or ethnicity).  Similarity (e.g., in profession, race or gender) 
is the basis for categorizing oneself and others into social groups (Williams, 2000). According 
to social identity theory individuals use groups to which they belong (i.e., social aggregates) 
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to construct their own identity and accordingly categorize others as in-group or out-group 
members (Kane, Argote & Levine, 2002). At the same time, individuals’ identities (i.e., social 
groups with which they identify) determine the extent to which they perceive each other to be 
similar.  
When people identify with a given social group, it allows them to “surface certain 
cognitive assumptions about themselves in relation to others” (Child & Rodriques, 2003: 537) 
as well as “expectations about the behaviors and intentions of the members of a collectivity” 
(McEvilly et al., 2003: 98).  In particular, social similarity, in terms of values and beliefs, as 
well as personalities, demographics, educational and professional backgrounds, leads to the 
assumption that common background expectations exist and opportunistic behavior is 
unlikely (Zucker, 1986). As a result of social categorization and in-group bias processes, 
ingroup members therefore tend to be evaluated more positively than out-group members, in 
terms of their cooperativeness, commitment (McEvilly et al., 2003) as well as honesty, 
loyalty, benevolence, and trustworthiness (Kane et al., 2002; Doney & Cannon, 1997). These 
positive attributions stemming from social similarity are likely to produce trust between 
individuals (Brewer, 1981; Burt, 1992; Porter, 1997; McGuire, 1968).  
In the organizational context, similarity of occupational identities of the gatekeepers 
(based on shared practice, i.e., networks of practice) are likely to be of primary importance as 
they can “serve as a bridge” between the partner organizations in an alliance (Child & 
Rodriguez, 2003: 544). Thus linking of partnering organizations along the lines of networks 
of practice can be considered a condition conducive to operational-level trust between their 
boundary spanners, due to the social identity they share based on similarity of practices they 
engage in. Consequently, we expect the following: 
 
Proposition 2: The level of characteristic-based trust at the operational level in an 
alliance will positively affect tacit knowledge flows between the 
partners. 
 
In terms of operationalization, professional and education background characteristics of the 
boundary spanners can easily be measured and may be a preferable proxy compared to 
personality traits or demographic features, because of their higher relevance in formation of 
occupational identities. 
Summarizing, we expect experience- and characteristic-based trust at the operational 
level to be the most important determinants of knowledge sharing between boundary 
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spanners.  These two types of trust, however, should not be viewed as being independent. 
Plaskoff (2003) stresses that development of in-group identification is fostered by the 
alignment of cultural elements, as well as common reference points (e.g., experiences, 
frameworks). This would suggest that similarity would not only result in more trust (direct 
effect) but also stimulate the boundary spanners’ propensity to interact and thus positively 
affect experience-based trust.   
 
3.5.2. Modes of trust production at the strategic level 
  The role of strategic-level managers regarding an alliance is likely to be very different 
from that of operational-level employees (Andrews, 1971). In their role of strategy makers, 
top executives are responsible for initiating and directing the strategic actions of their 
organizations. Therefore it is in the alliance formation stage that their involvement can be 
expected to be greatest, while the subsequent, every-day functioning of the alliance (with the 
exception of some extraordinary circumstances) would largely be the responsibility of lower 
level managers. Having set up an alliance, top mangers are likely to move on to other pressing 
issues of strategic nature, some of which may involve formation of other alliances. What the 
above implies is that compared to non-executive boundary spanners strategic-level managers 
are likely to have a much higher exposure to a variety of alliances while being much less 
involved in the actual effectuation of any of them. They thus can be expected to treat each 
alliance much more instrumentally than would be the case for operational-level boundary 
spanners. Additionally, since the decisions surrounding the formation of an alliance (e.g., 
partner choice, resource contributions or collaborative arrangements) are of crucial, strategic 
importance for the organizations they represent, top-managers can be expected to arrive at 
them by way of relatively conscious rational deliberations. Therefore in identifying sources of 
trust relevant at the strategic level, we turn to the theoretical paradigm of strategic choice, 
which focuses on motives like profit and growth as drivers of the strategic choices of top 
executives (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). Consequently, at the strategic level we expect 
strategic considerations to be dominant and trust founded on calculation, institutional 
safeguards, reputation and the track record of expectations fulfillment to be most relevant. 
 
Calculation-based trust 
According to Madhok (1995), besides a behavioral component (akin to experience-
based trust), trust between partners has also a structural component, based on the hostages 
held mutually by the partners. The conviction that the partner will meet his obligations for 
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fear of the consequences of not doing so lies at the heart of calculation-based trust (Lewicki & 
Bunker, 1994). Calculation may consider the impending punishments, but also the loss of 
potential rewards from breaching trust.  
Organizations that engage in a continuous collaboration have economic incentives to 
behave in a trustworthy manner as seeking short-term benefits may endanger the possibility of 
future, repeated transactions (Granovetter, 1985; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). We argue thus 
that high level and/or severity of potential consequences from terminating collaboration or 
placing the quality of the relationship at risk will result in trustworthy behavior of alliance 
partners. Such alignment of partners’ incentives, in turn, is likely to find expression in the 
collaborative arrangements that would allow for a flow of knowledge between the partners 
necessary to assure their continued successful collaboration. This type of trust is more 
relevant at the strategic than at the operational level, because, as we argued earlier, decision 
behavior at the strategic level is of less social and more instrumental nature. It seems plausible 
to expect that the level of trust held by organizational decision makers towards a partner 
would be correlated with whether they perceive the structure of the incentives to be conducive 
to parties’ trustworthy behavior (i.e., abstention from opportunism). We thus propose the 
following: 
 
Proposition 3: The level of calculation-based trust at the strategic level in an alliance 
will positively affect the conduciveness of the collaborative 
arrangements to tacit knowledge flows between the partners. 
 
In the context of empirical research, incentive alignment may be proxied with the partners’ 
perceived goal congruence. Where such congruence is present, it can be expected to be in the 
partners’ best interest to abstain from opportunistic behavior that could endanger the quality 
of the relationship (Sarkar et al., 1997).   
 
Institution-based trust 
Institution-based trust is grounded in values and standards of conduct that guide 
behavior as well as formal structures that enable and constrain it (Nooteboom, 2002). 
Institutions support risk taking and trusting behavior (Hagen & Choe, 1998) of both 
individuals and organizations (Rousseau et al., 1998). Institutionalization at the country-level 
encompasses shared values and norms of conduct, which constitute part of national culture  
(Nooteboom, 2002) as well as the framework of national laws and regulations (Kostova, 
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1999). In the same way as norms and values vary significantly across cultures (Fukuyama, 
1995) and legislative systems differ across countries, and thus have varying effects on the 
behavior of the entities and individuals whose actions they guide and regulate (Fukuyama, 
1995). Additionally, institutions that issue public statements concerning the qualifications and 
reliability of entities (for example professional certifications) as well as other bureaucratic 
structures are likely to serve as formal, social, trust-evoking structures (Parkhe, 1998b; Zucker 
1986).  
The stronger the institutions, the easier it will be for business partners to rely on trust, 
since those institutions safeguard against (some of) the potential for opportunistic behavior on 
the part of the partners (Mudambi & Navarra, 2002). Therefore, the strength of 
institutionalization of the environment in which the alliance is embedded should positively 
influence the level of strategic-level trust between partners for two reasons. First, it would 
increase the probability of the partner’s behavior in conformance to a cultural norm of value. 
Second, it would mitigate the fear of partner opportunism. We therefore propose the 
following: 
 
Proposition 4: The level of institutions-based trust at the strategic level in an alliance 
will positively affect the conduciveness of the collaborative 
arrangements to tacit knowledge flows between the partners. 
 
International differences in trust-inducing institutionalization may be operationalized with 
published indices of the judicial system effectiveness, the bureaucratic process reliability, etc. 
(Gwartney, Lawson & Block, 1996). Such indices do not exist for differences in 
institutionalization between industries (within a country), however. For the latter, proxies 
could be identified by investigating the membership density of industry associations, or by 
qualitatively comparing and rating arbitration arrangements within industries.  
In line with what we argued above, formal institutional structures as a source of trust 
are related to legally or socially established guidelines, which result in negative consequences 
for parties violating trust (Hagen & Choe, 1998). Trust based on calculation, on the other 
hand, is grounded in the partners’ belief that the other party will not defect (behave 
opportunistically) considering the impending sanctions (Gulati, 1995). From that perspective, 
institution-based trust (its structural part) and calculation-based trust are both grounded in 
deterrence, since both are a source of potential sanctions for a defecting partner. The 
difference between the two is that in case of the former the sanctions are relationship-specific, 
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while in the latter they are general and hold across all relationships, independent of the 
partner. Institutional trust thus “generalizes beyond a given transaction and beyond specific 
sets of exchange partners” (Zucker, 1986:64).  
 
Reputation-based trust 
  Reputation allows for confident expectations about the other’s behavior based on 
third-party experiences. Reputation may be equated with the “record of cumulative past 
behaviors” (Parkhe, 1998a: 233) or “a symbolic representation of past exchange history” 
(Zucker, 1986: 62) and thus be positively related to trust (Ireland et al., 2002). The network of 
relationships in which firms are embedded is a rich source of information concerning the 
competencies and reliability of potential partners (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). These networks 
are what the decision makers rely on in deciding on who to potentially collaborate with (cf. 
Dollinger, Golden & Saxton, 1997; Gulati, 1995) and how open to be towards a partner with 
respect to tacit knowledge exchange. Considering the above, we propose the following: 
 
Proposition 5: The level of reputation-based trust at the strategic level in an alliance 
will positively affect the conduciveness of the collaborative 
arrangements to tacit knowledge flows between the partners. 
 
In measuring reputation empirically, one must take care to distinguish reputation from the 
positive experience-based impressions gained by a firm from interacting with the partner. 
Hence, an operationalization of reputation should capture the strength of the general 
reputation of a company in the industry, rather than impressions expressed by the partners, 




Finally, similarly to the operational level, we expect experience-based trust, grounded 
in the partners’ past exchanges to play a role at the strategic-level. Trust based on knowing the 
partner emerges from past and current interactions (Ireland et al., 2002), which allow the 
organizations to get to know each other (Gulati, 1995). Through prior cohesive ties partners 
gain knowledge of each other’s competencies, reliability and integrity, on which trust is based 
(Madhok, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). The better the past expectations have been met  
“the more confident a firm’s decision makers will be in believing that a partner will follow 
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through on its current” (Parkhe, 1993) and future promises. The better the collaborating 
organizations know each other, therefore, and the more dependable and reliable the partners 
have proven themselves to be (Rousseau et al., 1998; Ireland et al., 2002), the higher the 
mutual trust held by their executive managers will be. Higher strategic-level trust, in line with 
our previous argument, should result in collaborative arrangements more conducive to 
knowledge flows. We thus propose the following: 
 
Proposition 6: The level of experience-based trust at the strategic level in an alliance 
will positively affect the conduciveness of the collaborative 
arrangements to tacit knowledge flows between the partners. 
 
In an empirical investigation, the number of previous collaborations between the firms can be 
used as a measure of initial experience-based trust in a particular partner (cf. Gulati, 1995).  
The two sets of propositions—those pertaining to the effect of operational-level trust 
on knowledge flows (1 & 2) as well as those pertaining to the effect of strategic-level trust on 
the collaborative arrangements (3, 4, 5, & 6)—can be linked, as knowledge flow may be 
assumed to be higher when the appropriate collaborative arrangements are in place. Hence: 
 
Proposition 7: The conduciveness of the collaborative arrangements to tacit 
knowledge flows between the partners, ceteris paribus, will positively 
affect the tacit knowledge flows between the partners. 
 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the arguments of this paper. 
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3.6. Discussion and limitations 
 
We have developed an argument for the role of trust in interorganizational learning 
based on social learning theory. We have posited that the level of inter-partner trust at the 
operational and strategic levels positively affects learning between alliance partners. 
Operational level trust has a direct effect on the extent of learning between organizations, as it 
affects the sharing of knowledge between operational-level boundary spanners involved in the 
crosscutting communities of practice. Strategic-level trust in turn affects learning indirectly 
through the facilitating effect of collaborative arrangements designed by the executive 
managers. Based on the above, we have identified relevant sources of trust for each level of 
analysis and formulated corresponding propositions. Below we seek to address a number of 
considerations related to robustness of our argument. In particular, we focus on the issue of 
causality between learning and trust, the limits to trust-driven knowledge sharing and the 
operationalization of concepts. 
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3.6.1. Causality of trust and learning 
 In our analysis so far, we have assumed a unidirectional effect of trust on 
interorganizational knowledge transfer. It is much more realistic, however, to view the effect 
as bi-directional. Open communication between partners has been argued to be a condition for 
the build up of trust for a number of reasons. First, communication between partners allows 
them to work through any differences that are likely to come up in the process of any 
relationship (Das & Teng, 1998) and thus provides early warning signals of things going 
wrong (Gulati, Khanna & Nohria, 1994). Second, open communication allows partners to 
discover and further develop their common values and norms thus reinforcing the sense of 
trust (Das & Teng, 1998). Third, partner openness towards each other allows them to collect 
evidence concerning each other’s intentions, competences, credibility and trustworthiness 
(Das & Teng, 1998; Zand, 1972). The latter two arguments concern the exchange of partner-
specific information, which allows the parties to form better expectations with regard to each 
other’s trustworthiness (norms, values, intentions etc.). This dissertation, however, does not 
deal with inter-partner learning in the sense of partners getting to know each other better. 
Rather, the focus here is on substantive knowledge, i.e., technological, managerial or 
marketing. We believe, that generous and proactive exchange of valuable substantive 
knowledge between partners demonstrates their commitment and benevolence and through 
reciprocity reinforces their mutual trust (cf. Das & Teng, 1998). The above four reasons, and 
the last one in particular, lead us to conclude that the relationship between learning and trust 
should be considered as that of a mutually reinforcing mechanism.  
 However, although trust and learning are mutually reinforcing, some initial 
expenditure of trust towards the partner (no matter how small) must come before any learning 
can take place. Therefore, the question concerning the origin of this initial trust must be 
addressed. Additionally, and related to the previous point, we believe that trust has a wide 
array of antecedents extending beyond the collaboration process itself. Thus, while for certain 
types of trust (for example experience-based trust) the mutually reinforcing effect with 
learning would be very strong, this is not so for other types of trust (e.g., institutional-based 
trust or reputation). Third, since we assume learning to be one of the objectives of a 
collaborative venture, it seems justified to take trust as a condition conducive to its 
achievement (i.e., an antecedent of learning), and not the other way around. Finally, 
considering the train of our argument for why we expect trust to result in superior knowledge 
transfer and the mechanisms through which we believe the effect to come about, the 
possibility that a reverse relationship would hold is very unlikely. For all the above reasons, 
Chapter 3 
 68
we believe it justified to give trust theoretical primacy in considering the relationship between 
trust and learning. At the same time we affirm that the reverse effect is of equal importance, 
yet its consideration would extent beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
3.6.2. Limits to trust-driven knowledge sharing 
The effectiveness of sharing knowledge on the basis of trust should not be 
overestimated (McEvilly et al., 2003). There are a number of reasons why that is the case. 
First, “even the most reliable and best-intentioned source can mistakenly share knowledge 
that is inaccurate, invalid, or outdated” (McEvilly et al., 2003: 97). Second, the benefits of a 
high trust level between transacting partners are evidently conditional on the accuracy with 
which the trustworthiness is perceived or evaluated. Trust in organizational settings requires a 
“probabilistic leap of faith, which may lead the trustor astray” (McEvilly et al., 2003: 98), as 
the attributes of trustworthiness are not easily observable (Barney & Hansen, 1994). It is 
possible that the amount of trust endowed on a trustee exceeds the actual level of his 
trustworthiness (Barney & Hansen, 1994). What this implies is that generous sharing of 
knowledge based on an overly optimistic perception of the partner’s trustworthiness (i.e., 
misplaced trust), may result in expropriation and leakage of knowledge. Additionally, a high 
level of trust between the partner organizations may lead to the (possibly false) assumption 
that all the information is provided without the parties asking for it (Jeffries & Reed, 2000). 
Finally, greater trust, experience-based in specific, provides opportunity for greater 
malfeasance than it would be in case of its absence, since trust towards a trustee makes the 
trustor more vulnerable than s(he) would be as a stranger (Granovetter, 1985).  
What the above discussion suggests is that high level of interorganizational trust can 
be both beneficial and detrimental to organizational well being (cf. Soda & Usai, 1999). Too 
much trust is not always better, just as more tacit knowledge flows between alliance partners 
is not always desirable from the point of view of their performance. Note, however, that the 
above considerations do not in any way undermine our propositions. Misplaced or excess of 
trust (of any type we distinguish) will still positively affect the transfer of tacit knowledge (for 
as long as the alliance holds), albeit to the detriment of one of the partners.  
 
3.6.3. Operationalization issues 
The propositions developed in this paper can be tested on a sample of alliances, 
preferably in an international context, in order to generate variation in institutional 
environments. For that purpose, appropriate measures of knowledge flow and collaborative 
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arrangements need to be identified. Starting with the latter, we defined collaborative 
arrangements as those elements of interorganizational structure, systems and management 
process that condition the flow of knowledge between alliance partners.  Decisions about 
structure include the choice of a partner and ownership form as well as of the collaborative 
goals. The choice of a partner determines what tacit knowledge resources can be contributed 
to the alliance (Tiemessen et al., 1996) and the ease with which they can be transferred 
(Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Lyles & Salk, 1996). The number of 
participants in an alliance is also an important element of alliance structure affecting the 
extent of interpartner learning (Levinson & Asahi, 1995). Articulated goals, well defined tasks 
and expectations for the collaboration facilitate knowledge transfer in the alliances by 
aligning the vision of the partners and providing a yardstick with which to compare the 
learning outcomes and evaluate them (Lyles & Salk, 1996; Doz, 1996). Finally, ownership 
structure has a bearing on knowledge acquisition in alliances (Lyles & Salk, 1996); equity 
alliances (Gulati, 1995; Kogut, 1988; Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996; Hennart, 1988), 
alliances with more hierarchical controls (Gulati & Singh, 1998), shared management joint 
ventures (Lyles & Salk, 1996) and link alliances (as compared to scale alliances) (Dussauge, 
Garrette, & Mitchel, 2000) are argued to be superior conduits for transfer of tacit knowledge 
between partners.  
  Management systems influence knowledge transfer between partners. Two kinds of 
systems can be distinguished; those that by providing opportunities for knowledge sharing 
have a direct effect on knowledge transfer, and those that by affecting the level of control over 
the alliance by the partners (i.e., control mechanisms) have an indirect effect on knowledge 
transfer. The first group comprises such mechanisms as JV-parent interactions and personnel 
rotation, as well as training, internal consulting and assistance that provide the opportunity for 
evolution of communities of practice and the ‘bleeding of ideas” between the organizations 
(Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002; Lyles and Salk, 1996; Lane, Salk & Lyles, 2001). 
Second, organizational control mechanisms (e.g., incentive structures, board representation) 
can assure the necessary reciprocal information flow capacity in an alliance (Kumar & Seth, 
1998; Tiemessen et al., 1996). They can also help the partners protect themselves against the 
adverse effects of unintended flows of knowledge (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). 
  Finally interpartner learning requires appropriate processes  (Zaheer & Vankatraman, 
1995; Lane et al., 2001). For example, the extent to which conflicts are managed integratively 
in the alliance fosters exchange of knowledge both directly (through intensity of contacts) and 
indirectly (through increased perception of procedural justice) (Kale et al., 2000). Learning 
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necessitates also the creation of an integrating frame of reference (i.e., shared social identity) 
(cf. Child & Rodrigues, 2003) by means of context-oriented, culture-based mechanisms  
(Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Das & Teng, 1998). These include rituals, traditions, ceremonies 
or networks (Makhija & Ganesh, 1997) as well as other processes of manager socialization, 
which can assure the necessary reciprocal information flow capacity in an alliance (Kumar & 
Seth, 1998). 
Turning now to interorganizational knowledge flow, operationalizing the construct 
may pose problems, as it is debatable whether it is an observable phenomenon—that is, 
whether acquiring new knowledge is always reflected in organizational change. Two distinct 
approaches to the relationship between learning and organizational change are pronounced in 
the literature. The first postulates that learning constitutes an increase in the stock of 
knowledge that will be activated only when it is needed (e.g., Huber, 1996; Villinger, 1996). 
Thus, although learning might have taken place, a change in behavior will not necessarily be 
observed. In the second approach, every time learning takes place it is assumed to find 
reflection in improved actions and modified routines (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Levitt & March, 
1996), thus in change of behavior. Greve (1998) argues, “an organization learns when its 
experience results in behavioral changes”. If the latter approach is adopted as a basis for 
operationalizing organizational learning, knowledge flows could be assumed to be present 
when behavioral changes are observed.  
This would be an advantage, as finding proxies for knowledge flow is not an easy 
task. Both objective and perceptual measures may be considered. Developing good objective 
proxies is difficult, especially that many of the less direct ones induce the risk of conflation 
with the measures of collaborative arrangements (e.g., frequency of communication, visits to 
and tours of production facilities, shared project teams). Also, and especially with respect to 
frequency of communication between the partners, there is a danger of confusing its quantity 
dimension with the quality dimension (cf. Liker, Kamath, Wasti, & Nagamachi, 1996). As for 
the perceptual measures, perceptions of the type and amount of knowledge acquired from the 
partner organization can be gauged. These measures, however, come with all the drawbacks 
of subjective evaluations of a respondent (usually one per organization). 
 




 This paper provides an explicit theoretical argument for the role of trust in 
interorganizational tacit knowledge transfer in strategic alliances. We argue that 
interorganizational trust at two levels, operational and strategic, has a significant positive 
effect on the extent of tacit knowledge transfer between partnering organizations. Using the 
theoretical lens of social learning theory we argue that trust at each of those two levels is 
different in nature, i.e., different in antecedents and knowledge related outcomes. Tacit 
knowledge flows between organizations only through intimate interactions of their boundary 
spanners in crosscutting communities of practice, which create a context for trust 
development (i.e., operational-level trust) and knowledge sharing. Trust at the strategic level 
hinges on strategic considerations of the partners, which determine how conducive the 
collaborative arrangements are to creation of communities of practice and thus indirectly 
affects knowledge sharing. 
We argue that operational-level trust stems primarily from the identification that 
boundary spanners develop through personal experience, and is reinforced by the 
characteristic-based mechanism of trust production, which hinges on social similarity of the 
interacting actors. Strategic-level trust in contrast originates predominantly in partners’ 
calculation and institutional safeguards as well as in the record of partners’ past behaviors, be 
it in their direct interactions or with other parties. 
On a practical note, our work identifies the mechanisms through which trust at both 
the operational and strategic-levels in an alliance is formed. Thus, it points to ways of 
stimulating tacit knowledge transfers between alliance partners. Yet our argument that more 
trust between partners results in superior tacit knowledge flows between them should not be 
taken as a normative statement; more tacit knowledge transfer between partners might not 
necessarily be desirable from the point of view of an organization’s performance. Future 
research should endeavor to address the question of what the optimal level of tacit knowledge 
sharing between alliance partners is. Future research should also undertake to test the 
conclusions of the paper empirically. If support for the propositions is provided, the 
managerial implications of the current work would gain in significance and robustness. To 
that end, we provide suggestions for possible operationalizations of the relevant variables. 
Finally, future research should undertake to factor the effect of partners’ wider networks of 
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relationships into the analysis of interorganizational trust and knowledge flows, as these are 
















 The growth in the number of strategic alliances since the beginning of the ‘90s has 
exceeded 25 percent annually (Inkpen, 1998). Strategic alliances encompass a broad range of 
contractual forms, from arm’s-length contracts to equity joint ventures (Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999). Learning between partners is an important aspect of inter-firm collaboration, because it 
poses both opportunities and threats to the cooperating firms (Hamel 1991; Kogut 1988). 
Concurrently, the notion of trust emerges as an important factor for understanding human 
nature and exchange relationships of market participants, while the emphasis on opportunism 
in, for example transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985), is subjected to much criticism 
(Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). In specific, trust, as an expectation of the partner’s reliability with 
regard to his obligations, predictability of behavior, and fairness in actions and negotiations 
while faced with the possibility of behaving opportunistically (cf. Zaheer, McEvily & 
Perrone, 1998), is argued to be an important variable in interorganizational cooperation (e.g., 
Gulati, 1995; Madhok, 1995).  
 A high level of trust is suggested to have a positive effect on knowledge sharing 
(McEvilly, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003) in both the intra-organizational (e.g., Kostova, 1999; 
Makino & Inkpen, 2003; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) and the inter-organizational context 
(Geringer, 1988; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Inkpen, 1997; Hedlund, 1994). However, most studies 
take the effect of interorganizational trust on learning for granted or handle it marginally. In 
particular, little attention is paid to the meaning of trust as an interorganizational 
phenomenon. Yet, when considering trust in such context one has to heed the distinction 
between organizational actors who frame the strategic intentions of the organizations in a 
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cooperative agreement and those who actually implement the agreement at the operational 
level. This consideration is rarely reflected in research on learning in interorganizational 
alliances (Salk & Simonin, 2003). As was argued in Chapter 3, trust between executive 
decision-makers of the collaborating organizations, i.e., strategic-level trust, is likely to be 
different in its sources and consequences from trust between operational-level boundary 
spanners, i.e., operational-level trust. Consequently, trust at these two levels can be expected 
to be related to interorganizational learning differently.  
 In this chapter we focus on the strategic-level by investigating how organizational 
decision makers’ trust towards the partner organization and its members affects learning 
between the organizations. We also identify sources of trust likely to be relevant for the 
formation of trust at this level. We formulate and test hypotheses relating sources of trust at 
the strategic level to the extent of learning between organizations. In light of the above the 
contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we formulate an explicit argument for the effect 
of strategic-level trust on learning between collaborating organizations. In doing that, we 
point out the qualitative differences between trust at the strategic and operational level and the 
unequal role they play in interorganizational knowledge transfer. Second, we identify sources 
of trust relevant for the strategic level of analysis and argue that they can be used as predictors 
of trust at this level. This yields theoretical insight into the formation of interorganizational 
trust at the strategic level but also constitutes a basis for the alternative approach to tapping 
trust in interorganizational relationships, which we subsequently demonstrate. Third, we 
empirically test the link between sources of trust at the strategic level and the conduciveness 
of the collaborative arrangements to knowledge flows between organizations. 
 The set-up of the paper is as follows. First, the theoretical underpinnings of the current 
work are expounded. Second, we formulate hypotheses relating sources of strategic-level trust 
between the partners to interorganizational learning. Third, the data and the method are 
presented. Next, we discuss the results. Conclusions follow. 
 
 
4.2. Learning between alliance partners 
 
 Interorganizational learning is pointed to by many as the primary reason for the 
existence of alliances (Salk & Simonin, 2003; Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Lyles, 1988). Others, however, argue that many alliance partners do not have a well-
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defined learning objective (e.g., Hagedoorn & Sadowski, 1999; Inkpen, 2000). We distance 
ourselves from that dispute, and assume that whether some alliances are formed for the sole 
purpose of acquiring knowledge from the partner or not, they do offer opportunities for 
learning between the partners (cf. Inkpen, 1997).  
 Knowledge may be explicit or tacit (Polanyi, 1962). The former is systematic, 
formalized and transferable without loss of integrity (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Polanyi, 1962). 
Its transfer across organizational boundaries is thus likely to be for the most part 
unproblematic. Tacit knowledge in contrast is intuitive and unarticulated, cannot be 
verbalized, and thus cannot be easily transferred (Martin & Salomon, 2003; Kale, Singh, & 
Perlmutter, 2000; Polanyi, 1962). Compared to explicit knowledge, the flows of tacit 
knowledge necessitate more informal control mechanisms (Makhija & Ganesh, 1997) as well 
as a higher level of understanding and commitment of the learning parties (Brown & Deguid, 
1991). Tacit knowledge transfers are thus best achieved by means of strong ties that assure the 
necessary intensity of interaction (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000), quality of communication and 
“intimacy” between the partners (Szulanski, 1996). Arguably, the effectiveness of such 
mechanisms is contingent on the level of trust between the parties. 
Tacit, knowledge-based resources are considered to be the primary source of an 
organization’s competitive advantage (cf. Barney, 1991). Sharing of such knowledge, 
therefore, is marked by the risk of the competitive advantage being dissipated and/or the 
knowledge being used by the partner to the focal organization’s detriment. This is a 
consideration of special relevance in strategic alliances, which constitute an environment 
where partners can relatively easily access each other’s knowledge-based, organizationally 
embedded, tacit resources (Hall, 1992; Inkpen, 1997; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
The fear of opportunistic behavior on the part of the partner firm can be at least partially 
mitigated by interorganizational trust (Kale et al. 2000). Trust between partners, therefore, is 
likely to be a more important determinant of tacit knowledge transfer compared to explicit 
knowledge transfer. Thus in our further analysis we focus exclusively on tacit knowledge.  
  The higher the tacitness of knowledge, the more individuals must be its transfer agents 
(Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Hedlund, 1994). Successful transfer of tacit knowledge between 
alliance partners requires wide-ranging, continuous, face-to-face interactions between 
individual members of the learning alliance partners (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Lane & 
Lubatkin, 1998; Kale et al., 2000). The extent to which such intimate contacts between 
organizational boundary spanners of the partner organizations are possible is determined by 
the collaborative arrangements of the alliance (Kale et al, 2000; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Dyer 
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& Singh, 1998). More generally, we view collaborative knowledge arrangements as any 
combination of interorganizational structure, systems and management process elements that 
are put in place and modified in the course of collaboration by the decision makers (cf. 
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) with the aim to stimulate or prevent knowledge flows between the 
organizations they represent. These knowledge management mechanisms, by fostering, 
blocking or delaying knowledge flows between partners, are a strong determinant of learning 
between the partners (Doz, 1996; Tiemessen, Lane, Crossan & Inkpen, 1996).  
  An optimal configuration of the collaborative arrangements assures the necessary flow 
of information for the successful functioning of the alliance, while simultaneously preventing 
uncontrolled flow of proprietary knowledge (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002). The above 
also implies that although “most learning takes place at the lower levels of alliance”, where 
the operating employees “play a vital role in acquiring knowledge”, the learning process 
begins at the top (Hamel, Doz, Prahalad, 1989: 138), with top management’s commitment to 
knowledge acquisition from the partner. The flow of knowledge resulting from direct sharing 
between organizational boundary spanners can therefore be distinguished from the 
collaborative knowledge arrangements that make this sharing possible. In the remainder of 
this study, we focus on the latter aspect of knowledge transfer and how partners’ mutual trust 
affects conduciveness thereof to knowledge flows.  
 
 
4.3. Interpartner trust at the strategic level  
 
 Organizations are made up of and managed by individuals (Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay, 
1996) through whom inter-firm relations come into effect (Inkpen & Currall, 1997; 
Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997). These actors, however, play different roles in 
organizations and thus have unequal power to impact organization’s behavior in the 
collaborative context. Every position in organizational hierarchy is associated with a certain 
role, which reflects the expectation with respect to the position holder’s contribution to the 
operational and strategic tasks (Floyd and Lane, 2000). Organizational roles thus restrict and 
guide individuals’ conduct in an organizational (Nooteboom et a., 1997). This implies that 
individuals involved in an alliance on both sides are likely to play different roles depending 
on the position they occupy in the organizational hierarchy. While the roles of the top 
management are dominated by decision-making tasks (e.g., ratifying or directing), those of 
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the non-executive managers encompass primarily communication of and reaction to 
information (e.g., implementing, facilitating, conforming or responding) (Floyd and Lane, 
2000). Therefore, while top (executive) mangers can influence the overall cooperation policy 
of the organization, this is clearly not the case for operational level employees, who will likely 
be responsible for its implementation. Therefore, strategic-level trust is bound to be 
manifested in the collaboration policy of the firm in general and collaborative knowledge 
arrangements in specific. 
 We frame the strategic-level trust, therefore, as the attitude held by the company’s 
executives towards the partner firm (cf. Inkpen & Currall, 1997) and its members (cf. Gulati 
& Gargulio, 1999). Such approach to understanding interorganizational trust is unique in that 
it defines strategic-level trust according to who holds it, independent of who is the object of it. 
Previous research has shown that individuals with ease distinguish between trust towards the 
partner organization and an individual counterpart boundary spanner (for example Zaheer, 
Lofstrom, & George, 2002). Yet, we do not expect the decisions concerning the collaborative 
knowledge arrangements to be systematically affected by whether the object of strategic-level 
trust is an individual or an organization. In fact, it seems justifiable to assume that a certain 
level of trust towards both is needed for organizational decision makers to be willing to create 
conditions for the free flow of knowledge across organizational interface.  
 As a criticism of the above conceptualization, executive managers could be argued to 
affect interorganizational knowledge transfer not only as those who shape collaborative 
arrangements but also as the agents of knowledge sharing. However, it seems plausible that in 
most cases the role of executives will be restricted to setting the parameters of the 
collaboration and that their opportunity for engaging in intensive, hands-on interactions 
needed for knowledge sharing will be quite limited. Thus, since the role of the top executives 
as organizational decision maker is likely to overshadow that of a knowledge transfer agent, 
we do not consider it in our further analysis. This is obviously a simplification, as at least 
some knowledge can be expected to flow at the executive manager level. Yet, although 
undeniably there is an overlap in terms of roles played by boundary spanners at the executive 
and non-executive levels with respect to knowledge transfer, for the sake of conceptual clarity 
we stress the difference between the two. 
 
4.3.1. Effect of strategic-level trust on collaborative knowledge arrangements 
 In shaping the collaborative arrangements, executive managers need to consider the 
risks that their organizations face by engaging in knowledge sharing. First, there is the risk of 
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expropriation, if the partner uses the rightfully obtained knowledge opportunistically in ways 
contrary to the letter or spirit of the alliance contract. Second, an organization runs the risk of 
knowledge leakage, where the partner, intentionally or unintentionally, acquires knowledge 
that was not meant to be shared. Even if the alliance partner is not a potential competitor (i.e., 
the linkage is of vertical rather than horizontal nature), the risk of spillover may still be high, 
if such competitors are part of the partner’s network. In such case core competence can leak to 
a competitor indirectly via the alliance partner (Nooteboom, 1999). Given these risks, trust 
between partners emerges as an important factor affecting their mutual knowledge transfers. 
Interorganizational governance based on trust mitigates the decision-makers’ fear of partner 
opportunistic behavior (Kale et al., 2000; Dyer & Chu, 2003) thus increasing their willingness 
to grant each other access to knowledge (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Kale et al., 2000). This is 
particularly so in case of tacit knowledge which usually constitutes the primary basis of 
organization’s competitive advantage (cf. Barney, 1991). Trust between partner organizations, 
by mitigating the fear of partner opportunistic behavior, is likely to positively influence their 
transparency, as reflected in the partners’ mutual openness and accessibility, and low degree 
of knowledge protectiveness vis-à-vis each other (Hamel, 1991). In short, it translates into the 
absence of structural barriers that can prevent the flow of knowledge between the partner 
organizations.  
Trusting the partner is also likely to increase organization’s motivation to acquire 
knowledge from the partner. Learning between partners in an alliance does not happen by 
default; strategic intent is a crucial ingredient of the organization’s commitment to learn and 
finds reflection in the amount of resources committed to learning (Hamel, 1991) and the 
strategic importance assigned to acquiring knowledge from the partner. However, since tacit 
knowledge is unarticulable its value cannot be reliably evaluated prior to its transfer (Hennart, 
1988). Therefore, perceived trustworthiness of the source of knowledge, rather than the 
knowledge itself, can be used by the knowledge acquirer as a proxy for quality of the 
knowledge. If the source of knowledge is deemed trustworthy, therefore, the receivers of 
knowledge feel less need to check its authenticity and veracity (Bhatt, 2000), and thus can be 
expected to be more intent on acquiring it.  
Considering all of the above we expect a higher level of strategic-level trust between 
organizations to result in collaborative arrangements more conducive to knowledge sharing 
between their operational boundary spanners. Such effect would be due to increased 
transparency and intent to learn of the partners and result in superior knowledge transfer 
between them. In line with that, we subsequently undertake to investigate the impact of inter-
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partner strategic-level trust on the conduciveness of collaborative knowledge arrangements to 
knowledge flows between organizations.  
 
 
4.4. Sources of trust  
 
  Extant literature on trust posits that the overall attitude of a trustor towards a trustee is 
a product of a number of conditions. Zucker (1986) identified four modes of trust 
production11; experience-based, reputation-based, characteristic-based and institution-based. 
Other authors (e.g., Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Doney & Cannon, 1997) have 
subsequently elaborated on a fifth mechanism, i.e., calculation. We believe that new insights 
can be derived from applying the trust production modes approach to analyzing the effect of 
multilevel trust on interorganizational learning, as different mechanisms of trust formation are 
likely to be relevant at different levels (cf. Doney & Cannon, 1997). Therefore, we 
subsequently undertake to identify those sources of trust—modes of trust production with 
their respective indicators—that we believe to be of primary importance at the strategic level.  
 
4.4.1. Sources of trust production at the strategic level 
  In their role of strategy makers, top executives are responsible for initiating and 
directing the strategic actions of their organizations. Therefore it is in the alliance formation 
stage that their involvement can be expected to be greatest, while the subsequent, every-day 
functioning of the alliance (with the exception of some extraordinary circumstances) would 
largely be the responsibility of lower level managers. Having set up an alliance, top mangers 
are likely to move on to other pressing issues of strategic nature, some of which may involve 
formation of new alliances. What the above implies is that compared to non-executive 
boundary spanners strategic-level managers are likely to have a much higher exposure to a 
variety of alliances while being much less involved in the actual effectuation of any of them. 
They thus can be expected to treat each alliance much more instrumentally than would be the 
case for operational-level boundary spanners. Additionally, since the decisions surrounding 
the formation of an alliance (e.g., partner choice, resource contributions or collaborative 
arrangements) are of crucial, strategic importance for the organizations they represent, top-
managers can be expected to arrive at them by way of relatively conscious rational 
                                                
11 Zucker (1986) distinguished in fact three mechanisms, with experience-based and reputation-based trust jointly 
constituting process-based trust. We choose to focus on each of the sub-types separately. 
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deliberations. Therefore in identifying sources of trust relevant at the strategic level, we turn 
to the theoretical paradigm of strategic choice, which focuses on motives like profit and 
growth as drivers of the strategic choices of top executives (Barringer & Harrison, 2000). 
Consequently, at the strategic level we expect strategic considerations to be dominant and 
trust founded on calculation, institutional safeguards, reputation and the track record of 
expectations fulfillment to be most relevant. 
  In Chapter 5 we will focus on sources of trust at the operational level and argue that 
the social learning perspective is the appropriate theoretical lens there. Accordingly, we will 
posit that the most relevant sources of trust at the operational level are the experience-based 
identification and the similarity-based shared social identity of the operational boundary 
spanners. Accordingly, we believe trust at the operational level to be less calculative in 
character. Arguably, similarly to the operational level some more relational aspects, next to 
strategic and calculative, would also be of importance at the strategic level. However, we 
would expect these to be primarily operational in the initial stages of the collaboration, when, 
for example, the partners are considering the potential for collaboration or its possible form. 
When it comes to drafting agreements, with specific deals being concluded and collaborative 
arrangements being decided on, the decisive factors would most likely be much more strategic 
in character. Considering the above, the subsequent discussion should be taken as reflection of 
our belief in the dominant role of the identified sources of trust at the strategic-level of 
analysis, rather than their exclusivity.  
 
Calculation as a source of trust 
The essence of calculation-based trust lies in the conviction that the partner will meet 
his obligations for fear of the consequences of not doing so (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) and is 
based on hostages held mutually by the partners (Madhok, 1995). Calculation considers the 
impending punishments, but also the loss of potential rewards from breaching trust. 
Organizations that engage in a continuous collaboration have economic incentives to behave 
in a trustworthy manner as seeking short-term benefits may endanger the possibility of future, 
repeated transactions (Granovetter, 1985; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Thus high level and/or 
severity of potential consequences from terminating collaboration or placing the quality of the 
relationship at risk, is likely to result in trustworthy behavior of alliance partners. Such 
alignment of partners’ incentives, in turn, is likely to find expression in collaborative 
arrangements that allow such flow of knowledge as is sufficient for assuring continued 
successful collaboration. This type of trust is relevant at the strategic level because, as we 
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argued earlier, decision behavior at the strategic level is predominantly of an instrumental 
nature. It seems plausible to expect that the level of trust held by organizational decision 
makers towards partner organization and its members would be correlated with whether they 
perceive the structure of the incentives to be conducive to parties’ trustworthy behavior (i.e., 
abstention from opportunism). 
 
Hypothesis 1: The magnitude of losses and/or lost opportunities for profit that the 
partner to the collaboration would incur from its potential termination, 
will positively affect the conduciveness of the collaborative 
arrangements to tacit knowledge flow from the focal organization to the 
partner. 
 
Reputation as a source of trust 
Reputation allows for confident expectations about the other’s behavior based on 
third-party experiences. Reputation may be equated with the “record of cumulative past 
behaviors” (Parkhe, 1998a: 233) or “a symbolic representation of past exchange history” 
(Zucker, 1986: 62) and thus is positively related to trust (Ireland et al., 2002). The network of 
relationships in which firms are embedded is a rich source of information concerning the 
competencies and reliability of potential partners (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). These networks 
are what the decision makers rely on in deciding on the choice of potential collaborators (cf. 
Dollinger, Golden & Saxton, 1997; Gulati, 1995) and in evaluating the level of partner’s 
expected trustworthiness. They also allow the decision makers to decide how much 
knowledge acquisition from the partner organization is desirable. Since we argued the 
trustworthiness of the partner to be an indicant of the knowledge quality to the organization, 
we hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The reputation of the partner as perceived by the focal organization will 
positively affect the conduciveness of collaborative arrangements to 
tacit knowledge acquisition from the partner. 
 
Experience as a source of trust 
Trust based on experience between partners is rooted in their repeated, current and 
past interactions (Rousseau et al., 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Ireland et al., 2002), 
assuming these were accompanied by successful fulfillment of mutual expectations (Rousseau 
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et al., 1998). The better the past expectations have been met, “the more confident a firm’s 
decision makers will be in believing that a partner will follow through on its current” (Parkhe, 
1993) and future promises. The better the collaborating organizations know each other, 
therefore, and the more dependable and reliable the partners have proven themselves to be 
(Rousseau et al., 1998; Ireland et al., 2002), the higher will be the strategic-level trust between 
them. Higher strategic-level trust, in line with our previous argument, should result in 
collaborative arrangements more conducive to knowledge flows and thus in superior learning 
outcome. Trust based on knowing the partner emerges from partners’ past interactions, i.e., 
prior collaborations (Madhok, 1995; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), and current interactions in the 
context of an on-going collaboration (Ireland et al., 2002). We thus hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The conduciveness of collaborative arrangements to tacit knowledge 
flow between the partners, will be positively affected by,  
a) the level of partners’ past experience with each other, 
b) the level of partners’ current experience with each other. 
 
Institutions as a source of trust  
Institution-based trust is grounded in values and standards of conduct that guide 
behavior as well as formal structures that enable and constrain it (Nooteboom, 2002). 
Institutions support risk taking and trusting behavior (Hagen & Choe, 1998) of both 
individuals and organizations (Rousseau et al., 1998). Institutionalization at the country-level 
encompasses shared values and norms of conduct, which constitute part of national culture  
(Nooteboom, 2002) as well as the framework of national laws and regulations (Kostova, 
1999). Both norms and values as well as legislative systems are likely to vary significantly 
across cultures or countries and thus have different effect on the behavior of the entities and 
individuals whose actions they guide and regulate (cf. Fukuyama, 1995). Additionally, 
institutions that issue public statements concerning the qualifications and reliability of entities 
(for example professional certifications) as well as other bureaucratic structures are likely to 
serve as formal, social, trust-evoking structures (Parkhe, 1998b; Zucker 1986). The trust-
inducing institutions are likely to vary not only between countries, but also between industries 
of one country, due to different legislation and private ordering arrangements.  
The stronger the institutions, the easier it will be for business partners to rely on trust, 
since those institutions safeguard some of the potential for opportunistic behavior on the part 
of partners (Mudambi & Navarra, 2002). Therefore, the strength of institutionalization of the 
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environment in which the alliance is embedded should positively influence the level of 
strategic-level trust between partners for two reasons. First, it would increase the probability 
of the partner’s behavior in conformance to a cultural norm of value. Second, it would 
mitigate the fear of partner opportunism. However, since all the JVs in our sample are based 
in one institutional environment, the assessment of the effect of institutions is impossible—in 
the context of our empirical investigation, they are constant. 
 In our analysis up till now, we have assumed a unidirectional effect of trust on 
interorganizational knowledge transfer. It is much more realistic, however, to view the effect 
as bi-directional. Also, we have implicitly assumed that more trust always results in a better 
learning outcome. In reality, however, limits to knowledge sharing based on trust are to be 
expected. Elaboration of both of these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. For 
a more thorough discussion of the issues we refer to Chapter 3.  
 
 
4.5. Data and method  
 
Hypotheses developed in this paper have been tested on a sample of 149 joint ventures 
formed in Poland between a local and a foreign partner. In the context of its joining of the 
European Union, Poland constitutes an especially suitable setting for an empirical study of the 
role of trust in interorganizational knowledge transfer. In order to be competitive in the 
common market, Polish companies need to catch up with their European rivals in terms of 
new technologies and market-oriented management practices. Transition-economy 
organizations view foreign partners as rich reservoirs of new knowledge (Lyles & Salk, 1996) 
and collaboration with them as an effective learning mechanism (Child & Markoczy, 1993; 
Markoczy, 1993). 
The data was gathered by way of a survey, which was carried out in the fall of 2002 
and spring of 2003. An address database of international JVs operating in Poland, including 
the name and function of a contact person (usually the CEO or another top manager), was 
acquired from a Polish commercial address provider, Teleadreson. A package containing a 
questionnaire, a cover letter, a recommendation letter from the Dutch Embassy in Poland as 
well as a stamped return envelope was sent to 1218 JVs. 129 filled-out questionnaires were 
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returned, five of which were found to be unusable12. This constitutes a 10,6% response rate. 
The nonrespondents were subsequently contacted by phone13 to inquire about the 
questionnaire. In 313 cases the firm was found not to be a joint venture (any more). An 
additional 79 firms were found not to be independent entities, not to exist any more, to have 
suspended their operations and/or to be in liquidation. 166 replacement questionnaires were 
sent out to firms that confirmed their JV status and indicated willingness to respond14. The 
second wave of mailing resulted in 26 additional responses (1 of them being unusable). The 
total response rate therefore, reached the level of 18,6% and is deemed to be of an acceptable 
level considering the transition economy standards15. The sample included both JV’s that 
came to existence by way of creation of a new, separate entity as well as those where the 
foreign partner acquired a minority share in an existing Polish company. 
The questionnaire itself was directed to the Poland-based JV organization. It was 
developed based on extensive literature review in the area of interorganizational learning and 
inter-partner trust as well as on an exploratory study which involved interviews with top 
managers of 9 Polish-foreign JVs. Questions were formulated with the aim to gauge the 
knowledge transfer processes between partners as well as the different sources of trust. The 
questionnaire was proof-read by a number of scholars both from the organization theory field 
and outside, with some having extensive experience with the survey method and some being 
native speakers of Polish. Subsequently, the questionnaire was tested on 4 JV managers to 
assure relevance and understandability of the questions as well as the appropriateness of the 
response scales.  
 Operationalization of the constructs posed a challenge. Especially in case of 
collaborative arrangements, which are a multidimensional construct (structure, systems and 
process), it was impossible to design a homogenous dependent variable. Therefore, resting on 
the assumption that the overall interorganizational knowledge flow (learning) between 
organizations is a sum of the collaborative arrangements and the sharing of knowledge 
between their boundary spanners, we adopted interorganizational learning as our dependent 
variable and controlled for the extent of knowledge sharing on the independent variable side. 
                                                
12 Due to clear misinterpretation of the purpose of the project by the respondent (as inferred from the respondent’s 
comments) and thus unreliability of the answers provided. 
13 In some cases the attempt was unsuccessful, due to missing or faulty phone numbers and companies not being listed 
in the on-line phone directory. There were a number of cases were despite the fact that the attempt was successful, it 
was impossible (despite numerous attempts) to obtain information about the questionnaire or the company’s ownership 
status (JV or not). 
14 In most cases the firms said not to have received the first questionnaire. Address or contact person misspecification 
was found to be a frequent occurrence. 
15 Low response rates are due to: (1) lack of tradition to collaborate with academia and  (2) large number of 
questionnaires received by most companies, which results in their reluctance to participate. 
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Thus, after factoring out the extent of sharing from the overall learning variable, we believe 
we were able to capture the collaborative arrangements as a dependent variable. Therefore, 
although in line with our argument, learning outcome in an alliance is a function of trust at 
both operational and strategic levels, by controlling for knowledge sharing we avoided an 
omitted variable bias and were able to partial out the effect of strategic level sources of trust 
on collaborative arrangements only. But operationalizing learning outcome was also far from 
straightforward, as it is debatable whether learning is an observable phenomenon, that is, 
whether acquiring new knowledge always finds reflection in organizational change. For the 
sake of empirical investigation, we assume that every time learning does take place it finds 
reflection in improved actions and modified routines of the organization (Fiol & Lyles, 1985; 
Levitt & March, 1996). This is a conservative measure of the amount of learning taking place 
in the JV.  
  To increase the reliability of the measures and limit the measurement error, multi-
item scales were used to assess some of the constructs (Churchil, 1979). This was particularly 
the case for the more latent and core concepts like learning outcome, knowledge sharing, 
calculation and reputation. Prior collaboration and JV duration, as well as the governance 
structure and turnover are much more tangible variables, and thus were tapped with single 
item variables. Strategic alignment (one of the control variables), although quite intangible in 
its character, was also assessed by means of a single item construct due to its non-core nature 
(in the context of this study). As for the multi-item variables, where possible an attempt was 
made to include both objective proxies and perceptual measures.  
 We measured learning outcome, the dependent variable, with four items, addressing 
the areas in which knowledge was acquired and scope of the acquisition, the improvements 
that took place in the company as a result of the collaboration and their scope, as well as 
increases in efficiency due to learning and application of the knowledge acquired from the 
partner in the JV’s operations. It is important to stress that our measure of learning outcome, 
besides transfer of existing knowledge may also be partly capturing the acquisition of 
knowledge newly created in the alliance. If this is indeed the case, the measure could be 
argued to misrepresent the intended construct and undermine the validity of our findings. 
There are two reasons why we believe the context in which the study was carried out (i.e., a 
transition economy) mitigates these concerns. First, the gap between the local partner and the 
foreign partner in terms of their knowledge bases is likely to be vast; while on one hand the 
Polish partner’s knowledge with respect to operating in free market circumstances is likely to 
be very limited, on the other hand the foreign partner’s knowledge of the Polish market can 
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also be expected to be very limited. Considering that creation of knowledge in an alliance 
requires certain proximity of the partners’ knowledge bases, the increases in efficiency and 
the scope of changes reported by the local partner can plausibly be attributed to knowledge 
acquisition from the foreign partner rather than to joint knowledge creation. Related to the 
above, partners to a Polish-foreign joint venture would likely contribute very different skills 
to the collaboration. While the foreign partner can be expected to contribute superior 
technological or managerial knowledge, the Polish partner would be a rich source of local 
market knowledge. This would further limit the potential scope for knowledge creation.  
As for independent variables, we operationalized calculation as the perceived negative 
effects of potential termination of the collaboration and measured it with a three-item 
composite variable. The items tapped such aspects of the cooperation as dependence of the 
JV’s success on the continued collaboration with the foreign partner, potential severity of 
consequences of the foreign partner withdrawal from the collaboration as well as reputation 
consequences in case of conflictual termination of the cooperation. The reputation effect was 
gauged by a couple of items, related to the extent of partner research prior to engaging in the 
collaboration and the impact the partner’s reputation has on the decision to engage in the 
collaboration. Finally, the effect of experience-based trust was captured by two independent 
variables. First, the effect of past experience was tapped with a dummy variable reflecting 
whether the partners collaborated in any way in the past. Second, the effect of current 
experience was captured with the JV duration item. For the exact wording of all the items see 
Appendix 1. 
 In our analyses we also included four control variables. First and most importantly, we 
controlled for the amount of knowledge sharing between organizational boundary spanners. 
As was argued above, the extent of actual learning between organizations is a function of the 
sharing between interacting boundary spanners as well as the collaborative arrangements that 
make the sharing possible. In this paper we focus on the latter element and how it is affected 
by strategic level trust between partners. Sharing is not a function of strategic-level trust but 
of operational-level trust (see Chapter 3). Therefore, in assessing the impact of strategic-level 
trust on interorganizational learning, we need to control for the extent of actual knowledge 
sharing between partner boundary spanners. We capture the sharing with a two-item 
composite variable. The two measures related to the sharing of knowledge between the 
foreign partner’s employees and those of the JV.  
Second, and related to sharing, we control for the turnover of the boundary spanners 
responsible for the day-to-day contacts with the partner organization. Turnover is likely to 
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affect the extent of learning between partners, independent of the collaborative arrangements; 
individuals occupying boundary positions can be replaced without the collaborative 
arrangements being altered. The effect of higher turnover on learning can be twofold. On one 
hand, it can stimulate learning; frequent rotation of the staff delegated to the JV by the 
parent(s) may increase the scope for learning (cf. Harrigan, 1985) as every new boundary 
spanner is likely to be a fresh source of knowledge. On the other hand, it may hinder the 
learning process by undermining the built up of trust between boundary spanners (cf. Inkpen 
& Beamish, 1997) and consequently the extent of knowledge sharing between them. The 
effect of turnover was tapped with a single item, which related to the frequency of change in 
the positions responsible for contacts with the foreign partner.  
Third, we controlled for the alignment of strategic goals of the JV and the foreign 
partner. When the strategic goals of the alliance partners collide, i.e., they are (potential) 
competitors, there is risk of spillover (Inkpen, 1998, 2000). Spillover risk implies the 
possibility of valuable organizational knowledge leaking to a competitor who can use it to 
leverage its competitive stance vis-à-vis the organization (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). When 
such risk is high, therefore, partners can be expected to be less willing to share knowledge 
with each other and the collaborative arrangements to be less conducive to the inter-
organizational knowledge flow. We expect therefore the structuring of strategic goals to have 
a direct effect on learning independent of the level of trust that is present in the relationship. 
The effect of strategic alignment was captured with one item variable that assessed the 
frequency with which the JV goals and those of the foreign partner collide (reverse coded).  
A word of comment seems in place on the difference between the calculation 
dimension of the relationship (hypothesized effect) and the strategic alignment (control 
variable). While calculation in the relationship captures the potential negative consequences 
of terminating the collaboration (reflects therefore strategic interdependence), strategic 
alignment considers the extent to which the overall strategic business objectives of the 
partners are aligned (do not collide), independent of the collaboration at hand. These are two 
conceptually different aspects of inter-firm collaboration, which is substantiated by the low 
0.20 correlation between the variables that capture the two effects (see Table 4.5). 
Finally, since the sample included both JV’s set up by way of a separate entity and a 
minority share alliance, we controlled for the governance structure effect by including a 
dummy variable that equaled 1 when a JV was a separate entity. There are two reasons why 
we believe this effect should be controlled for. First, separate entity JVs and minority share 
alliances may be argued to be quite different from the point of view of risks that knowledge 
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sharing involves. Compared to separate entities, minority share alliances may offer the 
partners a different scope for monitoring the use of knowledge subsequent to its transfer. 
Second, the choice of a governance structure might not be a free choice of the alliance 
partners. Polish regulations impose restrictions on foreign ownership in certain branches of 
industry. Additionally, in case of companies undergoing privatization, an external investor is 
often allowed to hold only a minority share in the previously fully state-owned enterprise 
(Janowicz, Piaskowska & Trojanowski, 2004). This consideration obviously affects the 
choice between full ownership and minority share governance rather than between a separate 
entity JV and a minority share governance. Nevertheless, it does suggest that minority share 
alliances might be different from the separate entity JVs in terms of motivations underlying 
their formation (if in fact, a minority share alliance is a default option in case full ownership is 
not allowed).  
 Before proceeding with our analyses, the discriminant and convergent validity of the 
composite variables needs to be assured. With the exception of two, all items used in the 
composite variables were measured on a 7-point Likert type scale. The two exceptions are 
items 1 and 2, which are product variables (a product of count measure with ranges from 0 to 
9 and from 0 to 7, respectively, and an 7-point item). See Appendix 1 for details. Although no 
strict levels of skewness and kurtosis pointing to departure from normality exist, skewness in 
the range 2.00 to 3.00 and kurtosis in the range from 7.00 to 21.00, are considered to be an 
indication of moderate nonnormality. Skewness and kurtosis of above 3.00 and 21.00, 
respectively, are an indication of extreme nonnormality (Byrne, 1998). Considering these 
criteria and the fact that the average skewness and kurtosis for the items are 0.80 and –0.75 
respectively, we can likely consider the scores below as approximating normality. Table 4.1 
presents the descriptive statistics for the items. 
 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics for composite variable items. 
 Mean St. Dev. Skewness p-value Kurtosis p-value 
Knowledge acquisition  17.47 14.73  5.19  0.00  1.13  0.26 
Introduced improvements  12.24 12.00  5.16  0.00  0.46  0.64 
Knowledge application   4.30  2.04 -0.21  0.30 -1.27  0.00 
Efficiency improvement   4.18  1.91 -0.15  0.46 -1.17  0.00 
Foreign partner sharing   3.56  2.04  0.31  0.12 -1.19  0.00 
JV sharing   3.65  1.99  0.28  0.16 -1.10  0.00 
Partner research   3.47  1.97  0.21  0.31 -1.21  0.00 
Impact of reputation   4.64  2.23 -0.54  0.01 -1.20  0.00 
Withdrawal consequences   5.30  1.73 -0.80  0.00 -0.09  0.98 
Success dependence   4.60  2.00 -0.45  0.02 -1.07  0.00 
Negative reputation effect   4.31  2.28 -0.19  0.33 -1.52  0.00 
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 To evaluate the reliability of the measures we used Confirmatory Factor Analysis, 
coefficient alpha and 
   indicators. The confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was carried out 
with the maximum likelihood estimation in LISREL 8.3 (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993). Each 
item was restricted to load on its specified construct, with the 4 constructs being allowed to 
correlate freely. The chi-squared for this model was not significant – chi-squared=46.30, 
df=37, p-value=0.14. The fit indices – the Absolute Fit Indices GFI (0.95) and AGFI (0.90) as 
well as the Comparative Fit Index (CFI=0.99) and the Incremental Fit Index (IFI=0.99) are all 
of high level. Additionally, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) was 
assessed as it incorporates a penalty for lack of parsimony. It took on a value of 0.041. All of 
the above point to a very good fit of the model with the sample observations. Cronbach’s 
alpha for learning (four items) equaled 0.83, for sharing 0.86, for calculation 0.82, and for 
reputation 0.72. A final measure of reliability we used were the 
   indicators. Value of 
more than 0.50 indicates that the variance captured by each construct is larger than the 
variance due to measurement error, which supports the validity of the constructs as well as the 
individual indicators that constitute them (Fornell & Larcker, 1981)—see Table 4.2 below. 
 Convergent validity of the constructs is established when the confirmatory factor 
analysis model fits the data and the factor loadings are significant (Abe, Bagozzi & 
Sadarangani, 1996). The first condition was discussed above and fully supports the claim of 
convergent validity. All constructs demonstrated large and significant standardized loadings 
and the average loading size equaled 0.77. All of this points to a desirable level of convergent 
reliability.  
 
Table 4.2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) results  
Construct      Standardized item loading t-value 
Learning  0.83 / 0.64    
Knowledge acquisition    0.80 10.89 
Introduced improvements    0.81 11.15 
Knowledge application   0.51  6.20 
Efficiency improvement  0.74  9.85 
Sharing 0.86 / 0.78   
Foreign partner sharing   0.97 13.96 
JV sharing   0.78 10.45 
Organization level reputation 0.72 / 0.59   
Partner research   0.69  5.06 
Impact of reputation   0.83  5.37 
Organization level calculation 0.82 / 0.61   
Withdrawal consequences   0.75 10.08 
Success dependence   0.94 13.73 




 A test for the presence of discriminant validity between constructs involves a 
comparison of a model in which the constructs are allowed to correlate freely with a model in 
which the correlations between them are fixed to be 1; the larger the difference in the chi-
square of the two models as well as in the GFI and CFI values they yield, the stronger the 
evidence of discriminant validity (Byrne, 1998). The difference in chi-squared between the 
two models equaled 189.39 (df=6) and was highly significant. The difference in GFI between 
the two models equaled 0.17 and 0.24 in CFI. Therefore, both statistical and non-statistical 
criteria provide evidence of discriminant validity being present between the constructs. 
Discriminant validity can also be inferred from the correlation estimates between any two 
constructs (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993). As evidenced in Table 4.3, no correlation took on a 
value of 1  (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). The highest correlation was 0.59 between learning 
and sharing. This high value is to be expected however as it captures the relationship between 
closely related, yet distinct concepts.  
 
Table 4.3. Inter-construct correlations and squared correlations (in the brackets) 
 Learning Sharing Reputation Calculation 
Learning 1.00    
Sharing 0.59 (0.35) 1.00   
Reputation 0.27 (0.07) 0.19 (0.04) 1.00  
Calculation 0.52 (0.27) 0.50 (0.25) 0.08 (0.01) 1.00 
 
 The discriminant validity of pairs of constructs with highest correlations (i.e., 0.5 and 
above) was additionally assessed using the strict Fornell and Larcker (1981). This was 
accomplished for each set of constructs by comparing two nested confirmatory factor 
analytical models; one where the constructs were allowed to correlate freely with another 
where they were perfectly correlated16. As was the case for the general discriminant validity, 
the larger the difference in Chi-squared and practical fit measures (i.e., CFI/GFI) between the 
models, the stronger the support for evidence of discriminant validity of the traits (Byrne, 
1998). Table 4.4 presents the results of this investigation. 
In all three cases the difference in chi-squared between the two models turned out to 
be strongly significant (p<0.001). Also, in all three cases the difference in the practical model 
fit was quite substantial. Therefore, on the strength of both statistical and nonstatistical 
criteria, there is sufficient evidence for discriminant validity of the constructs.  
 
 
                                                
16 LISREL 8.3 statistical package was used. 
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Table 4.4. Discriminant validity of pairs of traits 
  Chi-
squared 
df CFI GFI 
Learning vs. Sharing Free   11.92 7   0.99 0.97 
 Constrained   80.25 8   0.87 0.85 
    68.33 1   0.12 0.12 
Learning vs. Calculation Free   15.02 12   0.99 0.97 
 Constrained 106.38 13   0.84 0.83 
    91.36 1   0.15 0.14 
Sharing vs. Calculation Free    3.86 4   1.00 0.99 
 Constrained   78.89 5   0.75 0.82 
    75.03 1   0.25 0.17 
 
)LQDOO\ WKH GLVFULPLQDQW YDOLGLW\ EHWZHHQ WZR FRQVWUXFWV   DQG  LV DVVXUHG ZKHQ 
LQGLFDWRU 
  ! 2DQG 
  ! 2ZKHUH 2 is equal to squared correlation between the two 
constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). This was the case for all pairs of our constructs, which 
satisfies the requirement of discriminant validity (see Table 4.3). For all the composite 
variables, the scores on the individual items were summed and divided by the number of 
items. In the case of the learning outcome variable, where the scales of the items were not 
commensurable, the items were standardized prior to averaging their scores.   
 Besides the composite variables described and established above, we employed a 
number of single item variables. JV duration took on values ranging from 0 (set up in 2002) to 
19 years. Prior ties was a dummy variable, which equaled 1 when the partners collaborated in 
any form in the past and 0 if they did not. The strategic alignment was captured by means of a 
7-point Likert scale variable. Similarly, the boundary spanner turnover was measured on a 7-
point Likert scale and transformed into logarithmic terms before its inclusion in the models, 
due to its pronounced skewness. Finally, a dummy variable captured the effect of the JV 
governance structure, taking on the value of 1 when a separate entity was formed and 0 when 
the JV took a form of a minority share alliance.  
 We tested for the possible non-response bias by evaluating the differences in the 
means of the 16 variables (11 construct items and 5 single-item variables: strategic alignment, 
turnover, governance form, JV age, prior ties) between the early and the late respondents 
(Armstrong & Overton, 1977). The early respondents included the first 60% batch of returned 
questionnaires, while the late respondents the remaining 40% of responses. Such 
categorization approximately reflected the actual inflow of the questionnaires (cf. Lages & 
Lages, 2003). With the exception of one item, no significant differences between the early and 
late respondents were found. The two groups did significantly differ on one of the items 
constituting part of the calculation construct (i.e., perceived negative effect of conflictual 
termination of the collaboration for the JV’s reputation). The average for early respondents 
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equaled 3.91 while for the late respondents 4.90, with the item being measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale. We do not see this as a strong evidence of non-response bias, nor do we perceive 
this to pose a serious threat to the reliability of our results. 
 The instrument (i.e., questionnaire) used in this study could have created a common 
method variance. This would be particularly likely have the respondents known the theoretical 
framework used in designing the tool (Lages & Lages, 2003). This was, however, not the 
case. Additionally the items were not presented to the respondents in any way that would 
suggest the purpose of the study. To further check for a possible common method bias, we 
have performed a principal component analysis on the perceptual items (11 construct items, 
strategic alignment and turnover items) in our model. Four factors with eigenvalues above 1 
were identified, with the first factor accounting for 36% of the total variance. Based on the 
above, we conclude that the presence of common method bias is unlikely in our data.  
All hypotheses were tested by means of multiple regression17. Table 4.5 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the models. Some missing values were 
encountered. They were dealt with by applying list-wise deletion. To make the fullest possible 
uses of the scarce data, this was done, however, on a model-by-model basis, hence differences 
in sample size across the models. The highest correlation can be observed for the Learning 
and Sharing constructs (0.59). Yet, since the discriminant validity of the two constructs has 
been established and no evidence of multicollinearity in our models exists, we confidently 
proceed with the model estimation. Also, variance inflation factors (VIF’s) were calculated to 
check for the presence of possible multicollinearity. There is evidence of multicollinearity if 
the largest VIF is larger than 10, and the mean of all VIF’s is considerably larger than 1 
(StataCorp, 2001). As reflected in Table 4.6, no such evidence is to be found in our sample. 
Additionally, all the models were tested for the presence of omitted variable bias and 
heteroskedasticity18. No evidence of either of those problems was found. 
                                                
17 STATA 7.0 statistical package was used. 
18 With ‘vif’, ‘ovtest’ and ‘hettest’ commands in STATA 7.0. 
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Table 4.5. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 Mean St.dev N    1.    2.    3.    4.    5.    6.    7. 
1. Alignment 5.51 1.77 149  1.00       
2. Turnover (ln) 0.24 0.44 149  0.01  1.00      
3. Sharing 3.60 1.89 149 -0.20  0.18*  1.00     
4. Calculation 4.76 1.71 147  0.20*  0.30*  0.50**  1.00    
5. Reputation 4.06 1.87 145 -0.04 -0.12  0.19*  0.08  1.00   
6. JV duration 9.26 2.86 149  0.07  0.08 -0.15 -0.10 -0.02  1.00  
7. Learning -0.00 0.81 146  0.18*  0.25**  0.59**  0.52**  0.27** -0.10 1.00 
8. Prior ties a 0.39 0.49 149        
9. Separate entity a 0.81 0.40 149        





Table 4.6 (below) presents the results of multiple regression analysis. Models 1 and 2 
present the effect of control variables on learning, without and with the sharing effect, 
respectively. Models 3 through 5 test the effects of primary interest in the paper, with the tests 
for hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 tested for separately. Pairs of the hypothesized effects are tested for 
simultaneously in models 6 through 8. Finally, model 9, tests for all hypothesized effects 
simultaneously.   
 
Table 4.6. Parameter estimates (standardized) 
Learning Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Alignment  0.07*  0.07*  0.05†  0.08**  0.09**  0.06†  0.06*  0.09**  0.06* 
Turnover  0.47**  0.32*  0.21†  0.38**  0.37**  0.27*  0.26*  0.42**  0.31* 
Separate ent. -0.41* -0.32* -0.36** -0.30* -0.39** -0.33* -0.43** -0.35** -0.39** 
Sharing   0.24**  0.18**  0.22**  0.23**  0.16**  0.18**  0.22**  0.16** 
Calculation    0.12**    0.12**  0.12**   0.13** 
Reputation     0.09**   0.08**   0.08**  0.07** 
Prior ties      0.30**   0.31**  0.28*  0.30** 
JV duration     -0.00   0.00 -0.00  0.00 
Constant  n/s  (-)**  (-)**  (-)**  (-)**  (-)**  (-)**  (-)**  (-)** 
          
N  146  146  144  142  146  140  144  142  140 
R2  0.13  0.42  0.46  0.46  0.45  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.52 
Adj. R2  0.11  0.41  0.44  0.44  0.43  0.47  0.47  0.46  0.49 
Max VIF  1.00  1.03  1.49  1.07  1.09  1.59  1.50  1.10  1.61 
Mean VIF  1.00  1.02  1.20  1.04  1.06  1.22  1.18  1.07  1.21 
†    Significant at p < .10 
*   Significant at p < .05 
** Significant at p < 0.01 
 
The constant term was found to be negative and significant in all but one model (i.e., 
Model 1, where the constant is not significant). The increase in the R2 upon inclusion of 
subsequent explanatory variables, however, suggests that the explanatory power of our 
models is considerable. We observe the largest increase in R2 between Models 1 and 2, upon 
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inclusion of the sharing control variable. Also, addition of the focal explanatory variables (in 
Models 3 through 9) results in an increase of 0.1 in R2 (compare model 9 with model 2). 
Across all models the four control variables are significant. Three of them, in particular—
sharing, alignment and turnover—demonstrate a positive effect on inter-partner learning. The 
effect of the alliance being a separate entity, in contrast, negatively affects the extent of 
learning.  
Focusing now on Models 3 through 9, calculation and reputation demonstrate a 
positive and significant effect on interorganizational learning. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are thus 
supported. As for Hypothesis 3, we find only partial support; hypothesis 3a is supported, 3b is 
not. While past collaborative experience between partners appears to stimulate learning 





Our results support the argument that the presence of sources of strategic-level trust 
between collaborating organizations positively affects learning between them. We find that 
higher calculation of the JV, higher perceived reputation of the partner, and past collaborative 
experience of both, result in a superior learning outcome for the JV. Current collaborative 
experience does not have such an effect.  
We find that sharing has a positive and significant effect on learning. This finding is 
not surprising; the more knowledge the organizational boundary spanners share with each 
other, the more learning can be expected to take place between organizations. Related to that, 
we find the effect of boundary spanner turnover on the inter-organizational learning to be 
positive. Apparently higher turnover contributes to greater scope for learning as new 
boundary spanners bring in fresh knowledge. This points to the direct effect of turnover on the 
learning outcome, i.e., turnover affecting the novelty of knowledge, rather than an indirect 
effect, i.e., turnover negatively effecting sharing through the mediating effect of decreased 
level of trust. 
 The above two findings have important implications for our other findings; even after 
controlling for the two effects (sharing of knowledge and the turnover of the boundary 
                                                
19 Since our dependent variable besides knowledge transferred might have captured some knowledge created in the 
alliance, a curvilinear effect of the duration variable could be expected (Nooteboom, 1999). The model was re-
respecified to include a quadratic effect of alliance duration, however, the corresponding coefficient proved to be 
insignificant while all other results remained unaffected.  
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spanners), we still find substantial support for (most of) our hypotheses. What that implies is 
that besides the actual sharing of knowledge between organizational boundary spanners, there 
are other conditions (i.e., collaborative arrangements) that determine the interorganizational 
learning process. Not only that, the significant effects that we find, demonstrate that the 
conduciveness of these conditions to learning is (partially) explained by the presence of 
sources of inter-partner trust at the strategic-level. Therefore, although the effect of sharing 
accounts for a large portion of the explained variance in our models, the positive effect of 
strategic level trust on the conduciveness of collaborative arrangements to knowledge flows 
between the partners, is substantiated by our models. Consequently, in our further discussion 
we will refer to the effect of various sources of trust on collaborative arrangements, rather 
than the overall learning process. 
The results of experience on the collaborative arrangements offer interesting findings. 
The current collaborative experience, captured by the duration of the present collaboration, 
remains insignificant throughout the models. In contrast, prior experience as reflected in prior 
ties of the partners, turns out to have a positive and significant effect on the conduciveness of 
the collaborative arrangements to knowledge sharing.  That finding appears to be in line with 
our argument that trust between executive boundary spanners (strategic-level trust) is based 
on more instrumental grounds than the trust between interacting boundary spanners. In 
specific, it supports our claim that executive boundary spanners do not engage in the direct, 
day-to-day implementation of the alliance tasks—therefore the level of their trust would not 
change within the timeframe of a given collaboration and would not have an effect on the 
conduciveness of the collaborative arrangements to knowledge sharing. Yet, since the 
decisions makers would treat each collaboration more instrumentally, prior successful 
collaborations with a specific partner would result in higher strategic-level trust and thus 
willingness to authorize higher knowledge flows between operational boundary spanners. Our 
results, therefore, seem to support the argument of strategic-level trust being based on more 
strategic and instrumental grounds, than that of lower level boundary spanners.  
We find that calculative bases of trust have a positive effect on the conduciveness of 
the collaborative arrangements to knowledge sharing. The higher the stakes of preserving the 
collaboration for the JV, the more trustworthy it is perceived to be and consequently the more 
willing the foreign partner tends to be to make its knowledge accessible. This translates into 
collaborative arrangements that allow for greater sharing between boundary spanners. More 
generally, this finding supports our argument that higher calculation of the partners with 
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respect to their collaborative relationship results in higher mutual knowledge transfers 
between them. 
Finally, better reputation of the partner as perceived by the JV appears to have a 
positive effect on the conduciveness of the collaborative arrangements to knowledge flows. 
Two different effects may be at play here. First, higher perceived reputation of the foreign 
partner may be a source of trust and a proxy for the quality of tacit knowledge it holds and 
therefore result in an increased learning intent on the JV’s part. Second, foreign partner’s well 
established reputation, may result in more trustworthy behavior on its part, as the incentives 
for opportunism are curbed by the potential damage it may engender for the reputation. This 
in turn is likely to be reflected, among others, in the willingness to make the knowledge more 
accessible to the JV. Overall the higher esteem of each other the partners hold, the greater 
their mutual trust is likely to be, with the resulting higher conduciveness of the collaborative 
arrangements to mutual knowledge flows.  
 The control variables also provide some compelling findings. The alignment of the 
partners’ strategic goals appears to result in higher partner openness to knowledge sharing as 
reflected in the collaborative knowledge arrangements. We argued that partners would be 
more willing to make knowledge accessible to and acquire knowledge from the partner if they 
did not perceived each other to be competitors. We indeed find that the higher the alignment 
of the strategic goals of the collaborating parties, the more learning takes place between them. 
 Finally, the governance structure of the alliance appears to have a significant impact 
on learning between the partners. In specific, the conduciveness of collaborative arrangements 
to knowledge sharing turns out to be lower in JVs formed as a separate entity. Apparently 
partners are not ready to share as much knowledge in the context of separate entity JVs, as in 
the case of minority share alliances. This might have to do with the possibility to monitor the 
knowledge flows being higher in minority share alliances. This would be relevant in particular 
for the Polish partner on whose premises the collaboration and thus the knowledge sharing 
take place. The question remains, however, as to why there would be more willingness on the 
foreign partner’s part to allow for greater flows of knowledge to a JV that is a minority share 
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4.8. Conclusions and limitations 
 
 We have presented an explicit argument for the effect of interorganizational trust at 
the strategic level on interorganizational learning in the context of a strategic alliance. We 
have posited that due to their position in the organizational hierarchy, executive decision 
makers have the power to shape collaborative knowledge arrangements. We defined these as a 
sum of structure, system and process related factors in the interorganizational collaboration, 
which determine the extent of possible knowledge sharing between partner boundary spanners 
at the operational level. Therefore, we argued, that while the actual sharing of knowledge 
between boundary spanners of the partnering organizations affects the interorganizational 
learning directly, the collaborative knowledge arrangements do so indirectly. We have posited 
that the latter is a function of interorganizational trust at the strategic-level.   
We have tested our theoretical predictions on a sample of Polish-foreign joint 
ventures. To that end, we have employed an alternative approach to empirical measurement of 
trust. Namely, we have identified relevant sources of strategic-level trust and used those as 
proxies for the level of trust in the collaboration. In formulating our hypotheses, therefore, we 
have related the different sources of trust at the strategic level to the learning outcome 
directly, without the mediating effect of an umbrella concept of trust. Our results reveal that 
calculation, reputation and past experience, three out of four bases of strategic-level trust we 
have identified, significantly affect the conduciveness of the collaborative arrangements to 
knowledge sharing between alliance partners. These findings support our argument that trust 
at the strategic level is determined by factors of calculative and strategic nature. 
This study is marked by a number of limitations. From the theoretical point of view, 
inter-organizational learning incorporates both acquisition and internalization of partner 
knowledge (Kale et al., 2000). Newly acquired knowledge can further organization’s goals 
only inasmuch as it is disseminated and integrated within the organization (Jelinek, 1979). 
While, trust between organizations is likely to affect the transfer of knowledge, the 
internalization of knowledge can be argued to depend on the level of trust between 
organizational members. The latter being an intraorganizational process, falls beyond the 
scope of this paper. Our dependent variable, however, being composed of items that next to 
knowledge acquisition refer to the resultant organizational change and efficiency 
improvements as well as knowledge application to organization’s operations, captures both 
knowledge acquisition and internalization. Yet, on the independent variable side, we capture 
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the determinants of inter-partner knowledge transfer only. Not all knowledge transferred 
(acquired) from the partner is subsequently assimilated, and the factors that hinder the full 
assimilation of the acquired knowledge are not taken into account in our analysis. This is the 
likely reason for the negative and significant effect of the constant term in our models. If our 
dependent variable captured knowledge transfer explicitly, we would expect the constant term 
to be around 0. However, our dependent variable captures the learning from the foreign 
partner, which by definition can only be equal to or lower than the amount of knowledge 
transferred. From that perspective the negative effect of the constant term can be interpreted 
to be a correction for the overstatement of the magnitude of transfer. 
  Second, in obtaining our data, we were able to interview one side of the collaboration 
only. This is an obvious limitation to the study, especially since such elusive aspects of 
collaboration as trust are considered. Comparing the attitudes of the foreign partner 
organization would have greatly enriched the data and strengthened the findings. However, by 
attempting to gauge the presence of sources of trust in the relationship, rather than trust itself, 
we believe, we have been able to alleviate part of the bias inherent in our research design. 
This is due to the fact that sources of trust can be considered to be, to a large extent, 
symmetrical for the collaborating parties, which would be much less so for the subjective 
perception of trust by one of the collaborating parties.  
Third, a critique can be raised that the conditions, which we consider to be sources of 
trust between partners, may have a direct impact on learning, independent of their effect on 
trust. This seems to be particularly a concern for the experience variable—JV duration. The 
length of the ongoing collaboration could be argued to directly affect learning between 
partners through its influence on knowledge novelty; as the partners collaborate the scope for 
learning between them would decrease. On the other hand, duration could also have a positive 
direct effect on learning, by allowing partners to get to know each others’ knowledge-bases 
and develop routines for collaboration and knowledge sharing in specific. However, the fact 
that we find a positive significant effect of prior ties on learning and no such effect for JV 
duration suggests that we are in fact capturing the effect of experience on trust and not a direct 
effect of experience on learning. If the latter were the case, we would have expected to find an 
effect of duration on learning (whichever direction the effect would take) and no effect of 
prior ties. As for calculation and reputation, there does not seem to be a reason to suspect they 
would have a direct effect on learning, i.e., not mediated by trust. Therefore, we believe the 
results we obtain testify against this possible limitation of our study, i.e. the potential direct 
effect of sources of trust on learning. 
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More in general, one could criticize our approach to measuring trust based on the idea 
that it is impossible to prove that sources of trust (i.e., mechanisms of its formation) lead to 
trust and thus cannot be treated as proxies thereof. However, a similar argument can be raised 
with respect to instruments that measure trust by tapping its behavioral manifestations, e.g., 
generous information sharing, task coordination, informal agreements, or low surveillance and 
monitoring (cf. Currall & Inkpen, 2002). Trustworthy behaviors cannot be proven to result 
from trust only—they can be conditioned by other factors, unilateral dependence for example 
(cf. Nooteboom et al., 1997). From that perspective, outcomes or manifestations of trust can 
be criticized for not being good proxies of trust in the same way as sources of trust can. Of 
course, there are also a number of instruments aiming to measure trust directly by probing 
into the perceived trustworthiness, fairness, benevolence, reliability, honesty of the partner or 
the overall harmony of the relationship (e.g., Cummings & Bromiley, 1996; Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). However, all such measurements of trust are 
bound to be strongly subjective due to interpretational biases of the individuals reporting it 
(i.e., different respondents would likely understand those differently). What all of the above 
points to is that trust being an unobservable variable, there is no perfect way to measure it—
any approach is likely to suffer from some weaknesses. 
Fourth, since all the joint ventures in our sample were based in one institutional 
context, we were not able to evaluate the effect institutions as a source of trust between 
partners on learning between them. We consider further investigation of this issue as a 
direction for future research. Finally, future research should undertake to factor the effect of 
partners’ wider networks of relationships into the analysis of interorganizational trust and 















Determinants of interorganizational knowledge sharing: 





 The growth in the number of strategic alliances since the beginning of the ‘90s has 
exceeded 25 percent annually (Inkpen, 1998). Strategic alliances encompass a broad range of 
contractual forms, from arm’s-length contracts to equity joint ventures (Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999). Learning between partners is an important aspect of inter-firm collaboration, because 
of the opportunities and threats it poses to the cooperating firms (Hamel 1991; Kogut 1988). 
Concurrently, the notion of trust emerges as an important factor for understanding human 
nature and exchange relationships of market participants, while the emphasis on opportunism 
in, for example transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985), is subjected to much criticism 
(Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). In specific, trust, as an expectation of the partner’s reliability with 
regard to his obligations, predictability of behavior, and fairness in actions and negotiations 
while faced with the possibility of behaving opportunistically (cf. Zaheer, McEvily & 
Perrone, 1998), is argued to be an important variable in interorganizational cooperation (e.g., 
Gulati, 1995; Madhok, 1995).  
 A high level of trust is suggested to have a positive effect on knowledge sharing 
(McEvilly, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003) in both intra-organizational (e.g., Kostova, 1999; 
Makino & Inkpen, 2003; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) and inter-organizational contexts (Geringer, 
1988; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Inkpen, 1997; Hedlund, 1994). However, most of the studies take 
the effect of trust on learning for granted or handle it marginally. Yet, there is need to 
understand what it means for collaborating organizations to trust each other, as those who 
Chapter5 
 102
frame their strategic intentions are often distinct from those who actually implement them at 
the operational level; a consideration that is rarely reflected in research on learning in 
interorganizational alliances (Salk & Simonin, 2003).  
 In investigating the effect of trust on interorganizational learning, therefore, one 
should consider the potential role of trust at (at least) two levels. As it was argued in chapter 
3, trust between boundary spanners of the top management level, i.e., strategic-level trust, 
affects interorganizational learning differently than trust between operational level boundary 
spanners, i.e., operational-level trust. In this chapter, we focus specifically on the latter and 
argue that it is likely to differ from strategic-level trust not only in its effects, but also in its 
character. We also identify sources of trust likely to be relevant for the formation of trust at 
this level. Overall, we use social learning theory to analyze how trust at the operational level, 
with its distinct antecedents and consequences, affects learning between partners. Yet, the 
extent of knowledge sharing between partner boundary spanners depends not only on their 
willingness, but also on the opportunity they have to do it. The opportunities for knowledge 
sharing are determined by the organizational decision makers of the allying organizations. We 
endeavor therefore to identify the different structures, systems and process through which the 
top managers can stimulate (or hinder) knowledge flows between organizations.  
 In light of the above the contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we formulate an 
explicit theoretical argument for why trust between the operational-level boundary spanners of 
the alliance partners would result in superior knowledge sharing between them. In doing that, 
we point out the qualitative differences between trust at the strategic and operational level and 
the unequal role they play in interorganizational knowledge transfer. Second, we identify 
sources of trust relevant for the operational level of analysis and argue that they can be used 
as predictors of trust at this level. This yields theoretical insight into the formation of 
interorganizational trust at the operational level but also constitutes a basis for an alternative 
approach to tapping trust in interorganizational relationships, which we subsequently 
demonstrate. We empirically test the link between sources of trust at the operational level and 
the knowledge sharing between organizations boundary spanners. Third, we identify the 
different elements of collaborative arrangements and investigate their effect on the sharing of 
tacit knowledge in alliances.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. First, we explore the issue of inter-partner knowledge 
transfer in alliances. We delineate the process of knowledge sharing and collaborative 
arrangements that determine its possible extent. Second, we define the concept of operational 
level trust and explicate why we believe it to be conducive to knowledge sharing. Finally, we 
Determinants of interorganizational knowledge sharing 
 103
formulate and test hypotheses linking sources of operational-level trust and elements of 




5.2. Inter-partner knowledge transfer  
 
 Some authors point to interorganizational learning as the primary reason for the 
existence of alliances (Salk & Simonin, 2003; Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988; Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Lyles, 1988). Others, however, argue that many alliance partners do not have a well-
defined learning objective (e.g., Hagedoorn & Sadowski, 1999; Inkpen, 2000). We distance 
ourselves from that dispute, and assume that whether some alliances are formed for the sole 
purpose of acquiring knowledge from the partner or not, they do offer opportunities for 
learning between the partners (cf. Inkpen, 1997). In particular, extant literature views 
alliances as a particularly suitable environment for allowing partners’ to mutually access and 
share each other’s knowledge-based, organizationally embedded, tacit resources (Hall, 1992; 
Inkpen, 1997; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Whether the partners actually take 
advantage of this opportunity, is a question we do not seek to address here. 
 Knowledge may be explicit or tacit (Polanyi, 1962). The former is systematic, 
formalized and transferable without loss of integrity (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Polanyi, 1962). 
Its transfer across organizational boundaries is thus likely to be for the most part 
unproblematic. Tacit knowledge in contrast is intuitive and unarticulated, cannot be 
verbalized, and thus cannot be easily transferred (Martin & Salomon, 2003; Kale, Singh, & 
Perlmutter, 2000; Polanyi, 1962). Tacit knowledge is the personal judgment that comes in 
between explicit formulations of knowledge (e.g., rules, formulae) and the actual experience 
of an individual’s senses (Tsoukas, 2003). It finds expression in the skills of an individual, the 
rules of behavior which s(he) is usually not consciously aware of (Polanyi, 1962).  Compared 
to explicit knowledge, the flows of tacit knowledge necessitate more informal control 
mechanisms (Makhija & Ganesh, 1997) as well as a higher level of understanding and 
commitment of the learning parties (Brown & Deguid, 1991). Tacit knowledge transfers are 
thus best achieved by means of strong ties that assure the necessary intensity of interaction 
(Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000), quality of communication and “intimacy” between the partners 
(Szulanski, 1996). Arguably, the effectiveness of such mechanisms is contingent on the level 
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of trust between the parties. We conclude, therefore, that trust between the partners would be 
more relevant for the transfer of tacit knowledge than for the transfer of explicit knowledge 
and so in our further analysis focus on this type of knowledge only. 
 
5.2.1. Knowledge sharing 
  Successful transfer of tacit knowledge between alliance partners requires wide-
ranging, continuous, face-to-face interactions between individual members of the two 
organizations (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Kale et al., 2000). These can 
be achieved, among others, by means of organized personnel contacts, meetings and transfers 
of managers (Makhija & Ganesh, 1997). In fact, the greater the tacitness of knowledge the 
more individuals must be the transfer agents (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Hedlund, 1994). Yet, 
although the cognitive process of learning is individual in nature, the social context in which 
it takes place is of crucial importance (Brown & Deguid, 1991; Powell et al., 1996).  
  One of the basic precepts of the social learning theory is that learning is situated in the 
context of social activity and practice, (Plaskoff, 2003; Elkjaer, 1999, 2003; Fox, 2000) and 
accomplished through socialization, “observation and emulation of skilled practitioners” 
(Easterby-Smith & Arujo, 1999: 5).  Learning emerges thus as a product of social interactions 
of individuals within the context of communities of practice (Fineman, 2003), one of the 
primary notions of this theory (Fox, 2000). Communities of practice encompass individuals 
working closely together towards accomplishment of certain tasks (Fox, 2000). In the process, 
their members develop shared identity, which allows for the built-up of social networks along 
which tacit knowledge can travel efficiently (Brown & Deguid, 1991). The shared practice 
that members of a community of practice engage in can thus be said to constitute the rail 
along which tacit knowledge can travel within a community of practice. What the above 
implies is that sharing of tacit knowledge across organizational boundaries requires the 
formation of communities of practice that would cut across these boundaries. This can be 
achieved by creating conditions in which the operational-level boundary spanners of alliance 
partners can interact closely together, for example by jointly engaging in the effectuation of 
alliance tasks.  
 
5.2.2. Collaborative arrangements 
  We use the term collaborative arrangements to refer to conditions that contribute to 
the emergence of crosscutting communities of practice and thus affect the extent of possible 
knowledge flows between organizations. In other words, collaborative arrangements 
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determine to what extent the intimate, face-to-face, interactions between organizational 
boundary spanners from the partner organizations, which enable tacit knowledge sharing, are 
possible (Kale et al, 2000; Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Dyer & Singh, 1998). We conceptualize 
collaborative arrangements as any combination of interorganizational structure, systems and 
management process elements that are put in place and modified in the course of 
collaboration by the decision makers (cf. Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) with the aim to stimulate 
or prevent knowledge flows between the organizations they represent. These knowledge 
management mechanisms, by fostering, blocking or delaying knowledge flows between 
partners, are a strong determinant of learning between the partners (Doz, 1996; Tiemessen, 
Lane, Crossan & Inkpen, 1996).  
  An optimal configuration of the collaborative arrangements assures the flow of 
information necessary for the alliance to function successfully, while simultaneously 
preventing uncontrolled flow of proprietary knowledge (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002). 
The above also implies that although “most learning takes place at the lower levels of 
alliance”, where the operating employees “play a vital role in acquiring knowledge”, the 
learning process must begin at the top (Hamel, Doz, Prahalad, 1989: 138), with top 
management’s commitment to knowledge acquisition from the partner. Consequently in our 
further analysis we differentiate between the flow of knowledge along the lines of practice 
within cross-organizational communities of practice and the collaborative arrangements 




5.3. Interpartner trust at the operational level 
 
 Organizations are made up of and managed by individuals (Aulakh, Kotabe & Sahay, 
1996) through whom inter-firm relations come into effect (Inkpen & Currall, 1997; 
Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997). These actors, however, play different roles in 
organizations and thus have unequal power to impact organization’s behavior in the 
collaborative context. Every position in organizational hierarchy is associated with a certain 
role, which reflects the expectation with respect to the position holder’s contribution to the 
operational and strategic tasks (Floyd and Lane, 2000). Organizational roles thus restrict and 
guide individuals’ conduct in an organizational (Nooteboom et a., 1997). This implies that 
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individuals involved in an alliance on both sides are likely to play different roles depending 
on the position they occupy in the organizational hierarchy. While the roles of the top 
management are dominated by decision-making tasks (e.g., ratifying or directing), those of 
the non-executive managers encompass primarily communication of and reaction to 
information (e.g., implementing, facilitating, conforming or responding) (Floyd and Lane, 
2000). Therefore, while top (executive) mangers can influence the overall cooperation policy 
of the organization, this is clearly not the case for operational level employees, who will likely 
be responsible for its implementation. Therefore, strategic-level trust defined as the attitude 
held by the company’s executives towards the partner firm (cf. Inkpen & Currall, 1997) and 
its members (cf. Gulati & Gargulio, 1999) is bound to be manifested in the collaboration 
policy of the firm in general and collaborative knowledge arrangements in specific. 
 In contrast, and more importantly from the point of view of this paper, operational-
level trust between organizations captures trust held by the non-executive boundary spanners 
of the collaborating organizations, who “provide the linking mechanism across organizational 
boundaries” (Inkpen & Currall, 1997) as they carry out the operational tasks of the 
collaboration. Currall & Inkpen (2002) define ‘trust network’ as the sum of interpersonal trust 
in a joint venture, i.e., trust present in all dyadic relationships of boundary spanners from the 
partnering organizations. Our definition of operational-level trust includes a trust network 
thus defined but is still broader; it additionally comprises the boundary spanners’ trust 
towards the partner organization. Therefore, the object of the operational-level trust can be the 
partner organization as an entity and/or its individual members. Although previous research 
has shown that individuals with ease distinguish between trust towards the partner 
organization and an individual counterpart boundary spanner (for example Zaheer, Lofstrom, 
& George, 2002), we do not expect the extent of knowledge sharing to be systematically 
affected by whether the object of trust is an individual or an organization. In fact, it seems 
plausible to assume that a certain level of trust in both is needed for knowledge sharing to 
occur. Of course, the effect of trust in a counterpart boundary spanner and in the partner 
organization are unlikely to be independent. We expect that the two are positively associated.  
 
5.3.1. Effect of operational level trust on knowledge sharing 
  In the context of social learning theory, we expect operational-level trust to play a 
positive role in stimulating knowledge sharing between partner boundary spanners (cf. 
McEvilly et al., 2003). First, undertaking learning involves risk as admitting an error or 
asking for help can signal incompetence and negatively affect one’s image (Edmondson, 
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1999). Potential for embarrassment and interpersonal threat can thus impede learning 
(Argyris, 1982). Social construction of knowledge is argued to be a process fraught with 
conflict inherent in any social process (Easterby-Smith & Arujo, 1999). Learning is thus an 
emotional process (Elkjaer, 1999), and knowledge “an emotionalized commodity.” (Fineman, 
2003: 65). "Excessive concern about others’ reactions to actions that have the potential for 
embarrassment or threat, which learning behaviors often have” (Edmondson, 1999: 355) can 
be alleviated by team psychological safety. Trust is one of the foundations for creating the 
climate of psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999) and thus can be expected to positively 
affect learning behavior of team members.  
Second, as Brown & Starkey (2000) argue, individuals may resist learning because it 
might challenge their existing concepts of self. Resistance to internalize knowledge from a 
given source (Szulanski, 1996) can be at least partially overcome if the source is perceived to 
be trustworthy.  A trusting disposition towards another person makes one more open and 
susceptible to the influence exerted by this person (Chiles & McMackin, 1996) in terms of 
selection of goals, choice of methods, and evaluation of progress (Porter, 1997). 
Trustworthiness of the source can thus be conceived of as “a proxy for quality and veracity of 
the knowledge conveyed” (McEvilly et al., 2003). Perceived value of the knowledge, in turn, 
is likely to influence student’s openness to assimilate it. Polanyi (1962: 53) stresses:  
 
“to learn by example is to submit to authority. You follow your master because you 
trust  his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyze and account in detail 
for its effectiveness. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the presence 
of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, including 
those which are not explicitly known to the master himself. These hidden rules can be 
assimilated only by a person who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the 
imitation of another”.  
 
 Thirdly, individuals who view knowledge as a source of power may resist sharing it 
(Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Szulanski, 1996) or even erect barriers to prevent its incidental 
leakage. Trust between actors fosters free exchange of information, as they do not feel the 
need to guard themselves against opportunistic behavior of the other party (Jarillo, 1988). 
Therefore, if the sender of knowledge trusts the receiver, the former is likely to be more open 
in sharing the knowledge (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). In fact Edmondson & Moingeon, 
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(1999) argue that in the context of organizational learning “trust can be seen as a decision to 
place resources (i.e. knowledge) at others’ disposal”.  
Based on the above, we posit that higher operational-level trust, by increasing the 
parties’ willingness to make themselves vulnerable to each other (cf. Sarkar, Cavusgil, & 
Evirgen, 1997), mitigates the perceived risks involved in the learning process and thus leads 
to higher knowledge sharing between the interacting boundary spanners of the two partner 
organizations.   
 
 
5.4. Sources of trust at the operational level 
 
  Extant literature on trust posits that the overall attitude of a trustor towards a trustee is 
a product of a number of conditions. Experience, reputation, similarity, institutions20 (Zucker, 
1986) and calculation (e.g., Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Doney & Cannon, 
1997) have been identified in the literature as the primary modes of trust formation between 
partners. We believe that new insights can be derived from applying the trust production 
modes approach to analyzing the effect of multilevel trust on interorganizational learning, as 
different mechanisms of trust formation are likely to be relevant at different levels (cf. Doney 
& Cannon, 1997). Therefore, we subsequently undertake to identify those modes of trust 
production, which we believe to be of primary importance at the operational level. We do not 
wish to suggest that these particular modes are exclusive of others. Rather the argument is 
intended to reflect our belief in the dominating role of the identified sources of trust for the 
operational level of analysis.  
  Using social learning theory we have argued that shared practice leads to the 
development of shared identity among people, and thus constitutes a rail along which tacit 
knowledge can travel between the interacting boundary spanners of the alliance partners. 
Brown & Deguid (1999) posit that such shared identity can come about in the context of two 
kinds of networks. The first, and already mentioned, is the community of practice, 
characterized by high intensity of personal interactions among the members who engage in 
joint execution of tasks. Zucker (1986: 62) argues that extensive interaction of a small number 
of “individuals involved in a limited set of exchanges” over long periods of time results in the 
development of trust between them. In the process of working closely together members of 
                                                
20 Zucker (1986) distinguished in fact three mechanisms, with experience-based and reputation-based trust jointly 
constituting process-based trust. We choose to focus on each of the sub-types separately. 
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communities of practice can therefore be expected to develop trust, i.e., experience-based 
trust, which in turn facilitates knowledge sharing between them.  
 Experience-based trust between partners is based on their repeated, past interactions 
(Rousseau et al., 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), under the assumption that these were 
accompanied by successful fulfillment of mutual expectations (Rousseau et al., 1998: 399). In 
its deepest form, trust based on experience takes the form of identification (Rousseau et al., 
1998), where parties learn to recognize and understand each other’s desires, preferences and 
intentions (Lewicki & Bunker; 1996). Identification of members of a community of practice 
with each other has been argued to make the efficient sharing of tacit knowledge between 
them possible (cf. Brown & Deguid, 1999; Plaskoff, 2003). We argue therefore that through 
processes of repeated, close interactions within crosscutting communities of practice 
boundary spanners develop trusting relationships which result in higher knowledge sharing 
between them. The experience-based trust between organizational boundary spanners may be 
related to the past as reflected in the previous collaborations of the partners or to the present 
as reflected in the duration of the current collaboration. We thus hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The extent of tacit knowledge sharing between boundary spanners of 
collaborating organizations will be positively affected by the level of 
their: 
a) past collaborative experience with each other, 
b) current collaborative experience with each other. 
 
  Besides a community of practice, trust between individuals can come about in the 
context of yet another kind of network. Individuals who engage in a similar practice, but do 
not work on common tasks and may never come to know each other personally are part of a 
network of practice (Brown & Deguid, 1999). This implies that by practicing the same 
profession, individuals become part of one network of practice, regardless of whether they are 
members of the same organization or will ever meet in person or not. According to social 
identity theory individuals use groups to which they belong (i.e., social aggregates) to 
construct their own identity and accordingly categorize others as in-group or out-group 
members (Kane, Argote & Levine, 2002). At the same time, individuals’ identities (i.e., social 




  When people identify with a given social group, it allows them to “surface certain 
cognitive assumptions about themselves in relation to others” (Child & Rodriques, 2003: 537) 
as well as “expectations about the behaviors and intentions of the members of a collectivity” 
(McEvilly et al., 2003: 98).  In particular, social similarity, in terms of values and beliefs, as 
well as personalities, demographics, educational and professional backgrounds, leads to the 
assumption that common background expectations exist and opportunistic behavior is 
unlikely (Zucker, 1986). As a result of social categorization and in-group bias processes, in-
group members therefore tend to be evaluated more positively than out-group members, in 
terms of their cooperativeness, commitment (McEvilly et al., 2003) as well as honesty, 
loyalty, benevolence, and trustworthiness (Kane et al., 2002; Doney & Cannon, 1997). These 
positive attributions stemming from social similarity are likely to produce trust between 
individuals (Brewer, 1981; Burt, 1992; Porter, 1997; McGuire, 1968)—the type of trust called 
characteristic-based trust by Zucker (1986). Participation in the same network of practice, by 
providing the basis for the formation of characteristic-based trust (cf. Zucker, 1986) therefore, 
can be considered a condition that supports the development of trust between members of a 
community or practice. 
In the alliance context, shared occupational identity of the gatekeepers may thus 
“serve as a bridge” between the alliance partners (Child & Rodriguez, 2003: 544). Linking of 
collaborating organizations along the lines of networks of practice, therefore, by fostering 
practice-based social identity, is likely to be conducive to operational-level trust and 
knowledge sharing between their boundary spanners. Consequently, we expect the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The extent of tacit knowledge sharing between boundary spanners of 
collaborating organizations will be positively affected by the level of 
their professional similarity. 
 
Thus, we expect experience and similarity to be the most important determinants of 
operational-level trust and thus to have a positive affect on knowledge sharing between 
partner boundary spanners.  These two types of trust are likely to reinforce each other. 
Plaskoff (2003) stresses that development of in-group identification is fostered by the 
alignment of cultural elements, as well as common reference points (e.g., experiences, 
frameworks). This would suggest that similarity would not only result in more trust (direct 
effect) but also stimulate the boundary spanners’ propensity to interact and thus positively 
affect experience-based trust.   
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5.5. Effect of collaborative arrangements on knowledge sharing 
 
 Earlier, we have defined collaborative arrangements as those elements of 
interorganizational structure, systems and management process that condition the flow of 
knowledge between alliance partners. We now take a closer look at each group of elements 
and discuss their impact on interorganizational knowledge sharing in more detail. First, 
decisions about alliance structure include the choice of a partner and ownership form. The 
choice of a partner determines what tacit knowledge resources can be contributed to the 
alliance (Tiemessen et al., 1996) and the ease with which they can be transferred (Prahalad & 
Bettis, 1986; Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Lyles & Salk, 1996). Partners whose primary business 
activities are more similar are likely to find each other’s knowledge more relevant. Therefore, 
they would have more to learn from each other. Also they would likely be able to do so with 
more ease (cf. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990); Lane and Lubatkin (1998) found that firms learn 
more from each other when their knowledge bases are more similar. Also, firms are likely to 
learn from each other with more ease when their norms and values are compatible  (Prahalad 
& Bettis, 1986; Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). In contrast, culturally distant partners are likely to 
experience obstacles to knowledge sharing (cf. Kostova, 1999). Empirical research has shown 
that cultural distance is negatively associated with the efficiency of knowledge transfers 
between partners (Parkhe, 1991, 1993; Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996).  
 Ownership and governance structures are likely to have a bearing on knowledge 
acquisition in alliances (cf. Lyles & Salk, 1996) as some structures may offer greater 
opportunity for knowledge flows than others. Structures that allow for closer and more 
intimate interactions between the partner boundary spanners are likely to be characterized by 
more extensive knowledge flows between the organizations. Also, structures that require 
greater commitment of the partners are likely to be more conducive to knowledge sharing 
between boundary spanners of the collaborating partners. This is because partners’ 
commitment is likely to translate into greater involvement of their part and thus more 








Hypothesis 3:  The extent of tacit knowledge sharing between boundary spanners of 
collaborating organizations will be positively affected by the: 
a) similarity of the partners’ primary business activity, 
b) partners’ cultural similarity, 
c) alliance form(s) granting possibility for more intense interactions, 
d) alliance form(s) requiring more commitment on the partners’ part. 
 
  Among collaborative management systems two categories can be distinguished; those, 
which by providing opportunities for knowledge sharing have a direct effect on knowledge, 
transfer, and those that by affecting the level of control over the alliance by the partners (i.e., 
control mechanisms) have an indirect effect on knowledge transfer. The first group comprises 
mechanisms that provide the opportunity for evolution of communities of practice and the 
‘bleeding of ideas” between the organizations (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002; 
Lyles and Salk, 1996; Lane, Salk & Lyles, 2001). Training provided by the partners to each 
other is argued to be a conduit of both explicit as well as tacit knowledge (cf. Nonaka, 1994). 
Lyles & Salk (1996) found strong empirical support for training programs being an important 
knowledge acquisition mechanism. Second, control mechanisms may stimulate knowledge 
sharing, by assuring the necessary reciprocal information flow capacity in an alliance (Kumar 
& Seth, 1998; Tiemessen et al., 1996). They may also help the partners protect themselves 
against the adverse effects of unintended flows of knowledge (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). 
Expatriate managers delegated by the partner(s) to the alliance are argued to be an efficient 
channel for knowledge flows across the organizational interface (Hamel, 1991; Kogut & 
Zander, 1992). Empirically, higher numbers of foreign partner employees working in an 
international joint venture have been shown to be associated with higher levels of knowledge 
acquisition by the IJV (Lyles and Salk, 1996).  Expatriates can also be argued to be an 
effective venue for a foreign parent to acquire local knowledge from the alliance. We 
therefore hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  The extent of tacit knowledge sharing between boundary spanners of 
the collaborating organizations will be positively affected by the:  
a) frequency of training provided by the partners to alliance 
employees, 
b) number of expatriates delegated by the partners to the alliance. 
Determinants of interorganizational knowledge sharing 
 113
  Finally, besides structure and systems, interpartner knowledge flows require 
appropriate processes  (Zaheer & Vankatraman, 1995; Lane et al., 2001). Fairness of the 
decision processes, by increasing the perception of procedural justice, is likely to positively 
affect the extent of knowledge sharing the parties engage in. Steensma and Lyles (2000) 
found that balanced approach to decision-making power in international JVs reduces the level 
of inter-partner conflict. Lower conflict, in turn, can be expected to result in higher knowledge 
sharing. It is also argued that knowledge sharing is facilitated by the creation of an integrating 
frame of reference (cf. Child & Rodrigues, 2003) by means of context-oriented, culture-based 
mechanisms  (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Das & Teng, 1998). These include rituals, traditions, 
ceremonies or networks (Makhija & Ganesh, 1997) as well as other processes of manager 
socialization, which can assure the necessary reciprocal information flow capacity in an 
alliance (Kumar & Seth, 1998). Partners are likely to learn more from each other, not only 
when their knowledge bases are similar (hypothesis 1a) and norms and values are compatible 
(hypothesis 1b) but also when their “dominant logics”, or ways of doing things are aligned 
(Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). We expect, therefore, that similarity of 
partner business practices would likely stimulate knowledge sharing between their boundary 
spanners. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  The extent of tacit knowledge sharing between boundary spanners of 
collaborating organizations will be positively affected by the: 
a) perceived fairness of the decision processes in the alliance, 
b) similarity of the partners’ business practices. 
 
 
5.6. Data and method 
 
Hypotheses developed in this paper have been tested on a sample of 149 joint ventures 
formed in Poland between a local and a foreign partner. Poland constitutes an especially 
suitable setting for an empirical study of the role of trust in interorganizational knowledge 
transfer, in the context of it joining of the European Union. In order to be competitive in the 
common market, Polish companies need to catch up with their European rivals in terms of 
new technologies and market-oriented management practices. Transition-economy 
organizations view foreign partners as rich reservoirs of new knowledge (Lyles & Salk, 1996) 
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and collaboration with them as an effective learning mechanism (Child & Markoczy, 1993; 
Markoczy, 1993).  
The data was gathered by way of a survey, which was carried out in the fall of 2002 
and spring of 2003. An address database of international JVs operating in Poland, including 
the name and function of a contact person (usually the CEO or another top manager), was 
acquired from a Polish commercial address provider, Teleadreson. A package containing a 
questionnaire, a cover letter, a recommendation letter from the Dutch Embassy in Poland as 
well as a stamped return envelope was sent to 1218 JVs. 129 filled-out questionnaires were 
returned, five of which were found to be unusable21. This constitutes a 10,6% response rate. 
The nonrespondents were subsequently contacted by phone22 to inquire about the 
questionnaire. In 313 cases the firm was found not to be a joint venture (any more). 
Additional 79 firms were found not to be independent entities, not to exist any more, to have 
suspended their operations and/or to be in liquidation. 166 replacement questionnaires were 
sent out to firms that confirmed their JV status and indicated willingness to respond23. The 
second wave of mailing resulted in additional 26 responses (1 of them being unusable). The 
total response rate therefore reached the level of 18,6% and is deemed to be of an acceptable 
level considering the standards for transition economy24. The sample included both JV’s that 
came to existence by way of a new, separate entity as well as those where the foreign partner 
acquired a minority share in an existing Polish company. 
The questionnaire itself was directed to the Poland-based JV organization. It was 
developed based on extensive literature review in the area of interorganizational learning and 
inter-partner trust as well as on an exploratory study which involved interviews with top 
managers of 9 Polish-foreign JVs. Questions were formulated with the aim to gauge the 
knowledge transfer between partners as well as the different sources of trust. The 
questionnaire was proof-read by a number of scholars both from the organization theory field 
and outside, with some having extensive experience with the survey method and some being 
native speakers of Polish. Subsequently, the questionnaire was tested on 4 JV managers to 
                                                
21 Due to clear misinterpretation of the purpose of the project by the respondent (as inferred from the respondent’s 
comments) and thus unreliability of the answers provided. 
22 In some cases the attempt was unsuccessful, due to missing or faulty phone numbers and companies not being listed 
in the on-line phone directory. There were a number of cases were despite the fact that the attempt was successful, it 
was impossible (despite numerous attempts) to obtain information about the questionnaire or the company’s ownership 
status (JV or not). 
23 In most cases the firms said not to have received the first questionnaire.  Address or contact person misspecification 
was found to be a frequent occurrence. 
24 Low response rates are due to: (1) lack of tradition to collaborate with academia and  (2) large number of 
questionnaires received by most companies, which results in their reluctance to participate. 
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assure relevance and understandability of the questions as well as the appropriateness of the 
response scales.  
We measured knowledge sharing, the dependent variable, with two items, addressing 
the extent of knowledge sharing between the foreign partner employees and those of the JV. 
Similarity of the boundary spanners was operationalized with two items relating to the 
similarity of their educational backgrounds and professional experience. All the above four 
items were measured on a 7-point Likert scales. For both the composite variables, the scores 
on the individual items were summed and divided by the number of items. The effect of 
experience-based trust was captured by two variables, one for hypothesis 1a and one for 
hypothesis 1b. First, the effect of past experience was tapped with a dummy variable 
reflecting whether the partners collaborated in any form in the past. It took on value of 1 when 
it was the case and 0 when it was not. Second, the effect of current experience was captured 
with the JV duration item. It took on values from 0 (set up in 2002) to 19 years.  
Turning now to the independent variables related to the collaborative arrangements, 
the similarity of the partners in terms of primary activity was captured with a single item 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale. The (lack of) cultural similarity was measured with the 
composite cultural distance index based on the Hostede’s 4 dimensions as developed by 
Kogut & Singh (1988). The extent to which the alliance structure grants possibility for intense 
interactions between partner boundary spanners was proxied with the governance form of the 
alliance. In minority share alliances knowledge sharing is likely to be greater since they offer 
possibility for more extensive and intimate interactions between the partner firms compared to 
separate entity alliances. The variable was a dummy, which took on the value of 1 when the 
joint venture was set up by way of a separate entity and 0 when it was formed through an 
acquisition of a share in an existing venture. The extent to which the alliance requires 
commitment on the partners’ part was proxied with its ownership structure. The higher the 
share held by a partner in the JV, the more involved in the functioning of the alliance the 
partner can be expected to be. The respondents were asked to indicate the share held by the 
foreign partner in 20% intervals. The scores on this item were later recoded into a 5-point 
scale. Collaborative systems were proxied with the frequency of training offered to the JV 
employees by the foreign partner, and the number of expatriates delegated to the JV by the 
foreign partner (both variables were measured on 7-point Likert scales). Due to their 
pronounced skewness (2.24 and 3.18 respectively) both system variables were transformed 
into logarithmic terms prior to their inclusion in the models. The process aspects of 
collaborative arrangements, finally, were captured with two perceptual, single-item measures, 
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referring to the perceived fairness of the decision processes and similarity of the business 
practices of the partners. Again, both of them were measured on a 7-point Likert scale.  
 In our analyses we also controlled for two additional effects. First, sharing of 
knowledge between boundary spanners may result not only from trust but also from 
conformance to their superiors’ expectations to sustain good working relationship with their 
counterparts. In other words, some of the trustworthy behavior of the boundary spanners 
might result from their compliance to job requirements, rather than from their intrinsic 
motivation to do so. We measured the level of such expectation with a single item variable, 
related to the extent to which superiors expect the boundary spanners to sustain good 
cooperation with their counterparts. Second, yet related to the above, the extent to which the 
partner employees engage in knowledge sharing with each other might depend on the strategy 
adopted by the organization’s management concerning knowledge sharing. Organizational 
decision makers may decide to intervene in the knowledge sharing processes not only by way 
of the collaborative arrangements, but also by explicit instructions given to their subordinates. 
We tapped this effect with a dummy variable, which equaled 1 when the employees where 
instructed to limit the amount of knowledge sharing with their counterparts, and 0 when this 
was not the case. 
Before proceeding with the analyses, we need to evaluate the reliability and 
discriminant validity of the two composite variables, sharing and similarity. First, we assessed 
their reliability by calculating coefficients alpha and 
   indicators. Coefficient alpha for 
sharing equaled 0.86 and 0.77 for boundary spanner similarity. 7KH vc(  for sharing and 
similarity equaled 0.77 and 0.63. A value of more than 0.50 indicates that the variance 
captured by each construct is larger than the variance due to measurement error, which 
supports the validity of the constructs as well as the individual indicators that constitute them 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Thus for both the variables the above condition was satisfied and 
reliability of the measures assured. DLVFULPLQDQW YDOLGLW\ RI WZR FRQVWUXFWV   DQG  LV
assured when LQGLFDWRU 
  ! 2 aQG 
   ! 2 ZKHUH 2 is equal to squared correlation 
between the two constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). This was the case for our two 
constructs, the square correlation of which equals 0.13. The requirement for discriminant 
validity was thus satisfied.  
  We tested for the possibility of non-response bias by evaluating the differences in the 
means of the 16 variables (12 single item variables and 4 items constituting the 2 composite 
variables) between the early and the late respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). The early 
respondents included the first 60% batch of returned questionnaires, while the late 
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respondents the remaining 40% of responses. Such categorization approximately reflected the 
actual inflow of the questionnaires (cf. Lages & Lages, 2003). No significant differences 
between the early and late respondents were found. Therefore, we do not find any evidence of 
non-response bias in our data.  
 The instrument (i.e., questionnaire) used in this study could have created a common 
method variance. This would be particularly likely have the respondents known the theoretical 
framework used in designing the tool (Lages & Lages, 2003). This was, however, not the 
case. Additionally the items were not presented to the respondents in any way that would 
suggest the purpose of the study. To further check for a possible common method bias, we 
have performed a principal component analysis on the perceptual items in our model. Three 
factors with eigenvalues above 1 were identified, with the first factor accounting for 38% of 
the total variance. Based on the above, we conclude that common method bias is unlikely to 






All the hypotheses were tested by means of multiple regression25. Some missing 
values were encountered. They were dealt with by applying list-wise deletion. To make the 
fullest possible uses of the scarce data, this was done, however, on a model-by-model basis, 
hence differences in sample size across the models. The models were tested for the presence 
of multicollinearity by means of variance inflation factors (VIF’s). There is evidence of 
multicollinearity if the largest VIF is larger than 10, and the mean of all VIF’s is considerably 
larger than 1 (StataCorp, 2001). As reflected in Table 5.2. no such evidence is to be found in 
our sample. Additionally, all the models were tested for the presence of omitted variable bias 
and heteroskedasticity26. No evidence of either of those problems was found. Table 5.2 
presents the results of multiple regression analysis. 
 
 
                                                
25 STATA 7.0 statistical package was used. 







Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 






 Mean St.dev N 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1.Good collaboration required 5.61 1.60 147  1.00           
2. BRP similarity 5.13 1.52 148  0.32**  1.00          
3. JV duration 9.26 2.86 149  0.05 -0.03  1.00         
4. Similarity in business activity 4.63 2.32 147  0.12  0.21* -0.24**  1.00        
5. Cultural distance 1.79 1.26 147 -0.07 -0.08  0.09 -0.14 1.00       
6. Foreign partner share 3.53 1.12 149 -0.01  0.05 -0.00  0.26**  0.05  1.00      
7. Frequency of training (ln) 0.45 0.53 149  0.17*  0.24** -0.11  0.28** -0.02  0.24**  1.00     
8. Number of expatriates (ln) 0.25 0.42 148  0.15  0.05 -0.04  0.12 -0.04  0.02  0.27**  1.00    
9. Procedural justice 4.82 1.98 148  0.10  0.09 -0.01 -0.07  0.09 -0.10  0.06 -0.03  1.00   
10. Organizational practices 4.07 1.65 148  0.24**  0.48**  0.02  0.16 -0.03  0.16*  0.20*  0.07  0.28**  1.00  
11. Sharing 3.60 1.89 149  0.33**  0.36** -0.15  0.49** -0.04  0.22**  0.54**  0.25**  0.14  0.21**  1.00 
12. Protectiveness a 0.22 0.22 148            
13. Prior ties a 0.39 0.39 149            
14. Separate entity vs. minority 
share alliance 





















†   Significant at  p < .10 
*   Significant at p < .05 
** Significant at p < 0.01 
 
 
Sharing    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10    11 
Good cooperation. required  0.41**  0.43**  0.30**  0.32**  0.28**  0.24**  0.30**  0.20*  0.22*  0.22**  0.19* 
Protectiveness  -0.73* -0.81* -0.76* -0.83* -0.61† -0.67* -0.84* -0.53† -0.69* -0.69* -0.55† 
Prior ties   0.32   0.18  0.31  0.19  0.11  0.17  0.29  0.13  0.17 
JV duration  -0.11*  -0.10* -0.04 -0.07 -0.10* -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.02 
BRP similarity    0.37**  0.35**  0.26**  0.25**  0.35**  0.19*  0.28**  0.27**  0.21* 
Business similarity      0.29**    0.24**  0.29**   0.25** 
Cultural distance      0.01    0.01 -0.01  -0.01 
Separate entity     -0.17    0.46 -0.31   0.36 
Foreign partner share      0.17    0.08  0.21   0.12 
Training (ln)       1.43**   1.34**   1.40**  1.28** 
Expatriates (ln)       0.61†   0.62†   0.64*  0.67* 
Fairness of decisions        0.07   0.16*  0.09  0.14* 
Practices alignment       -0.00  -0.08 -0.04 -0.08 
Constant  (+)**  (+)**  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s.  n.s. 
             
N   146   146   145   145   142   144   143   141   140   142   139 
R2  0.14  0.18  0.22  0.25  0.37  0.42  0.25  0.51  0.39  0.42  0.51 
Adj. R2  0.13  0.15  0.20  0.22  0.33  0.39  0.21  0.46  0.33  0.38  0.46 
Max VIF  1.01  1.02  1.12  1.15  1.23  1.19  1.41  1.35  1.52  1.43  1.53 
Mean VIF  1.01  1.02  1.08  1.07  1.13  1.11  1.16  1.18  1.20  1.18  1.24 
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Model 1 presents the effect of control variables on knowledge sharing. Models 2, 3, 
and 4 test the effects of boundary spanner similarity as well as past and current experience, 
separately and jointly. Models 5, 6, and 7 present the effects of structure, systems and process 
elements on sharing separately. Models 8, 9 and 10 include two of the collaborative 
arrangements categories each, while model 11 includes all hypothesized and control 
explanatory variables simultaneously. 
The constant term turned out to be insignificant in almost all models. The two 
exceptions are Models 1 and 2. We also observe a steady increase in the value of R2 upon the 
addition of additional explanatory variables. Both the above findings suggest that we are able 
to capture a significant amount of variance in the dependent variable. Across all models the 
two control variables are significant and in the expected direction. As for our focal variables, 
past experience (i.e., prior ties) fails to reach significance in any of the models; Hypothesis 1a 
is therefore not supported. Current experience (i.e., JV duration) reaches significance in some 
models only (see Model 2, 4 and 7), and not otherwise. However, even in the models where it 
is significant the coefficient takes on a negative value, which is contrary to our expectations 
and indicates lack of support for Hypothesis 1b27. Overall, we do not find support for 
Hypothesis 1. We find that boundary spanner similarity positively and significantly affects 
knowledge sharing across all models thus supporting Hypothesis 2.  
The effect of similarity in primary business activity is strongly significant and of the 
expected direction across all models (see Models 5, 8, 9, 11). None of the other structure 
variables reach significance in any of the models. Therefore, Hypothesis 3a is supported while 
Hypotheses 3b through 3d are not. Among system variables, the frequency of training 
provided by the foreign partner is strongly significant and positive in all the models, yielding 
support for hypothesis 4a. The number of expatriates delegated to the JV, also takes on the 
expected positive value, and is significant. Hypothesis 4b, therefore, is also supported. Hence 
we find overall support for Hypothesis 4. Finally, among process variables, fairness of 
decision process reveals an expected positive effect, which however, is only significant in two 
out of four models (see Model 9 & 11). We therefore find some support for hypothesis 5a. As 
for similarity of business practices of the partners, it not only fails to reach significance in any 
of the models, but it also takes on a consistently negative sign. Hypothesis 5b is thus not 
supported.  
                                                
27 We ran two alternative specifications of the model, one to check for a curvilinear effect of the alliance duration 
variable and one to check for the presence of a similar effect of cultural distance variable. The quadratic terms in both 
cases failed to reach significance, while the other results remained unaltered. 
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5.8. Discussion  
 
Our results support the argument that both the presence of certain sources of 
operational-level trust and various elements of collaborative arrangements are conducive to 
knowledge sharing between partner boundary spanners in alliances. First, we find strong 
support for the effect of characteristic-based trust (based on occupational identity) on the 
extent of knowledge sharing. It points to the importance of allocating appropriate individuals 
to the boundary spanner functions. Boundary spanners who are similar in terms of their 
educational and professional backgrounds will be able to build trust faster and share 
knowledge more efficiently as they engage in the joint execution of the day-to-day operational 
tasks of collaboration. 
In all the models, the effect of current experience is consistently negative, which is 
contrary to our predictions. However, the effect remains for the most part insignificant. The 
negative estimates are counterintuitive from the point of view of the expected build-up of 
operational-level trust as the collaboration continues. A likely explanation for this finding is 
that JV duration is a poor proxy for experience-based trust, which fails to probe into the actual 
experiences of the partners in interacting with each other, whether their expectations were met 
or not. It does not reflect the extent to which these experiences increased partners’ regard for 
each others’ competence, benevolence and integrity. If the above if true, the negative 
experience effect that we capture, rather than being a source of trust, would reflect the direct 
impact that duration of a collaborative relationship has on sharing. As the collaboration 
continues, the novelty of knowledge held by the partner would likely go down, and the 
intensity of knowledge sharing could be expected to decrease.  
We also did not find support for trust-based on experience being a determinant of 
knowledge sharing. The effect of prior collaborations on sharing between partner boundary 
spanners remains insignificant throughout the models. This in fact seems to be an intuitive 
finding as prior collaborations between organizations as a whole are unlikely to affect the 
level of trust between the operational-level boundary spanners within one specific JV. The 
sharing of knowledge, as we argued, is a highly social process, based on intimate, personal 
interactions and interpersonal trust. Such trust is unlikely to carry from one collaboration to 
another, as probability is high that different persons would hold the boundary-spanning 
functions. Past collaborative experiences should therefore rather be expected to affect 
strategic level trust rather than trust between individuals. Unlike in the case of current 
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experience, we do not have concerns about the quality of the measure used here. We consider 
the dummy variable for previous collaborations to be a good proxy for (past) experience-
based trust; partners’ willingness to engage in collaboration again is a reflection of their 
mutual expectations having been met in the past.  
A second major finding of our study is the positive effect of various collaborative 
arrangements on the knowledge sharing processes. All three groups of factors turn out to have 
some effect on the process. Among the structural elements, only similarity in the partners’ 
primary business activity has the expected positive effect on interorganizational knowledge 
sharing. What this implies is that the choice of a partner firm with a relevant knowledge base 
is crucial for stimulating sharing of knowledge between the boundary spanners. This, of 
course, is a highly intuitive finding. Surprisingly the cultural distance between partners does 
no seem to affect the knowledge sharing processes in any way. The reason for that might be 
that our dependent variable captured the extent of sharing the boundary spanners engage in 
rather than the efficiency of the process, which is likely to be affected by cultural distance. 
This would not be a concern for similarity in primary business activity, as it would affect not 
only the efficiency of sharing but also its extent; it would make the knowledge more relevant 
to the boundary spanners thus stimulating their motivation to share more with each other. 
Neither the governance nor the ownership structure of the collaboration appear to have a 
significant effect on how much knowledge the boundary spanners are willing to share with 
each other. Evidently, the two governance structures and the various ownership levels do not 
significantly differ in terms of how much opportunity they offer for knowledge sharing 
between boundary spanners. More in general, it can be argued that the process of knowledge 
sharing between boundary spanners, being very social in nature, would not be affected by 
such strictly structural considerations. In short, the governance and ownership structures 
would not affect how much knowledge the organizational boundary spanners would be 
inclined to share with their counterparts. 
Both the collaborative systems elements, training and expatriates, have a positive and 
significant effect on knowledge sharing between partner boundary spanners. First, the 
frequency of training provided by the foreign partner to the JV employees has a strong and 
positive effect on knowledge sharing. This supports our argument that collaborative systems 
that foster the close interactions between individuals from the partnering organizations would 
stimulate knowledge sharing. Second, and in line with our expectation, the number of 
expatriates delegated by the foreign partner to the JV turns out to not only be a control 
mechanism but also an effective channel for knowledge sharing. Both these mechanisms can 
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therefore be considered to be conducive to fostering knowledge flows between alliance 
partners. 
Among the process elements, only the effect of fairness of decision processes on 
knowledge sharing receives some support. The corresponding coefficient reaches significance 
in two out of four models. In all four models, however, it takes on the hypothesized positive 
sign. This suggests that the perception of procedural justice between the partners is conducive 
to knowledge sharing between their boundary spanners. Finally, the similarity of the partners 
in terms of their business practices does not appear to have any effect on the knowledge 
sharing processes. Apparently, similarly to the national culture, the proximity of 
organizational culture of the collaborating partners does not affect the extent of sharing 
between the boundary spanners. That is not to say, however, that the efficiency of the process 
would be affected. This effect should be subjected to further investigation in future research. 
 Finally, the control variables provide some interesting findings. Our results indicate 
that when JV employees are expected to sustain good collaboration with the counterpart 
boundary spanners, the extent of knowledge sharing is greater. The question can be raised as 
to why such expectation on one side of the collaboration should affect the bilateral 
knowledge sharing. While it is readily obvious that JV boundary spanners’ compliance to the 
expectation of good collaboration may (partly) find expression in superior knowledge sharing 
on their part, this is not so for increased knowledge sharing on the part of the foreign partner’s 
employees. Yet, it is plausible to assume that when JV boundary spanners comply to the good 
cooperation expectation of their superiors, they are perceived as more trustworthy by their 
foreign partner counterparts, who in turn may share more knowledge with the JV employees.  
 We also find strong support for the effect of ‘enforced’ protectiveness on knowledge 
sharing between the boundary spanners. When the boundary spanners are instructed by their 
superiors to limit the amount of knowledge they share with their counterparts, the actual 
extent of sharing is significantly lower. Both the above findings reflect the importance of 
accounting for the fact that operational-level boundary spanners are subject to control by their 
superiors. The expectations and instructions of the latter would affect the boundary spanners’ 
behavior towards their counterpart boundary spanners and the extent of knowledge they are 
willing to share with them.  
Overall, our findings support the view of interorganizational knowledge flows as 
being affected by processes at both the operational and the strategic level of analysis. 
Knowledge sharing between operational boundary spanners is the means by which the 
interorganizational learning actually happens. This ‘spontaneous’ process is a function of the 
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level of trust between the boundary spanners. The managers and top executives, in contrast, 
while not involved in the direct sharing of the knowledge, affect the extent of 
interorganizational knowledge flows through the inter-partner collaborative arrangements 
they put in place and the instructions and expectations they impose on their subordinates in 
the intraorganizational context. 
 
 
5.9. Conclusions and limitations 
 
We have used social learning theory to develop an argument for the effect of 
operational-level trust on interorganizational knowledge sharing. We have posited that the 
level of inter-partner knowledge sharing and the conduciveness of collaborative arrangement 
to this process jointly, positively affect learning between alliance partners. From that 
perspective, operational level trust has a direct effect on the extent of learning between 
organizations, since it affects the sharing of knowledge between operational-level boundary 
spanners involved in the crosscutting communities of practice. Collaborative arrangements, in 
contrast, affect interorganizational learning indirectly through their facilitating effect on 
knowledge sharing. Additionally, we have argued that operational-level trust stems primarily 
from the personal experience that boundary spanners gain through frequent and intense 
interactions within the context of communities of practice, and is reinforced by the 
characteristic-based mechanism of trust production, which hinges on social identity of the 
interacting actors. Accordingly we have identified experience and similarity as the most 
relevant sources of trust at the operational level.  
We have tested 5 hypotheses relating the extent of knowledge sharing between partner 
boundary spanners to the presence of the sources of trust at the operational level as well as 
various elements of collaborative structure, systems and process. We found that trust based on 
commonality of practice is conducive to knowledge sharing. We found no such effect for the 
experience-based trust, which as we argued, might be partly due to methodological reasons. 
As far as the collaborative arrangements are concerned, we found that the choice of a partner 
with a related knowledge base is an important structural determinant of knowledge sharing. 
Also, the frequency of training and number of expatriates delegated to the JV positively affect 
knowledge sharing. Finally, some support was found for procedural justice considerations 
having an impact on the extent of sharing boundary spanners engage in.  
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Our study is marked by a number of limitations. First, in obtaining our data, we were 
able to interview one side of the collaboration only. This is an obvious limitation to the study, 
especially that such elusive aspects of collaboration as trust are considered. Comparing the 
attitudes of the foreign partner organization would have greatly enriched the data and 
strengthened the findings. However, by attempting to gauge the presence of sources of trust in 
the relationship, rather than trust itself, we believe, we have been able to alleviate part of the 
bias inherent in our research design. This is due to the fact that sources of trust can be 
considered to be, to a large extent, symmetrical for the collaborating parties, which would be 
much less so for the subjective perception of trust by one of the collaborating parties.  
Second, a critique can be raised that the conditions, which we consider to be sources 
of trust between operational boundary spanners, may have a direct impact on knowledge 
sharing, independent of their effect on trust. In case of the current experience variable—JV 
duration—the length of the ongoing collaboration could be argued to directly affect learning 
between partners by its influence on knowledge novelty; as the partners collaborate the scope 
for knowledge sharing between them would decrease. On the other hand, duration could also 
have a positive direct effect on knowledge sharing, by allowing the boundary spanners to get 
to know each other, learn to understand each other and develop routines for more efficient 
knowledge sharing. Considering the negative (and unstable) results, it is likely that many 
different effects get conflated in this measure. We conclude that JV duration is a poor proxy 
for any of the effects (trust, knowledge novelty or familiarity).  
Also the similarity of boundary spanners in terms of their educational and professional 
backgrounds, rather than being a source of trust, could be argued to affect knowledge sharing 
directly. We obviously cannot rule out that possibility. Similar boundary spanners might share 
more with each other, as they are likely to find their respective knowledge to be more relevant 
and easier to understand and absorb. In all likelihood, similarity of the boundary spanners 
variable would capture some of this direct effect on learning as well as some indirect, 
mediated by trust. However, by controlling for similarity of primary business activity of the 
partners as well as the alignment of partners’ national and organizational cultures, we believe 
to capture most of the direct effect of knowledge relatedness aspect on knowledge sharing and 
thus to factor (some of) it out of the boundary spanner similarity variable. We find the 
boundary spanner similarity to have a significant effect on knowledge sharing even after 
controlling for all the above effects.  
Additionally, it is worth pointing out that the direct effect of boundary spanner 
similarity on knowledge sharing should not automatically be assumed to be positive. In fact, 
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higher similarity of the boundary spanners could result in higher overlap between their 
knowledge bases and consequently smaller scope for mutual learning. Additionally, belonging 
to the same professional community can make individuals more competitive and unwilling to 
share knowledge to avoid loosing face or to preserve superior expertise. Therefore, we believe 
that we likely capture the positive effect of similarity on perception of others and assumptions 
that are made about their trustworthiness. All the above considerations make us reasonably, 
though cautiously, comfortable with using the boundary spanner similarity variable as a proxy 
for the level of operational-level trust.  
 Fourth, in our analysis we have assumed a unidirectional effect of trust on 
interorganizational knowledge transfer. It is much more realistic, however, to view the effect 
as bi-directional. Also, we have implicitly assumed that more trust always results in a better 
learning outcome. In reality, however, limits to knowledge sharing based on trust are to be 
expected. Elaboration on these issues, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. For a more 
thorough discussion we refer chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
On a practical note, our work identifies the mechanisms through which trust at the 
operational level in an alliance is formed as well as collaborative arrangements that allow for 
the sharing to take place. Thus, it points to ways of stimulating tacit knowledge sharing 
between alliance partners. Yet our argument and finding that more trust between partner 
boundary spanners results in superior tacit knowledge sharing between them should not be 
taken as a normative statement; more tacit knowledge sharing between partners might not 
necessarily be desirable from the point of view of an organization’s performance. Future 
research should endeavor to address the question of what the optimal level of tacit knowledge 





















6.1. Theoretical model and empirical approach: a summary 
 
The overarching aim of this research project was to further our understanding of the 
process of inter-partner learning in the context of strategic alliances and the role that 
interorganizational trust plays therein. To this end, first, a critical review of conceptualizations 
of interorganizational trust and its levels in the extant literature was carried out. This led to the 
elaboration of a new, multi-level conceptualization of interorganizational trust in which the 
trustor is always an individual, while the trustee can be either the partner organization as a 
whole or its individual members. Based on the assumption that trustor’s position in his or her 
own organization matters, trust of the strategic-level organizational actors, i.e., strategic-level 
trust, was distinguished from trust of the operational-level actors, i.e., operational-level trust.   
The above conceptualization of interorganizational trust and its levels was 
subsequently used to develop a model of the role of trust in inter-partner learning. Trust 
between boundary spanners at the top management level is likely to affect interorganizational 
learning differently than trust between operational level boundary spanners. Tacit knowledge 
flows between organizations are accomplished through intimate interactions of their 
operational boundary spanners, whose involvement in knowledge sharing is determined by 
the level of their mutual trust (operational-level trust). At the same time, however, knowledge 
flows between organizations, depend on how much opportunity for the intimate interactions 
the boundary spanners have. These opportunities are determined, in turn, by the collaborative 
arrangements designed by organizational decision makers. The conduciveness of such 
arrangements to formation of interorganizational communities of practice depends on the 
level of trust held by the organizational decision makers (i.e., strategic-level trust).  
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 Interorganizational trust at the two levels was argued to be different not only in its 
effects on interorganizational learning but also in its antecedents. Since assessing trust or 
trustworthiness directly is difficult individuals and organizations use certain indicators to 
assess the presence or absence of trust (Zucker, 1986). Trust can thus be said to stem from 
different sources.  Moreover, different antecedents and sources of trust are likely to be 
relevant for different levels of interorganizational trust (cf. Doney & Cannon, 1997). At the 
operational level interorganizational trust can thus be argued to be based on experience 
acquired in interactions with representatives of the partner in question and similarity of 
occupational identities of the gatekeepers. At the strategic level stakes involved in preserving 
collaboration, institutions providing safeguards, organizational reputation and experience in 
collaboration with the partner can be expected to be the most important sources of trust.  
 The above constitutes a basis for the approach to empirically gauging 
interorganizational trust at the two levels of analysis, as employed in this dissertation. It rests 
on two assumptions. First, since in the proposed conceptualization of interorganizational trust 
the trustor is always an individual, data collection at the level of the individual is also 
adequate. However, if trust at the operational and strategic level were to be tapped separately, 
reliance on a single respondent per company would pose the threat of confounding the two 
effects due to common method bias. Identifying distinct antecedents of trust at each of the two 
levels helps to go around the problem of measuring trust directly. Although several measures 
of the overall level of trust have been developed (e.g., Cummings & Bromiley, 1996; Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995), any direct measurement of trust is bound to 
be strongly subjective, due to interpretational biases of the individuals reporting it. In contrast, 
the presence or absence of conditions that facilitate the development of trust, as well as their 
degree/intensity across alliances can be assessed more objectively than the level of trust per 
se, which is a highly subjective and elusive phenomenon. The second assumption therefore is 
that, if the presence of sources of trust in a relationship rather than trust as such is measured, a 
well-positioned individual actor can be a reliable source of information concerning 
interorganizational trust at both the strategic and operational-level.  
 Additionally, since trust reported by respondents is likely to have various origins, it 
would not be very helpful or informative to determine that an overall high level of trust 
facilitates interorganizational learning, without knowing which factors influence this level. 
This is particularly so since the sources of trust are manipulable while trust, the level of which 
can only be affected indirectly, is not. Therefore, resorting to the analysis of the sources of 
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trust carries the promise of identifying possible means of stimulating the growth of trust and 
thereby indirectly the learning between JV partners.  
 Overall, reliance on the sources of trust appears to be a promising approach for future 
research into multi-level analysis of interorganizational trust in the (very common) situation 
where one respondent per organization is available. This approach guided the formulation of 
hypotheses in this dissertation. Accordingly sources of trust at the operational and strategic 
level were related to knowledge sharing between partner boundary spanners and the 
collaborative arrangements that contribute to the process, respectively. These theoretical 
predictions were subsequently tested on a sample of 149 Polish-foreign joint ventures 
surveyed in the fall of 2002 and spring of 2003.  
 
 
6.2. Discussion of findings 
 
 Our results support the argument that the presence of sources of strategic-level trust 
and operational-level trust between collaborating organizations positively affects learning 
between them. At the strategic level, higher stakes of preserving the collaboration for the JV 
and higher perceived reputation of the foreign partner were found to result in collaborative 
arrangements more conducive to knowledge flows. Also past collaborative experience of the 
partners was found to positively affect the conduciveness of the collaborative arrangements to 
formation of crosscutting communities of practice. Current collaborative experience did not 
have such an effect. At the operational level, the results revealed that the similarity of the 
partner boundary spanners had a strong positive impact on the extent of knowledge sharing 
between them. Neither past not present collaborative experience as measured in the study 
appeared to have such an effect.  
 The effect of past and current experience was assessed at both levels of analysis. The 
difference in the effect of these two variables on collaborative arrangements and on 
knowledge sharing calls for attention. Starting with past experience, while the effect of prior 
ties on knowledge sharing was insignificant, this was not the case for the collaborative 
arrangements, the conduciveness of which to knowledge flows was significantly and 
positively affected by previous collaborations of the partners. This finding seems to be in line 
with our argument that, compared to operational level trust, trust at the level of executive 
managers would be much more strategic in character. It is unlikely that the same persons 
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would act as boundary spanners in subsequent collaborations; therefore repeated 
interorganizational ties should not be expected to result in either higher trust at the operational 
level or superior knowledge sharing between persons currently serving as boundary spanners.  
The situation is very different at the strategic level; decision makers who shape the 
collaborative arrangements and whose trust is based on strategic considerations are likely to 
take the outcome of prior collaborations into account, even if they were not at the time 
personally involved in the decision processes. Prior collaborative experiences of the two 
organizations would likely find reflection in how the current collaboration is managed; they 
could be said to be preserved in the ‘institutionalized memory’ of the organization. Thus, 
while trust of the top decision makers and the resultant collaborative arrangements would 
likely be affected by the record of prior experiences between organizations, that would not be 
the case for the trust of the lower level managers and the extent of knowledge sharing taking 
place between them.   
The effect of current collaborative experience was proxied with the duration of the 
present collaboration. Its effect on collaborative arrangements and knowledge sharing was in 
both cases insignificant; however, the signs of the corresponding coefficients were different. 
In case of collaborative arrangements, the effect was neutral. The coefficients were virtually 
equal to zero and their sign oscillated between positive and negative. In case of knowledge 
sharing, the corresponding coefficients consistently took on negative values (in a few models 
even reached significance). Similarly as was the case with past experience, these findings 
seem to support our argument for trust of executive level employees being more strategic in 
nature than that of operational employees.  
The experience accumulated in the current collaboration would likely have no affect 
on the trust of executive managers since this trust is determined by strategic considerations 
that are unlikely to change in the duration of a given alliance. Also, assuming JV duration has 
a direct effect on knowledge sharing, i.e., not mediated by trust (compare with Chapter 4) it is 
unlikely that collaborative arrangements would become less conducive to knowledge sharing 
once the novelty of knowledge decreases. At the level of operational employees, however, the 
non-neutral (i.e., negative) effect of current JV duration points to the social nature of the 
processes taking place at the operational level. The negative coefficient indicates that our 
variable captured the direct effect of alliance duration on learning (rather than the indirect, 
mediated by trust) as over time the novelty of knowledge and consequently the scope for 
learning could be expected to decrease. 
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Besides the decreasing novelty of knowledge, there are other possible, more empirical 
explanations of the observed negative effect of JV duration on knowledge sharing. First, the 
effect might be specific for the transition economy from which the JV’s have been sampled. 
Collaborations undertaken in the periods directly following the transformation can be 
expected to be different from those that were formed more recently. While the early JV’s 
might have served the purpose of gaining a foothold in the market, the more recent ones might 
be orientated more towards knowledge transfers between the partners. Second, a possible 
survivor bias might be present in the sample. If some JV’s had been formed for the purpose of 
learning, the ones that did meet these goals might have dissolved sooner than those which did 
not have such objective or did not meet it.  
There is yet another variable, the effect of which was evaluated at both levels. This 
was governance structure. At the operational level the governance structure of the JV was 
found to have no effect on how much knowledge operational boundary spanners share with 
each other. At the strategic level, in contrast, separate entity JVs were found to have 
collaborative arrangements less conducive to inter-partner learning. We suggested that this 
might indicate that from the strategy point of view, the risk of transferring knowledge to an 
independent entity would likely be higher compared to a minority share alliance. This would 
hold at least for the Polish partner. The interpretation of this result notwithstanding, the two 
findings seem to support our argument that the sharing of knowledge between partner 
boundary spanners is a process different in nature from the collaborative arrangements 
designed and implemented by the organizational decision makers. Accordingly, the 
governance structure would not affect how much knowledge the employees are inclined to 
share with each other, but it would affect how much knowledge flows the organizational 
decision makers are willing to authorize by way of collaborative arrangements.  
 Finally, the lack of a significant effect of the JV ownership structure on the extent of 
boundary spanner knowledge sharing deserves a few additional words of comment. Results in 
Chapter 4 revealed that, contrary to the expectation, the share of the joint venture held by the 
foreign partner does not significantly affect how much knowledge is shared. This finding can 
be explained in the same way as the lack of effect of governance structure on knowledge 
sharing (see above). However, lack of such effect may also be due to the empirical context in 
which the hypotheses have been tested. Steensma & Lyles (2000) argue that in a transitional 
economy the deep-rooted attitudes towards ownership are likely to affect the dynamics 
between the local and the foreign partner. In particular, local managers may not associate the 
level of foreign partner ownership with the power to influence international JV operations 
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(Steensma & Lyles, 2000). Steensma & Lyles (2000) found that in contrast to management 
control imbalance, an inequality in equity holdings did not contribute to inter-partner conflict 
or to IJV failure. What this implies is that local partner respondents, who are the source of the 
data in this dissertation, may possibly underestimate the effect that ownership structure (i.e., 
share held by a foreign partner) can have on the JV processes, knowledge transfers in specific. 
That would indicate that our findings in this respect might be specific to an economy in 
transition, and possibly not generalizable to other contexts. This issue should be subject to 
further investigation by future research. 
In light of the above, investigation of how the differences between the transitional 
economy partners and their Western counterparts contribute to the difficulty of transferring 
knowledge appears to be a fruitful venue for future research. Transferring knowledge is 
always a challenging task (Szulanski, 1996), but even more so in a transitional economy 
context (Lane, Salk, & Lyles, 2001).  Part of the challenge stems from the fact that partners of 
different national origins are likely to learn to trust in a different manner (Doney, Cannon, and 
Mullen, 1998).  That would imply that trust formation process in a context of any given 
international JV would depend on the nationalities of the partners involved (Parkhe, 1998a,b). 
Another part of the challenge, however, would likely be specific to collaboration with a 
transitional economy partner, whose attitudes (to control, for example) have been shaped by 
the communist regimes (Steensma & Lyles, 2000). 
Based on our results the overall conclusion can be drawn that interorganizational 
learning in the context of strategic alliances is a combination of strategic and social processes 
and therefore, factors affecting both need to be considered. The positive effects of calculation, 
reputation and prior ties on the conduciveness of collaborative arrangements to knowledge 
sharing between partners point to the importance of calculative considerations in trust 
formation at the strategic level. The positive effect of boundary spanner similarity and 
negative (albeit insignificant) effect of JV duration on knowledge sharing indicate that more 
relational aspects of collaboration are of importance in stimulating knowledge sharing at the 
operational level. This leads us to the conclusion that both self-interested as well as the less 
calculative aspects of trust are at play in assuring knowledge flows between collaborating 
organizations. What this implies is that quality of the relationship as much as appropriate 
incentive structure of the collaboration are pivotal for achieving knowledge transfer in an 
alliance context. While incentive alignment can help assure that it is in the partners’ best 
interest to act in a trustworthy manner, it cannot be assumed to persist indefinitely; 
misalignment can result from exogenous shifts (cf. Arino & De la Torre, 1998) as well as 
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from evolving partner capabilities and their strategic choices (Parkhe, 1998b). This is what 
makes the positive relational aspects of collaboration so crucial—they can be considered to be 
much more robust in the collaboration.  
 The limitations of this research have been mentioned in the subsequent chapters of the 
dissertation. The primary ones include the one-sided evaluation of the level of trust in the 
collaborative relationship, and the impossibility to tap the effect of institutional trust, due to 
all sample observations being based in one institutional environment. Future research should 
therefore endeavor to replicate our results with respect to the positive impact of trust at two 
different levels in interorganizational relationship on inter-partner trust with two-sided data on 
































(Summary in Dutch) 
Het concurrentievoordeel van een organisatie vindt zijn oorsprong in de idiosyncratische 
hulpbronnen die de organisatie bezit (Barney, 1991). Om dit voordeel te behouden is het 
noodzakelijk dat voortdurend nieuwe hulpbronnen worden verworven en dat bestaande 
hulpbronnen verder ontwikkeld worden (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Voor organisaties die niet in 
staat zijn om zelfstandig alle benodigde hulpbronnen te ontwikkelen of te verwerven is 
samenwerking vaak de enige manier om te overleven en te groeien (Dussauge, Garrette & 
Mitchel, 2000). Echter, belangrijke hulpbronnen zijn vaak verbonden aan diep in de 
organisatie verankerde impliciete kennis, die sterk intuïtief en niet-gearticuleerd is, en 
bijgevolg moeilijk transfereerbaar (Martin & Salomon, 2003; Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 
2000; Polanyi, 1962). Strategische allianties worden beschouwd als een bij uitstek geschikte 
context voor organisaties om toegang te verkrijgen tot dit soort hulpbronnen (Hall, 1992; 
Inkpen, 1997; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Het begrijpen van de processen van 
impliciete kennisoverdracht tussen organisaties en de factoren die deze beïnvloeden vormt de 
kern van deze dissertatie. 
Het delen van kennis brengt aanzienlijke risico’s voor de samenwerkende organisaties 
met zich mee: risico van kennisonteigening, het “weglekken” van kennis, of het maken van 
hoge kosten voor de overdracht van kennis die vervolgens niet voldoet aan de verwachtingen. 
Gezien deze risico’s wordt verondersteld dat de mate van vertrouwen tussen de partners een 
belangrijke factor is die de onderlinge kennisstromen beïnvloedt. Vertrouwen verkleint de 
angst van partners voor opportunistisch gedrag (Kale et al., 2000; Dyer & Chu, 2003), en 
verhoogt aldus de bereidheid tot het verschaffen van toegang tot kennis (Dirks & Ferrin, 
2001; Kale et al., 2000). De betrouwbaarheid van de partner kan door de ontvanger van 
kennis tevens dienen als een indicatie voor de kwaliteit van de kennis, waardoor het minder 
noodzakelijk wordt om de waarde van de kennis te verifiëren (Bhatt, 2000).  
Naast het verschaffen van een context waarin partners toegang tot elkaars kennis 
kunnen verkrijgen bieden strategische allianties ook gelegenheid voor het gezamenlijk verder 
ontwikkelen van deskundigheid (Powell et al., 1996). De theorie van sociaal leren (‘social 
learning theory’) concipiëert leren  als een geheel van sociale activiteiten, en richt daarmee de 
aandacht op de interactie tussen individuen, zoals de medewerkers van twee bij een 
strategische alliantie betrokken organisaties (Plaskoff, 2003; Elkjaer, 1999, 2003). Sociaal 
leren is beladen met risico’s, zoals het moeten toegeven van fouten, het moeten inroepen van 
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hulp (Edmondson, 1999). Sociaal leren kan ook het zelfbeeld van individuen in het geding 
brengen (Brown & Starkey, 2000), en de macht van een persoon ondermijnen voorzover deze 
gebaseerd is op kennis (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Szulanski, 1996). Vertrouwen tussen 
partijen bevordert dat zij zich open stellen voor elkaars invloed, omdat het enerzijds 
gemakkelijker wordt om de behoefte om te leren toe te geven, en anderzijds het delen van 
kennis als minder bedreigend wordt ervaren. 
Tegen deze achtergrond kan vertrouwen tussen partners als een belangrijke variabele 
voor kennisoverdracht tussen organisaties worden aanzien. Onderzoek heeft uitgewezen dat 
vertrouwen een positieve invloed heeft op het delen van kennis (McEvilly, Perrone, & Zaheer, 
2003), zowel binnen organisaties (zie bijvoorbeeld Kostova, 1999; Makino & Inkpen, 2003; 
Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998) als tussen organisaties (Geringer, 1988; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Inkpen, 
1997; Hedlund, 1994). Het is echter niet duidelijk hoe vertrouwen het beste 
geconceptualiseerd en in empirisch onderzoek gemeten kan worden.  In de literatuur is een 
enorme variëteit aan theoretische en empirische benaderingen van vertrouwen tussen 
organisaties te vinden. Een belangrijk aspect hierbij wordt gevormd door de verschillende 
niveau’s van aggregatie waarop het begrip “vertrouwen” onderscheiden kan worden, dat van 
de organisatie als geheel, en dat van de individuele medewerkers van organisaties.  
Hoofdstuk Twee van deze dissertatie bevat een kritisch overzicht van het onderzoek 
op dit gebied. De sterke en zwakke punten van de verschillende wijzen waarop in de 
bestaande literatuur  inter-organisationeel vertrouwen wordt geconceptualiseerd worden 
besproken, en een alternatieve manier om inter-organisationeel vertrouwen op verschillende 
aggregatieniveau’s te definiëren wordt voorgesteld. In deze conceptualisering nemen de 
verschillende rollen die actoren spelen binnen de betrokken organisaties  een belangrijke 
plaats in. In dit hoofdstuk wordt ook ingegaan op incongruenties tussen de theoretisch te 
onderscheiden niveau’s van vertrouwen en de wijze waarop dit construct wordt gemeten  in 
een aantal empirische studies. Hoewel terecht gewezen kan worden op het probleem van de 
beperkte beschikbaarheid van data, blijken deze onvolkomenheden ook samen te hangen met 
de wijze waarop het begrip vertrouwen in deze studies wordt geconceptualiseerd. De in het 
hoofdstuk voorgestelde alternatieve conceptualisering kan hier uitkomst bieden. 
Hoofdstuk Drie ontwikkelt een theoretisch model omtrent de invloed van vertrouwen 
tussen organisaties op de kennisoverdracht tussen deze organisaties. Een alternatieve 
conceptualisering van vertrouwen tussen organisaties wordt voorgesteld, berustend op de 
assumptie dat verschillende groepen van actoren binnen de betrokken organisaties van elkaar 
onderscheiden moeten worden. Het topmanagement, dat de strategische intenties van een 
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organisatie in de samenwerking met een andere organisatie moet vormgeven, moet 
onderscheiden worden van de actoren die deze intenties moeten implementeren op het 
operationele niveau (Salk & Simonin, 2003). Vertrouwen tussen ‘boundary spanners’ op top 
management niveau zal naar verwachting het leerproces tussen organisaties op een andere 
manier beïnvloeden dan vertrouwen tussen individuen op het operationele niveau. Op het 
operationele niveau zal vertrouwen tussen vertegenwoordigers van de beide organisaties 
leiden tot het delen van impliciete kennis, terwijl vertrouwen tussen top managers van beide 
organisaties op het strategische niveau de randvoorwaarden bepalen die dit delen van kennis 
al dan niet faciliteren. Tot slot stelt Hoofdstuk Drie dat vertrouwen op deze twee 
onderscheiden niveau’s niet alleen verschilt in zijn effecten, maar ook op uiteenlopende 
wijzen wordt ontwikkeld. Het hoofdstuk identificeert  de verschillende mechanismen die aan 
de basis liggen van de ontwikkeling van vertrouwen op beide niveau’s. Hoewel de bestaande 
literatuur omtrent vertrouwen en inter-organisationeel leren de verschillende bronnen die aan 
de basis liggen van vertrouwen tussen partners erkent en bestudeert, wordt het feit genegeerd 
dat sommige bronnen belangrijker kunnen zijn voor de ontwikkeling van vertrouwen op het 
ene niveau, en andere bronnen voor de ontwikkeling van vertrouwen op het andere niveau.  
In hoofdstukken Vier en Vijf worden de voorspellingen van hoofdstuk Drie empirisch 
getoetst. Hoofdstuk Vier richt zich op het strategisch niveau en onderzoekt de invloed van 
drie bronnen van vertrouwen die op dit niveau van speciaal belang geacht worden te zijn 
(berekening, reputatie, en ervaring) op mate waarin samenwerkingsovereenkomsten leiden tot 
kennisoverdracht tussen partners. Vertrouwen gebaseerd op berekening (calculation-based 
trust) en vertrouwen dat gebaseerd is op reputatie hebben een positieve invloed op 
kennisoverdracht. Vertrouwen dat gebaseerd is op voorafgaande samenwerkingservaring is 
eveneens van invloed. Vertrouwen gebaseerd op ervaring binnen de bestaande samenwerking 
heeft echter geen effect. 
Hoofdstuk Vijf richt zich op het operationele niveau, dat wil zeggen het niveau 
waarop individuele contactpersonen (boundary spanners) van beide organisaties interacteren. 
Het hoofdstuk analyseert de invloed op de mate van kennisoverdracht tussen deze actoren van 
de twee op dit niveau meest relevant geachte bronnen van vertrouwen: persoonlijk 
gelijkenissen tussen de contactpersonen, en de ervaringen die de contactpersonen hebben 
opgedaan in hun onderlinge interactie. Vertrouwen gebaseerd op persoonlijke gelijkenissen 
tussen individuen heeft een positief effect op het delen van kennis, terwijl vertrouwen 
gebaseerd op ervaringen met elkaar dit niet heeft. Aangezien bij een gegeven mate van 
operationeel vertrouwen de kennisoverdracht tussen partners bepaald wordt door de wijze 
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waarop de samenwerking is vormgegeven, toetst dit hoofdstuk eveneens de invloed van de 
vormgeving van de samenwerking in structuren, systemen en processen op de kennisdeling 
tussen contactpersonen. De bevindingen zijn dat verschillende elementen van de vormgeving 
van de samenwerking een positieve invloed hebben op kennisdeling tussen de 
contactpersonen van de partnerbedrijven. 
De empirisch analyse van deze dissertatie werd uitgevoerd op een steekproef van 149 
joint ventures tussen Poolse en buitenlandse ondernemingen. Zowel de 
transactiekostentheorie (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Kogut, 1988; Mowery, Oxley & Silverman, 1996) 
als de ‘resource-based view’ (Mowery et al., 1996) stelt dat, in vergelijking met contractuele 
samenwerkingsovereenkomsten, joint ventures met aandeelhouderschap betere mogelijkheden 
bieden voor de overdracht van impliciete kennis. Dit type van samenwerkingsverband tussen 
bedrijven vormt bijgevolg een geschikte context voor het testen van de invloed van 
vertrouwen tussen partners op overdracht van  impliciete kennis. 
Een groot deel van het bestaande onderzoek naar leren tussen partners in strategische 
allianties is uitgevoerd in de context van ontwikkelde markteconomieën. Men kan echter 
significante contextuele verschillen verwachten tussen een economie in transitie (zoals Polen) 
en een volgroeide markteconomie (Steensma & Lyles, 2000). Het gebrek aan onderzoek naar 
leren tussen organisaties in de context van transitie-economieën is problematisch, aangezien 
kennisoverdracht, en vooral de overdracht van impliciete kennis, van groot belang is voor 
deze economieën. Voor vele organisaties in transitie-economieën vormen buitenlandse 
partners rijke bronnen voor nieuwe kennis en capaciteiten (Steensma & Lyles, 2000) en 
samenwerking met hen is een potentiëel effectieve leerstrategie  (Child & Markoczy, 1993; 
Markoczy, 1993). Tegelijkertijd kan samenwerking met een locale partner voor vele Westerse 
bedrijven die uitbreiden naar Oost Europa of andere transitie-economieën een efficiënte 
manier zijn om locale kennis te verkrijgen (Steensma & Lyles, 2000). Tegen deze achtergrond 
is Polen als voorbeeld van een economie in transitie een bij uitstek geschikte context voor het 
bestuderen van kennisoverdracht tussen alliantiepartners.  
Traditioneel werd in Oosteuropese landen in onderwijs en training prioriteit gegeven 
aan techniek, terwijl disciplines als marketing en management verwaarloosd werden 
(Steensma & Lyles, 2000). Men kan bijgevolg verwachten dat er op het vlak van management 
een grote kenniskloof tussen de buitenlandse en de lokale partner zal zijn (Steensma & Lyles, 
2000). Shenkar & Li (1999) stellen dat in vergelijking met kennis op vlak van de productie en 
het productieproces, management vaardigheden sterk impliciet en sociaal ingebed zijn, terwijl 
technologische kennis en kennis omtrent produktontwikkeling en marketing tussen beide 
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liggen (Lane, Salk & Lyles, 2001). Vandaar dat in het leren tussen een partner uit een 
transitie-economie en een partner uit een volgroeide markteconomie impliciete kennis een 
belangrijke plaats zal (moeten) innemen. 
Naast de theoretische bijdrage zoals deze hierboven is uiteengezet heeft deze 
dissertatie ook praktische implicaties. De mate van vertrouwen tussen partners in een alliantie 
is niet een exogeen gegeven maar kan door acties van leidinggevenden worden beïnvloed (cf. 
Parkhe, 1998a,b). Deze dissertatie geeft een indruk van de bronnen van vertrouwen die een 
belangrijke rol spelen bij de inter-organisationele leerprocessen binnen strategische allianties. 
Op dit moment is onze kennis van de wijze waarop bedrijven vertrouwensrelaties kunnen 
opbouwen en instandhouden nog beperkt, vooral in de context van internationale joint 
ventures (cf. Inkpen and Currall, 1997). Het in deze dissertatie gegenereerde inzicht in de 
verschillen tussen de bronnen en effecten van vertrouwen op de twee onderscheiden niveau’s, 
het topmanagement en het operationele niveau van samenwerking, vormt een eerste 
uitgangspunt voor het ontwikkelen van samenwerkingsstrategieën die tot betere 
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Learning (composite variable) 
1: Have you in the course of collaboration, acquired knowledge from the foreign partner in 
the area of: 
• production / service technology 
• firm management 
• information and computer technology 
• human resource management 
• customer service 
• business negotiations 
• market knowledge 
• marketing 
• financial and tax management 
 
Scale: “1-yes” --- “0- no” (max=9, min=0) 
2: On average how much did you learn from the foreign partner in the above areas? 
 
Scale: “1-nothing” --- “7-a lot” 
3: Has the collaboration with the foreign partner result in improvements in the JV in the area 
of: 
• Computerization 
• Product quality 
• Marketing 
• Human resource management 
• Top management 
• Financial performance or market share 
• The way of conducting business 
 
Scale: “1-yes” --- “0- no” (max=7, min=0) 
4: What was the scope of the above improvements (on average)? 
 
Scale: “1-very little” --- “7- very large” 
5: What we have learned from the foreign partner helped us improve the efficiency of the 
JV’s functioning.  
 
Scale:  “1-strongly disagree” -- “7-strongly agree” 
6: What we have learned from the foreign partner we use in projects developed independently 
by the JV.  
 
Scale:  “1-strongly disagree” -- “7-strongly agree” 
Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.8328 
 
                                                
28Prior to averaging the scores on the items (to form the composite variable), sum of the positive answers on items 1 










Calculation (composite variable) 
1: If the collaboration were to end in conflict, it would have a negative impact on our 
 reputation. 
 
Scale: “1-strongly disagree” --- “7- strongly agree” 
2. The success of our firm depends on the continued collaboration with the foreign 
 partner.  
 
Scale: “1-strongly disagree” --- “7- strongly agree” 
3. The foreign partner’s withdrawal from the collaboration would cause you:   
 
Scale: “1- great loss” --- “7-great gain” (reverse coded) 
Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.82 
Reputation (composite variable) 
1: How much research concerning the foreign partner did you engage in prior to entering the 
collaboration (market intelligence etc.)? 
 
Scale: “1-none” --- “7-a lot” 
2: To what extent did the reputation of the foreign partner influence your decision to engage in 
the collaboration?  
 
Scale: “1-not at all” --- “7-very much” 
Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.72 
Experience variables (single items) 
1: What year was the JV formed? (Current experience) 
 
(recoded into a duration variable with the reference point of year 2002) 
2: Have you collaborated with the foreign partner in any form in the past? (Past experience) 
 
Scale: “1 – yes”, “0 – no” 
Sharing (composite variable) 
1: To what extent are the foreign partners employees willing to share their professional 
 knowledge with the JV employees? 
 
Scale: “1 – not at all”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “5”, “6”, “7 – very much” 
2: To what extent are the JV employees willing to share their professional knowledge 
 with their foreign counterparts? 
 
Scale: “1 – not at all”, “2”, “3”, “4”, “5”, “6”, “7 – very much” 









Boundary spanner (BRP) similarity (composite variable) 
1. Our employees and their foreign counterparts have similar educational backgrounds.  
 
Scale: “1-strongly disagree” --- “7- strongly agree” 
2. Our employees and their foreign counterparts have similar professional experience.  
 
Scale: “1-strongly disagree” --- “7- strongly agree” 
Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.77 
System variables (single items) 
1. In the course of one year, how often do JV employees on average participate in training 
sessions organized by the foreign partner in Poland or at its headquarters? (Training) 
 
Scale: ”0”,“1-2”,“3-5”,“6-9”,“10-14”,“15-20”,“more”(recoded into a 7-point scale) 
2. On average how many foreign partner representatives are permanently working in the JV and 
living in Poland? (Expatriates) 
 
Scale: “0”, “1-2”, “3-5”, “6-9”, “10-14”, “15-20”, “more” (recoded into a 7-point scale) 
Structure variables (single items) 
1: What is the degree of similarity between the JV and the foreign partner in terms of the primary 
business activity? (Business similarity) 
 
Scale: “1- very small” --- “7-very large”  
2: Kogut & Singh (1988) cultural distance index (Cultural similarity) 
 
 
3: Was the JV formed by way of a separate entity creation or a minority share acquisition? 
(Governance structure) 
 
Scale: “1 – separate entity”, “0 – minority share” 
4: What is the equity share held by the foreign partner in the JV? (Foreign partner share) 
 
Scale: “0-19.9%”, “20-39.9%”, “40-59.9”, “60-79.9%, “80-100%” (recoded into a 5-point 
scale) 
Process variables (single items) 
1. Both sides have an adequate saying in the decisions concerning the JV. (Procedural justice) 
 
Scale: “1-strongly disagree” --- “7- strongly agree” 
2. The foreign partner’s way of doing business is similar to ours (Practices alignment) 
 









Control variables (single items) 
1: Our goals and those of the foreign partner often collide. (Goal structuring) 
 
Scale: “1-strongly disagree” --- “7- strongly agree” (reverse coded) 
2: How often do the employees responsible for contacting the foreign partner change? 
(Turnover) 
 
Scale: “1-very rarely” --- “7-very frequently” (logarithmically transformed) 
3. Was the JV formed by way of separate entity creation or a minority share acquisition? 
(Governance structure) 
 
Scale: “1 – separate entity”, “0 – minority share” 
4: As an employer, we expect of our employees the ability to cooperate well with the foreign 
partner counterparts (Good cooperation required) 
 
Scale: “1-strongly disagree” --- “7- strongly agree” 
5: Have you instructed your employees to restrict the amount of information they  
   share with their foreign counterparts? (reverse coded) (Protectiveness) 
 
Scale: “1 – yes”, “0 – no” 
